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
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Law of Struggle

Hyman Segal



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THE LAW OF STRUGGLE

By
HYMAN SEGAL

Author of
"The Book of Pain-Struggle"
etc.



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Foreword

ON THE WAR AND THE BOOK

WE HAVE promised ourselves that this War is to be the last. Still, how do we know? We did not seek it, yet it came. We are in the grip of momentous currents, we know not how. Evidently, we still do not know the laws by which we live. Tho we have stored up great accumulations of miscellaneous, unrelated, unassimilated facts concerning ourselves, these accumulations have only served to make confusion worse confounded. And yet, the great problems with which the world is wrestling so bloodily to-day are compounded of the measure and quality of our self-knowledge. We still do not know our place in the scheme of things; and the blows of the Germans resounding against the gates of Paris, beat also upon the faith in the hearts of men.

If the Great War, which has descended upon us like a visitation from another world, is not really native to our true nature as human beings, why does it have such a hold upon us? Whence does it derive its power to stretch forth its gruesome hand and drag us, open-eyed, protesting, horror-stricken, into its dread vortex? Why are we finally fascinated by it and go exulting into the fray?

To accuse the world of inconsistency and hypocrisy provides us with no explanation. Beneath every cover of duplicity is concealed some earnestness of purpose. What is it? What is the blundering purpose of the world?

Some years ago—in the year 1911, to be precise—I wrote a book* in which I attempted to set forth this riddle and its answer. The whole problem seemed to me then—as it does now, in the fourth year of the Great War—to be embodied in the correct understanding of pain and struggle

*The Book of Pain-Struggle

and their true avenues of expression; the whole solution, in the frank recognition of pain as of the very stuff of life and the way in which it must normally react in struggle. Perhaps if the subject had been given a tithe of the study devoted to armaments and tactics, the world would not today be peering so anxiously out of the bloody abyss in which finds it itself.

I might have been willing to wait a while longer before attempting, with my poor powers, to touch upon this great theme again, but this cataclysmic War which, please God, we shall win, impels me to speak once more at this time.

Is this War of us or of another? Is it inherent in our life or not? If it is, why do we not adjust our life and our sense of values to it? If not, how comes this eruption in our midst and what can we do to avoid its repetition? In short, what has been wrong with our thinking, what is wanting in our self-knowledge?

It behooves us to give these questions our serious attention.

HYMAN SEGAL

New York, May, 1918.

The Law of Struggle

THE LAW OF STRUGGLE

CHAPTER I.

THE WILL TO STRUGGLE

1. Pain-and-Struggle.

THE scientist in his demonstrations relies not alone upon his statistical charts, but upon a knowledge of life in his readers by which his proofs must ultimately be tested. The statistics of pain and struggle in particular have first of all to be perceived by the inner eye, and only then tested and checked formally. If we have the eye to see it, the necessary data is unescapable wherever we turn, whether we view life as a whole or examine it in small sections under the microscope.

The essential thing in order to grasp the subject is to know pain when we confront it, even tho we have been wont to recognize it only in tooth-aches and ailments generally which are only acute instances of disproportion between pain and struggle. Our view of pain must become more comprehensive, and we must recognize struggle even when not accompanied by the startling signs of physical strife. Physical conflict has always been held out to us as almost the synonym of struggle. And yet, even in this class of struggle, it is not necessarily the most clamorous and ferocious antagonist who is the most redoubtable. So, too, we are accustomed to think of the lion, the tiger, the bandit and the burglar as very formidable fighters indeed but, as a matter of fact, they are very feeble strugglers and have long been out-classed; so much so, in fact, that they hardly enter into our calculations to-day.

On the other hand, there are a great many far-reaching struggles in nature that seldom arrest our attention. Who,

for example, stops to think of the battle-royal that goes on between the insect and the plant, the ants and their prey, the innumerable little invaders, such as the nits that settle upon the eye-balls of the African buffalo or the combats which go on in our own blood? Who stops to take stock of the fact that the basis of our daily existence, our goings and our comings, our conversations and dealings, is founded upon pains or yearnings innumerable fulfilling themselves thru the years, in their ordered ways, in barely discernable little struggles? So, for instance, hunger is a form of pain, eating the struggle therefrom; anger is pain, the act of punishment, struggle; fear, anxiety, ambition, desire or yearning of whatever kind are all forms of pain. The act by which these are allayed or satisfied represents the struggle therefrom. These things occur and recur all the time. Let a man seat himself comfortably in his chair, let him try to lie down, let him walk, let him win the scholarship that he coveted, the fortune or wife of his dreams, yet the surges of pain will reach his highest accomplishment and beget new desires which crave fulfillment or struggle.

Take any little pastel from life—take this one that anyone may see enacted through his window at one time or another:—

Two dogs, one a black, wooly-haired mongrel, the other a black-and-tan, are fighting in the street, snarling and biting each other with eager, panting barks. Passers-by pause to watch them; a minister of peaceful mien slows up in his gait somewhat and gazes at them with an amused interest difficult to suppress; the little boys shout with glee; and a grinning policeman approaches the fighting pair with slow, restrained steps, hoping to see a decision before the dogs can be separated.

Finally, the little black-and-tan dog gives a piteous yelp, and, shaking himself free, skulks away with the crestfallen, disgraced air discernible more or less, in all that experience defeat; with the black dog in triumphant pursuit.

The little crowd comes to itself again, as it were, the business man hastening to resume the daily struggles of his class, the minister to assail the devil and the problems of his

parish, the policeman to continue his vigil, and the little boys, the adventures of the day.

The foregoing is simply one of the innumerable trifling but obvious little incidents of a day illuminating the life-interest of sentient beings, the rule of struggle in life. But there are less obvious examples pointing in the same direction.

For example, who has not paused involuntarily at one time or another to watch a man in the pursuit of a fast-going street-car? We are transfixed, as it were, until we see the eager runner actually aboard the vehicle, when our interest in him ceases. So, too, tho we may consider a prize-fight ever so brutal, if it is brought to our attention, it cannot fail to interest us.

But I will not cite instances. There are too many. Our little life is rounded with pain-and-struggle. When we are lacking in more concrete evidences of this fact, we are reminded by those mysterious visitations of vague longings and depressions that haunt even the most cheerful of us all thru life.

The statistics of struggle are everywhere. There are no exceptions. Moreover, life is so constituted that we must needs suffer if every pain or suggestion of pain is not duly fulfilled. The one horror of human existence is the yearning which is not satisfied, the uplifted hammer which does not descend, the ambition disappointed, the plan which does not work out, the promise not kept, the musical bar which does not fulfill itself, the effort which does not succeed; in fact, all unfulfilled effort, thwarted yearnings crying for struggle, are, in varying degrees, the most pitiable and the most important things in the world.

I shall perhaps be told, "Pooh, you are placing too much emphasis upon one aspect of life. All things are relative only."

Things are indeed relative, but, as I shall try to show in these pages, this relativity only has reference to relative degrees of the same thing—degrees of pain and struggle. To unravel the complicated filaments of our relations to these fundamental causes is no easy thing and one may not be uniformly successful in the undertaking. But I shall rejoice—for a while—if I succeed at least in arousing an interest in

and a study of this old-new theme which has received so little of the consideration of mankind, and which mankind can so little afford not to consider, as this great War shows. Such interest and study, I am convinced, will aid in revealing our natural relations to the great world-issues of the day, in distinguishing between necessary and unnecessary forms of struggle, and in thus clearing the way for further struggle.

2. Pain or Sensitiveness.

“In the beginning” there was pain or sensitiveness. Sensitiveness is the oldest thing in the world. It was born in infinity and is without end. It is not computable and cannot be measured in time nor space. It is without dimension and is imponderable. In fact, time, space, dimension have no existence apart from sensitiveness and are mere incidents of it. It is the most universal of all attributes and is the most mysterious. It appears to be perceptible by all the five senses and by none. It has no substance and yet, it is the very stuff of life out of which all things are fashioned and in which all things have their being. Our mind cannot grasp its mystery, its origin, scope and purport. Yet, it is with us all the time. The cool contact of the evening breeze, the grateful taste of water when we are even slightly thirsty, the refreshment that is in rest and change, all these give us but a hint of the yoke of pain or sensitiveness under which we continuously strive.

In the past, philosophers seem to have overlooked the eternal quality in pain or sensitiveness. This followed naturally from the fact that every thinker started out with the intention of providing the world with the cure-all for unhappiness. The elimination of pain was therefore a first consideration and the *raison detre* of their systems of thought. To confess inability to whisk pain out of life would have been tantamount to a confession of failure and the uselessness of their lucubrations. Pain has therefore always been considered an intruder for whom no place had been provided, a vagrant, troublesome visitation, to be extracted like a sore tooth from the body of life; at best, a transient evil to be eradicated as often as it comes and having but an adventitious hold upon us.

In our time, when the pain of the world stands in stupendous relief, we are advised by the votaries of Christian Science that pain can be thought out of existence, somewhat like the belief of certain Hindu sects; while our more materialistic contemporaries, the Socialists and Utilitarians, incline strongly to the view that pain can be eliminated through the socialization of the state, civic reform, sanitation and the like.

Yet, the evidence presented by all phenomena of life seems to be overwhelming that pain is of the very stuff of life, that it transcends the boundaries of life, and is present in the beast as well as in what we call inanimate matter. Our normal condition is the state of pain from which we are ever struggling. This we realize most completely either when we are overtaken by calamity (which paralyzes our will to struggle for the time) or when the pain is concentrated from some cause in a portion of our body or mind. As long, however, as the proportion of innumerable little struggles from these pain-sensations continue, we are fain to believe that we enjoy what is called "happiness." And the scale on which these pain-combats are carried on are for the most part so fine that we are hardly aware of them. Who, for instance, notices the relief one experiences in breathing, or in easing one's position in a chair by the crossing or uncrossing of a leg, or is conscious of the satisfaction of giving utterance to thoughts or feelings which surge for expression? Indeed, we only realize it when, as I have said, it becomes extreme or when by an effort of the mind we take cognizance of it in some one direction or "localize" the sensation, as it has been termed; as for instance, when one listens to the vibrations of the atmosphere in his ear-drums or is able, by dispelling all other sensations, to "induce" the feeling of a sensation, say, in his toe.

Thus, too, all the senses are degrees of sensitiveness or the faculty of feeling pain. Tasting, smelling, feeling (touch), and hearing are degrees of sensitiveness. Seeing, too, is only a sensation of objects sensed through the organ called the eye. It is one of the most delicate of the five, but none the less, a sensation. The sixth and rarest of all is the sense of mental perception, the understanding. For the mind, too, is one of

the sensitive acids with which man is endowed to perceive rarer substances.

When we understand, then, that we are normally in a state of pain and that man's function is struggle or the getting away from pain, the inference becomes inevitable that all life is the fulfillment of pain in struggle; and that the basic law of life is the will to struggle. We shall see how this definition accords with universal phenomena.

3. Pain in the Inanimate.

There is a common impression in the world that things inanimate, i. e., things that do not seem to have the sentient characteristics of living creatures, are devoid of all feeling.

I do not share this view. I am sure it is all a question of degree. Our own reason should teach us to suspect, even if our sensitiveness does not, that things about us are also sensitive in the same general way, although the evidences thereof do not have that recognizable quality to us as human beings.

Still, if a flower will wilt after being picked, what reason have we for believing that it does not in some flower-conscious way feel itself dying? Why should not the hoarse shriek of metal under the belaborment of grinding machinery be indicative of some degree of sensitiveness, even though so low as to be imperceptible to us? What reason have we for believing that the log of wood burning and crackling furiously in the blaze is not heat-conscious in some degree? Am I the only one then to have perceived that the water boiling in the kettle, the sugar dissolving in the glass of water, the darting blue flame in the electric current, seem to have a certain impressive responsiveness to sensation?

Doubtless, it will be explained that the majestic roar of the locomotive is due to purely physical causes; that it might even be diminished or eliminated without effecting the locomotive as a whole. But are not the stentorian tones of the tenor also due to physical causes which we have not yet learned to manipulate? Suppose we cut out one of his vocal cords, would it not effect his singing? I am sure, if we apply one of the hot coals stowed in the belly of our metal leviathans

to the flesh of the tenor, the ensuing tones would be simply astounding, and they would be due to the physical properties of the singer over-sensitized by the application of the hot coal to his body exactly as in the case of the locomotive.

All matter is sensitive, differing only in degree. The data of scientists, whether in the field of astronomy, chemistry, paleontology, metallurgy, physics, biology or elsewhere is simply a record of the sensitiveness of matter under varying conditions. We are always making new discoveries in these fields and we are apt to forget that these discoveries are evidences of our relative callousness to the sensitiveness of the elements by which we are surrounded. What are the attractions and repulsions of matter, the heating, sweating and freezing points, dissolutions, evaporations, crystalizations or breakages but the evidence of reaction in struggle by inanimate matter under varying conditions of pain?

Matter may not possess the five senses present in man but it has the one sense which is the basis of all the senses—the sense of contact.

We naturally ask ourselves, But how conscious is matter of its sensitiveness? We can only speculate. Consciousness is a very high state of sensitiveness. As far as we know, only man has attained to it. I believe matter is sensitive, but not conscious save only in the limited sense in which the word consciousness means sensitiveness.

4. Struggle and Evolution.

Although pain is the stuff of life, the universe is not merely a tortured deposit in a cauldron of sensitiveness. It is given us to re-act from pain, to fulfill our pain, or, as it is best put, to struggle.

Pain is the dynamic force which keeps all creation in a state of universal flux. But it is struggle which gives purpose and direction to the world. To borrow a legal phrase, struggle is the executor of pain—an executor who is also a direct heir. The relationship of struggle to pain can only be grasped by us intuitively. It is not a relationship which is capable of the sharp delimitations to which our too human minds are accustomed. We can only think of struggle in

relation to pain as the expression, the resolution, the embodiment and apotheosis of the same thing. Subjectively, it appears to us as relief-with-effort.

We see then that life is the fulfillment of pain in struggle. We are continually reacting from pain by struggle. These processes go on within us all the time in greater or less degree, depending upon the accumulation of pain within us or our sensitiveness to our experiences.

Now it is important to remember that although these reactions or struggles from pain occur all the time, they are not mechanical operations barren of result. The ceaseless round of pain and the struggle from pain does not make automatons of us. With every urge of pain something is added, something will be gained or created. The longing of one year, if it is sufficiently intense, generally becomes the accomplishment of another. The cravings of one generation finds fulfillment in another. Could the Russian Revolution of which we are witness have been possible without the decades of pain which preceded it? Into every realization or accomplishment goes the effort, the striving, in brief, the pain-experience of the past.

To use a simple illustration: Say, a blacksmith is impelled by ambition to wield his hammer daily. Now the sensation of ambition and its reflexes in work again is not barren of all other result. The physical experiences of each day have gone into the development of the blacksmith's muscles. His sinews grow in strength and endurance. Each day has its own gift to its successor. Now what is true of the blacksmith's muscles is also true of his mental faculties. The latter is not always as easily demonstratable in statistical terms, but it is true, just the same, or we never could have developed or evolved.

We are indebted to certain painstaking observers for the discovery of the fact that the physical characteristics of the animal specie undergo variations conformable to environment. These discoverers have even succeeded in piecing together the consanguinity of almost the whole family of living creatures and shown how and to what extent different physical conditions have operated to effect structural growths and forma-

tions. To this tendency in nature has been given the name of Evolution.

Now it has always seemed to me that the explanations of Evolution do not really explain in that they do not touch the kernel of things. Doubtless, the same thought has occurred to others. It is true that Evolution has established a common tendency in living beings. But in this it does not go far enough. The consanguinity of living beings with all matter has been in the thoughts of mankind from time immemorial, though it still remains to be demonstrated scientifically.

But the most signal failure of Evolution lies in the fact that it simply points to a tendency but does not suggest a cause or origin. Evolution itself is not a cause but an effect. It is true that the fish in a dark cave will probably be blind, that the giraffe, by enforced stretching for food, will develop a long neck, that my hands will grow callosities with too much handling of the oar or spade; but what is that impulse which moves a specie toward such a struggle with nature as will result in these modifications of life-habits and limbs, the change in the power of the eye or the shape of a foot, wing or fin? In other words, is there not some dynamic force in the heart of things impelling every living organism to strive and cope as best it may with all the elements of which it is cognizant? What is it? What is it that impinges all living things against the rock of environment and stamps them with the varying lineaments of sentient life? Is it hunger only? But how about fear, imitateness, antagonism, the sense of heat and cold, the yearning for the congenial mate?

It is useless to look for the cause in special appetites or proclivities on the one hand nor in extraordinary places and guises on the other. It lies quite close to our hand. It is nothing more nor less than primal pain or sensitiveness which is the dynamic force actuating all effort to whatever results scientists have been able to tabulate in living things. After all, what is hunger even, save a pain from which we struggle by the assimilation of food? So every other appetite and sensibility is part of the dynamic unrest, yearning or pain calling for its requisite struggle.

With every struggle from pain something is added, something is contributed to make some function more adap-

table to this form of struggle. Thus, evolution is an aspect, an incident of the reaction of pain in struggle. But the greatest measure of evolution is obtainable through increased sensitiveness, irrespective of physical metamorphoses. It is this which is the real seat of evolution; and it is important to remember that it is not caused by but is the cause of evolution. The progress implied in evolution can by no means be disassociated from the normal processes of pain expressing itself in struggle. Evolution is an incident of Pain-Struggle.

5. The Will To Struggle.

At the outset, I shall probably be confronted by an objection born of an older school of thought. I shall be told that man has no will to struggle; that he would rather not struggle; that he has "the will to live." Let us consider this.

When we speak of "will" in the scientific or universal sense, we must reduce this faculty in man to its simplest element. It must not consist of matter by way of speculation as to what he wishes or prefers but what must be. For instance: Let a small dog be thrown into the water. Let us imagine him to have had no experience of water and no ability to swim. It would be easy for him to sink. Nevertheless, to the extent of his ability, he will persist in using his powers of locomotion, however crudely, as long as possible, simply in order not to surrender to the state of helplessness which is the opposite of struggle.

To cite another example: If I unconsciously place my hand on a hot stove, I hastily withdraw it, not because my life is endangered (although the danger may be conceded to be present), but because I am conscious of pain from which I struggle irrespective of consequences.

Again, nothing shows us the strength and persistence of the Will to Struggle as the example of the suicide. (As a matter of fact, few things are more common than the habit of risking one's life which is almost part of the daily routine of many.) But in the case of the suicide the so-called will to live is flagrantly set at naught. Yet it is of the very nature of a fundamental "will," if it exists at all, that it be obeyed under all circumstances, that it be unescapable.

But, it may be argued, does not the suicide likewise disprove the Will to Struggle, since by taking his life he cuts off his capacity for further endeavor? This is not the case, however. The suicide is confronted by the overwhelming desire to avoid the immediate pain as he knows it. The act of suicide is an act of struggle freeing him from that pain. Granted that it is of a lower order of struggle, it is still struggle. The fact that by this deed, this struggle, he cuts off all possibilities of further struggle, may be a powerful deterrent, but, however true, it is only matter by way of speculation. He obeys his Will to Struggle in its immediate relation to his present pain, which for the purposes of any analysis of Will, is all that he is bound to do. It is not a renunciation of struggle, much as he himself may believe it to be; it is the assumption of a lower standard of struggle to counteract the immediate sense of pain.

I have heard of serpents crossed in love, who in their jealousy or rage bite themselves and die. There we have an instance of the will to evade the immediate pain by plunging into another sensation by way of distraction—from which death, we must presume, in the case of the serpent, comes as an unforeseen result. The habit of some people to bite their lips or fingers or seek other diversions of this kind, is fundamentally a process of the same kind and is expressive of their will to struggle, each according to the nature of his temper or development.

But these instances are insignificant in the light of the examples afforded us in the history of the development of man and beast. Struggle with both has been and remains a first principle. It is idle to say that this struggle comes from the conflict of wills to live. From whence comes this perception of conflict in man? But let us imagine that in the case of man it comes by virtue of a sophistication, a perversion of the intellect in which his natural instinct is suppressed. How comes it, however, to the beast? Is this not an extraordinary prerogative for so low an order of creation to arrogate to itself?

So, too, the doctrine that self-preservation is the first law of nature is utterly wrong. It is the last consideration. Self-preservation is simply incidental to our instinctive habit of

defence against all forms of attack as a habit of struggle. But when we are not attacked, we ourselves do the attacking. For it is struggle, not self-preservation, which is "the first law of nature."

More worthy of attention than the idea of the so-called "will to live" is one more recently propounded. It is suggested that there is a "will to power." Now, we have seen that the fallacy inherent in the idea of the "will to live" is that it is really an afterthought, not a first consideration. Now, while the first idea suffers from being an after-thought and not a first consideration, the latter suffers from being an approximation, and it is only by resolving the conception of Will into its simplest element that a law of universal application may be hoped for.

Let us see what is power. Power is accumulated pain. In other words, pain is power.

Now pain or power is not a thing that is willed. It is present. When present in sufficient volume it begets struggle, or, as it may be said, it must express itself. This expression is will, but power is simply the thing expressed. Thus, translated in terms of Pain-Struggle, power is accumulated pain, whether it be expressed in the form of a volt of electricity or horse-power, the yet unexpressed longing of an ambitious student in a garret, the fury of a beast in pain, or the yearnings of a generation of men. In other words, to say that that Will is "will to power" is to say that it is will to pain instead of will to the expression of pain, that is, to struggle. Pain does not crave pain, but to express itself, i. e., to struggle.

Will may be divided into two classes: Human or organized will, and will in nature or unorganized will.

Human or organized will is the kind of will in which the element of volition seems to be present.

Will in nature or unorganized will is present in all phenomena, including man, and is proved by the responsiveness of all phenomena to certain stimuli; its presence in man is made evident by his reflex actions, as for example, when we touch hot or cold substances, etc.

It is apparent, then, that will is fundamental in man and nature. But the attribute of organized or volitional will is

given us in corresponding degrees as we are more or less sensitive or, in other words, as we know pain.

See you a strong man, a "self-made" man? We can be certain that somehow pain has burnt deeply into his soul and has become resolved into Will. We often find the sons of strong, "self-made" men lacking in will-power because they lack the foundation of experience in pain which would have crystallized into Will. The maniac, the tortured prisoner in bonds, the highly sensitive person, however wrought upon, will show tremendous will-power under the stress of pain and overcome unbelievable obstacles.

In order to establish the fact that we have really acquired a correct conception of fundamental will, we must make certain, for one thing, that our "will" is universal in character. It must apply to man as well as to beast and to inanimate matter as well as to either. That the will to struggle exists in man and beast is, I hope, established to the satisfaction of the reader. I have also indicated that the same will to struggle exists and is bound to exist in matter because matter is also in a state of pain or sensitiveness which is expressed in the struggle or metamorphosis common to matter under given conditions of sensitiveness.

I admit, however, that there is a difference in the will to struggle in man, beast and matter. There is a difference in the relative will to struggle even as between men. This difference consists in the amount of volition present in the fundamental will. Thus, in matter, although the fundamental will is there, volition is absent. We feel this to be true, because matter will always react in the same way under the same conditions, while we can have no such certainty about the reactions of human beings. On this account, it is best to call the struggle of matter, reflexes. Thus, all the planets flying in their orbits, for example, are not engaged in an act of volition, but represent reflexes from the pain or sensitiveness of which they are conscious.

In the case of the beast, we approach somewhat nearer to the idea of volition in the will to struggle. Doubtless, many actions of the beast—as in man—are merely reflex movements from pain, although I am not prepared to say that all actions of all beasts are merely reflex in their nature. But

this is an inquiry which I would prefer to leave to more learned students of animal life than I am.

In man, as in matter, the will to struggle is present in most instances, it is true, as non-volitional reflexes from pain. This has reference to his unconscious existence when he is on the same plane with matter. But he is also capable of and constantly exercises volitional reaction or struggle, which distinguishes him above all other creations responding to the will to struggle. Nay, some men even attain to what is called Free Will which is only obtainable through the comprehension of and union with the universal scheme of things; this is the highest attainment of volition in conjunction with Will. But leaving the question of Free Will out of consideration, the great distinguishing difference between the will to struggle in matter and in man is that, in the one, Will is merely a reflex, while in the other, it is largely volitional. Volitional will is the highest form of organized struggle from pain.

6. The Survival of the Sensitive.

It is a fact that, generally speaking, the "fittest" do survive the unfit. It is a fact in nature which is so obvious that it requires no argument. But it does require some interpretation.

What does it mean to be the "fittest?" I believe it means to be adapted or to be able to adapt one's self to difficult conditions and persist in spite of them. In other words, the survival of the fittest is encompassed through adaptability—adaptability in struggle. But whence comes adaptability? Adaptability comes with sensitiveness.

Whence comes it, for example, that a race schooled in suffering becomes so adaptable? Why does it so readily assimilate the culture of other peoples and become so proficient in the art, literature, trade, industry, politics and the very manners of alien peoples? To what is it due, save its exceptional experience in pain and struggle which has sharpened its sensitiveness to a superlative degree?

In the flesh, it is the physically best adapted that survive those physically less adapted. As between the flesh and the spirit, the spiritually adapted will survive the physically

adapted because mind is more powerful than matter. This is how man attained to the rule of the animal world and why civilized races exercise dominion over barbarians.

The "fittest," then, are the most sensitive; and we have already seen that the most sensitive are the most powerful in struggle. They are the most adaptable and can grapple best with the forces of nature, beast and man. Premonitions of changes of climate—or of politics—reach and affect their sensitive tissues—or consciousness—long before their more callous brethren suspect what is in the wind.

To become "fit" in some circumstances may require increased physical strength or endurance or a prehensile tail or wings or a skin covered with thick fur or an acute ear or sharp eyes or keen sense of smell or a good memory or an intuitive mind. It may require several if not all of these things. But none of these things can be gotten or developed through the years save through sensitiveness to the conditions that require them. It is true that the degree of sensitiveness required in the development of claws or of a skin covered with fur may not be of a relatively high order and may be entirely subconscious, it may be nothing but the sensitiveness of tissue; but it is sensitiveness nevertheless, without which there could be no accommodation or adaptability to nature, and therefore no successful struggle insuring survival of the specie in question. For the survival of the "fittest," whether we have in mind beast or man, can mean nothing else than the survival of the most sensitive.

The sensitiveness of man is so extraordinary that he can often see his good or his evil on the way before it has arrived. In order to embrace the good and forestall evil, he promulgates his laws of hygiene, morality, and conduct generally. These laws are intended to have the effect of keeping each generation in health and of enabling it to transmit its struggle to succeeding generations. Thus it is that the sensitiveness of man has enabled him to keep his various adversaries at bay while his callous cousins have been surprised by forces beyond their strength, endurance or ingenuity and were annihilated or dominated and stunted by them. Man has survived through his sensitiveness; and his laws of hygiene and of

morality, his traditions of adequate conduct under all circumstances as well as his spirit of scientific inquiry are simply the expression of his inborn, far-reaching, sleepless anxiety.

I know that the idea that has gained currency is that the principles of the survival of the fittest implies the survival of the callous, of the brute. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The survival of man thus far indicates the principle of the survival of the most sensitive. I shall endeavor to show hereafter that the continued survival of man can only be realized by following out the necessary implications of this principle and the extension of sensitiveness into all relationships; how our psychology, morality, state-craft and religiosity are expressions of this ever-growing sensitiveness; how our so-called science of economics must reckon with it and express it; and how the Great War of which we are witness is a conflict between a lower and a higher order of sensitiveness in the world.

CHAPTER II.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF STRUGGLE

1. Why Psychology?

THAT psychology is related to individual as well as national struggle there can be no question. The War has taught us something of the practical workings of human psychology. Germany, in particular, has played upon the psychology of peoples and, in fact, all the belligerents have had to weave psychological considerations into their war-policy. It is important, then, to know the workings of human psychology, not alone for war purposes, but to enable us to learn the natural limits of our demands upon each other and to abide by them. In fact, our ideas of morality itself can only be clarified by an understanding of the real principles of human psychology.

2. The Ego.

In considering the ego or selfhood, much becomes clear if we view self simply as the unit of sensitiveness. So viewed, we can see, for instance, that the germ or the jelly-fish stirring uneasily under some irritant, or the plant opening its leaves to the morning light and shutting them at dusk, are blood-relatives of mankind. All creation is full of units of sensitiveness.

But the ego of man is a thing of infinite capacity for contraction and expansion. This process in the ego, described roughly as contraction and expansion, grows by an ever-increasing sensitiveness to and contact with pain. We do not possess a plurality of selves, as is sometimes averred, but self is capable of many modifications under different degrees of pain-stimuli.

The primitive, naked ego or selfhood is our starting point. It is concerned primarily with self-interest in the narrowest sense of the word. Nature endows this selfhood with the knowledge of pain, hunger, thirst, physical injury, the need for exercise, shelter, rest, and ego expands to this

extent. Next comes the attachment and responsibility for offspring; then comes the larger interest compelled by love and the devotion to another resulting in a more expanded selfhood. Next, the more or less conscious allegiance to a herd or a tribe or a community and the expansion of individual interests involved therein.

In the true consideration of ego, the words selfish and unselfish can be regarded in their accepted sense only if understood to be degrees of the same thing. Both egoism and altruism are stages in the development of the ego; altruism is an enlarging of the radii of self-interest.

Take, for example, the instance of a suckling infant. At the outset, its ego is limited by the simple physical desire for nourishment. This, apparently, is the limit of its interest in the world. Later, its ego expands to include other desires, say, for toys or sundry other objects and even persons. Some are wont to regard these desires as evidence of wilfulness and nascent selfishness. On the contrary, these are indications of the expansion of the ego in the infant to include wider interests. In the course of some years, the infant absorbs the particular personality of its mother so fully that the well-being of the mother becomes almost a cardinal necessity to the child. From this point other interests and attachments enter into the composition of the ego, making it sensitive to all those life-interests which the average person cannot shake off because they become amalgamated with what we call self. The greatest expansion of self is not exemplified in "selfish" persons but in the friends of mankind, public-spirited persons, patriots, prophets, men who have the welfare of the world at heart and feel for its well-being as part of their own well-being, seers who can distend the radii of their self-interest to include other peoples and climes and are sensitive to the harvests of later eras than their own.

Thus, if I were to represent the ego—or the unit of sensitiveness—by a sketch, I should draw a circle to contain a point like the hub of a wheel with ever-widening radii. I should call the hub or starting-point, the Ego or Unit of Sensitiveness which would represent the narrowest circle of our individual interests in its most undeveloped stage. From the radii springing out of the initial circle of selfhood I

would draw a wider circle which I should call Filial Sensitiveness or Love of Parents. From the combined radii of the initial and succeeding circle I would form a still wider circle which I would call the Sense of Attachment to the Chosen Mate or Love. In the same way, I would form five other circles successively larger in size, all of which would be radiated from the original starting-point or Unit of Sensitiveness. Thus, I would call the fourth circle, Sensitiveness or Responsibility to Family; the fifth circle, Sensitiveness to Friendships; the sixth circle, Sensitiveness to the Well-being of the Community or Nation; then there is the seventh extension of selfhood or circle indicated in the sensitiveness to or sense of identity with the well-being of the world as a whole as shown by the prophets and humanitarians; finally, there is the eighth circle or extension of the ego evinced by those seeking salvation through religion, that is, a selfhood sensitive as to its place in the cosmic scheme of things and hungering after a form of immortality or survival after death. The order of the extensions of our selfhood may not follow my sketch—which is only an approximation—but it is essentially correct.

Thus, if we follow the implications of my imaginary sketch, all our aims, no matter how benevolent, are simply extensions of our ego or selfhood. Our ego, which is the unit or starting point of our sensitiveness or interest, is the source and the periphery of all our wishes and our works.

3. Selfishness, Unselfishness.

Is there, then, no distinction between selfishness and unselfishness? There is a considerable difference, but it is a measurable one. It lies in the difference in the development or distension of the ego or selfhood. Those who are selfish have a small ego, have a smaller radius of sensitiveness, live in a small world and have more limited interests. The unselfish have a larger ego, a larger radius of sensitiveness, live in a larger world and have wider interests. When we speak of selfishness and unselfishness, therefore, we simply refer to comparative stages in the sensitive development or radius of the ego.

The Old Woman Who Lived in a Shoe was certainly unselfish in relation to her numerous progeny. Her selfhood was charged with responsibility for their welfare, nor could she rid herself of her sense of obligation. But suppose a book-agent made his way into her crowded abode and offered to interest her in the complete history of the French Revolution? Her callous imperviousness to this great national tragedy would be the height of selfishness. Nevertheless, we would not condemn her because we realize clearly that her Shoe-ego, broad enough to contain her brood, could not extend far enough to include so divergent an interest.

4. The Sense of Duty.

There has been considerable difficulty in finding a definition for duty. Philosophers of former times have wondered because the sense of duty apparently stood in such complete isolation from the other faculties attributed to man. Probably this difficulty would have been overcome if the nature of self would have been better understood and if selfishness and unselfishness would not have been considered as being at opposite poles instead of degrees of the same thing, as they really are.

For duty stands in no such ethical isolation as has been imagined. Duty is an attribute of extended selfhood. It is simply the extension of the sense of obligation to self beyond the immediate tangible interests of the individual. This does not mean, however, that the element of self-interest is missing in the sense of duty. Thus, one may have a sense of duty to one's friends, family, tribe or country, but they are all extensions of selfhood.

5. The Growth of Selfhood.

Since self is the unit of sensitiveness, it follows that the more comprehensive the ego the more sensitive it is and the more complex. As we have already seen, when we speak of unselfishness, we mean selfishness of a wider radius. This wider radius of selfishness—or unselfishness—only comes with the accession of a wider range of sensitiveness. What brings

a wider range of sensitiveness? Evidently, experience in pain and struggle. Every experience of pain increases our sensitiveness, and, by bringing new centres of sympathy into the radius of our ken, helps to distend our ego or selfhood, and to add new spheres to the world which is in every individual's being.

We thus come to the consideration of the ego in its manifestations of growth or extension through the experience of pain and struggle. In this connection it would be well to bear in mind that ego and struggle in an individual always maintain an exact proportion. The smaller—the less inclusive—the ego in an individual, the smaller the capacity to struggle; the larger—the more extended or inclusive—the greater the capacity to struggle.

The struggle of the tiger, for example, is said to be headlong and unpremeditated; it proceeds from an undeveloped ego whose manifestations in struggle are simple, limited and direct. More extended and wary is the ego and struggle of the fox, say, and argues greater experience of pain. If we go into the realm of men, we find that their struggle is still more subtle and extended, tho, often enough, quite as patently contentious as in the lower animals. The battle-line of every man is measured by the extent of his selfhood. The thug and the pick-pocket maintain a struggle that is co-extensive with their egos, the captain of industry, the statesman, the leader of masses, the general and the prophet, in accordance with theirs. As pain expresses itself in struggle in proportion to its content and, as the ego or self is the unit of sensitiveness or pain in every individual, it follows unerringly that the struggle of everyone is exactly in proportion to the ego or unit of sensitiveness that is in him.

6. The Senses.

Self is the unit of sensitiveness. The human self, however, contains many avenues thru which it receives sensation and which color, intensify or qualify sensation. These avenues or senses are the sense of hearing, tasting, smelling, seeing and the sense of touch or contact. Perhaps there is one or more senses which we have not yet succeeded in dis-

tinguishing, but this is not pertinent at present. The interesting question that suggests itself to me is, What is the true relation between the senses and sensitiveness in general?

I will hazard a guess that is not altogether a guess, and say that the senses are the protean guises of sensitiveness in general, since there can be no sensitiveness without constant variety in kind or degree (in the last analysis, all variety is variety of degree). I strongly suspect that all the senses simply represent degrees of sensitiveness to phenomena. All the senses have one uniform quality—the sense of contact or “touch.” Now what is the difference whether we say that the sense of touch is in our fingers, our nose, our eyes, our tongue or our ears? If we substitute the word “contact” for “touch” we can say that all the senses have the same sense but each has a special quality of sensitiveness adapted to register our contact with given objects. I do not pretend to know which of the senses represent the greatest degree of sensitiveness. There are things which can be seen at a great distance, that is, which contact on the retina of the eye but which furnish no contact with the sense of hearing, taste, smell or ordinary sense of touch. On the other hand, there are things which do not register on our sight which we can smell; and so on, right along the line.

In short, then, the senses are a few of the extensions or conduits, as it were, of sensitiveness in general with special properties of demarcation and registration.

7. Memory.

When a given experience has made an impression somewhere on our consciousness, the affected part of our consciousness remains sensitive in varying degrees depending upon the intensity or number of identical experiences. This sensitiveness of our consciousness to what has happened is what we call memory or retentiveness. Memory or resensitization comes to us when the sensitive spots in our consciousness are revived by suggestions or experiences more or less like those which have already affected us.

8. Intuition.

Now if memory is the state of sensitiveness in spots of our consciousness after the occurrence of experiences, intuition is the ability to remember or resensitize past experiences, analogize or compare with other experiences and draw conclusions or anticipations. In short, intuition is the ability to re-sensitize or remember, compare and anticipate.

Intuition is probably the oldest of purely human faculties as well as the most wonderful intellectual property in man. It appears to be present also in animals in some degree. Although intuition is an intellectual attribute, it operates unconsciously like the act of breathing.

9. Reason.

Reason is intuition made conscious. Reason is the latest of man's intellectual acquirements and, at present, is very imperfect, being, in fact, comparable to a toy which works for a while and breaks down frequently, especially where it seems to be needed most. Reason's usefulness and functions have been very much exaggerated and over-rated. The fact is that our life is organized and lived, not according to our reason, but according to our intuition. This is because, despite the fulminations of rationalists and utilitarians, we have very little confidence in reason for most purposes. Some of us imagine that we accomplish wonders with our reason, but the truth is that it is of service only in checking up our intuition. Intuition need only justify itself by result. But reason must both explain and justify itself and for this reason it can only traverse a beaten track. Despite all that is claimed for it, reason has no creative power whatever because it cannot anticipate. All invention is the product of intuition. Despite reason's pretensions all it has attained to is the humble though useful office of applying the plumb-line to the anticipations of intuition.

I said that reason is intuition made conscious. Perhaps I should say reason is the attempt to make intuition conscious, because reason cannot keep pace with intuition. Intuition is capable of seizing hold of innumerable factors and relations

and wielding them before reason can even realize what has been done. Let the great chemist, biologist and mathematician introspect a little and he will find that his formula, statistical record or proof was preceded by one little sacred moment of intuition in which his whole discovery was first conceived.

The early Greeks made a great ado about the efficacy of reason in human relations and institutions but their ratiocinations were neither regarded by themselves nor by the world at large. Instead, the world embraced the doctrine of an obscure people whose teachings were not the creation of reason but of intuition born of an intense experience of pain and struggle. To-day, the relics of Greek rationalism are of value, chiefly, as mental exercises.

10. Instincts or Animal Propensities.

When we refer to the instinct of an animal, we mean an inherited sensitiveness to a given experience resulting in an unexplained yet responsive act. Instinct is a primitive form of intuition. Instinct stands in the same chronological relation to intuition as intuition does to reason. Instinct, like intuition, is based upon memory; but, unlike intuition, it is vitalized, not through the ability to compare and anticipate, but through sensitiveness intense enough to result in premonition but not sufficiently accentuated to result in the higher state of sensitiveness culminating in anticipation. Instinct is the oldest intellectual attribute and, next to memory and sensitiveness itself, the most rudimentary of faculties. Lacking the faculties of comparison and anticipation, which are attributes of intuition, creatures living by instinct alone have naturally proven no match to those who have attained to intuition.

11. Sensitiveness, Consciousness and Will.

Sensitiveness, consciousness and will are degrees of the same thing in an ascending scale. Consciousness is a higher degree of sensitiveness. It is sensitiveness cognizant of itself. Will is the crystallization of consciousness and is, therefore, the highest manifestation of sensitiveness. Be it understood

that when I say "will" I mean will to struggle, for there is no other will.

12. Imagination.

What is called flesh and spirit would be translated in our terms as less struggle and greater struggle. Just as spirit is a more powerful emanation of the flesh, so spiritual struggle is a more powerful form of struggle than physical struggle. The more powerful the form of struggle the less liable is it to be perceived by the senses. When a wheel turns slowly we can see the spokes in it; the more swiftly it revolves the less likely are we to see them. Such is the relative power of mind which is imperceptible as compared to matter which is perceptible. So imagination presents an invisible extension of ordinary struggle beyond the feeble limits of matter.

13. Fear.

Fear is the feeling engendered in us by the sense of helplessness or unpreparedness to master or struggle against an impending pain. I have heard of persons who were fearless but I do not believe any exist. As our capacity to struggle is unevenly distributed, however, it is natural for certain situations to imbue some people with more fear than others and some with none at all, in proportion to the consciousness of strength we can summon to overcome the given difficulty.

14. The Terror of Death.

It may be difficult to hold to the idea but it is none the less true that pain is constantly with us. On this account, in order to keep in good spirit, we have to constantly fortify ourselves with the feeling that the possibilities of struggle are always with us. Every man of us, when he is not struggling, is telling himself that he is still good for a fight. It is thus that he retains faith in himself. Why we have such a terror of death—for there is no use denying it, we are afraid of death—is because death presents to our mind a condition of helplessness or inability to struggle from pain. It is useless

for us to tell ourselves that pain cannot survive death. Try as we will, we cannot shake off the consciousness that life provides us with the weapons with which to struggle from pain, whereas death delivers us while still pain-conscious into the hands of the enemy—Helplessness or Inability to Struggle—which is the greatest evil known to man. The reflection that we will probably not carry our pain-consciousness into the halls of death is merely a speculation and has little power over healthy beings who are able to maintain a good proportion between their pain and their struggle-from-pain. Invalids, persons suffering from great bodily or mental pain whom life has not vouchsafed relief through proportionate struggle, i. e., who are helpless in the face of pain, can naturally look upon death with a greater degree of equanimity if not of longing, as the final corrective of their disproportionate existence, as the only act of struggle, in fact, that remains to them.

But the strong can be no lovers of death. The strong will willingly accept death in only one eventuality—as a necessary incident of a great struggle. As the fear of death is born of the fundamental love of struggle so, also, it disappears because of the love of struggle. Death does not weigh much in the balance with love of struggle. This is simply another way of re-stating what we have already found to be true, namely, that love of life or the “will to live” is not a universal law and is wholly subordinate to the law of struggle. So the secret yearnings of even a child is to die, if die he must, fighting gloriously. There is nothing better or truer than this childish imagining in all the books of wisdom.

15. The Pain of Disease.

There are many who imagine that pain is synonymous with disease. But pain is always with us. Disease is simply an acute instance of inability to translate pain into its requisite struggle; it is, therefore, an interference with the normal processes of pain.

16. Hate.

Hate is the feeling engendered in us by anybody who, passively or actively, has the effect of impeding our struggle.

In relation to the imaginary sketch of the ego already referred to, hate would represent a contraction of the circle of selfhood to exclude identity or sympathy with the person or persons hated. If a person has incurred our enmity, therefore, it means that we are injured to the extent that, in relation to our enemy, at least, the radius of our selfhood has been delimited and interrupted in its sympathies or identity with the world.

17. Love.

Love is the feeling of or sense of identity with the pain of another. It follows that there can be no love of another without knowledge of the other, knowledge of the other's pain; also, there can be no knowledge without sensitiveness. Thus, to demand of a barbarous, ignorant and unfeeling world to "love one another" is not immediately realizable. The world has first to become sensitive to pain, from whence proceeds knowledge or intimacy and then only, love.

Love is by no means incompatible with struggle. Nothing is incompatible with struggle except surrender. We may even struggle with him whom we love; but love compels us to extend our battle-line and fight for wider interests.

There never was a great lover who was not also a correspondingly great fighter in proportion to his opportunities. I am not now alluding only to the prophets and saviours of mankind. I am referring also to the much-abused Hannibals and Napoleons of the world. Their battle-lines were not as far-reaching as those of the prophets, but they could not have marshalled vast armies nor carried state-responsibilities upon their shoulders, if they were not essentially devoted men whose self-love was co-extensive to a degree with the interests of the millions under their wing.

18. Sleep.

I have often wondered as to the nature of sleep and its relation to consciousness, until it occurred to me that sleep was always preceded by a state of exhaustion or, at least, customarily, by the period when exhaustion was due to occur. The nature of sleep then became reasonably clear.

As I have already pointed out, our normal condition is the state of pain or sensitiveness. In other words, consciousness is the state of extreme sensitiveness. This extreme sensitiveness, whether we are aware of it or not, is maintained only with great effort. When we are exhausted, our sensitive faculties relapse into a kind of apathy and from thence the superlative degree of sensitiveness is still further reduced and falls away into that blurred state of sensitiveness known as sleep. It is probable that sleep is an outgrown state of consciousness like the consciousness of the sensitive plant. In other words, sleep is a feebler degree of consciousness to which we revert in periods of exhaustion.

The same thing applies to all degrees of semi-consciousness. Even in our waking hours, every individual is capable of several degrees of concentration, that is to say, of consciousness. The same thing is true of lower stages of consciousness in which we revert to discarded levels of intelligence which once marked our maximum development.

What I cannot fathom, however, is how it can be maintained that a person while in a lower state of consciousness can discover and convey information that he could by no means derive in his waking hours, i. e., when he is in possession of full consciousness and has his maximum powers of concentration. If my analysis is not a mistaken one, here is an instance where we ask of a lower order of sensitiveness or consciousness to do that which we find difficult for superlative sensitiveness. If my analysis is correct, the only explanation is that the "mediums" relied upon are untrustworthy or, as I am inclined to think, that their revelations are no more credible than the replies which anyone can elicit from persons given to talking in their sleep. The verbal jangles of persons in a semi-conscious condition cannot be more responsible. Persons in a semi-conscious state may be able to reply cogently to a certain extent. They may, conceivably, relate experiences that have originated in or penetrated to their lower consciousness. But to expect them to transcend the possibilities of consciousness, predict the future and hold converse with people in distant places, is over-shooting the mark somewhat. It would be much more plausible to expect such feats from the conscious state.

19. Dreams.

It has been said that dreams represent the fulfillment of the unsatisfied longings of our waking hours. This may happen occasionally but I do not believe that it is the rule. Very frequently quite the opposite occurs, and our dream-state often presents horrors and grotesqueries which have the most adventitious relations to the thoughts and wishes of our waking hours.

It can hardly be denied, however, that the wishes, determinations, experiences and impressions of our waking hours do have some relation and are tangled up with the imaginings of our dream-state. It is impossible to predicate any set rule for our dream-experiences because our will-power is at a low ebb at such times, our sense of discrimination weak and our powers of co-ordination disintegrated, so that the thoughts of the day which remain with us during sleep will result in the most haphazard effects. We are, at such times, like a sensitive harp played upon by the winds of chance.

There is one permeating thread which runs thru all dreams with unchanging consistency, however, and that is the will to struggle. In the dream-state, as in what we call actuality, our perspective may be all wrong, our visions and sense of relations distorted, our anticipations exaggerated, our plans absurd and our hopes and wishes sinful or grotesque in the light of day, but the impulse to struggle remains true and undeviating. All the stray impressions that remain with us and are compounded in dreams are tossed around by our struggle-instinct like leaves in a gale.

20. Telepathy.

Although I do not believe that super-conscious perceptions are attainable thru subconscious mediums, I do believe that it is not impossible for us to evolve a method of communication, if we have not already attained to it, by mental suggestion; that is, by extreme mental concentration evolved from a greater degree of intellectual sensitiveness than is yet prevalent among men. After all, what is speech and sign language except emotion made perceptible through increased sensitiveness?

21. Pleasure.

Listen to the salubrious phrases of the Christian Scientists, the stentorian dogmas of the Socialists and the eloquent nonsense of the full bloom of latter-day rhapsodists and one must come to the conclusion that happiness can be had for the asking and that pain is a demon who can be exorcised with the formula of economic sufficiency and rhapsody, if we were only more perfect. In my unregenerate heart, however, I cannot believe this any more than I could bring myself to believe the statement of a great Russian rhapsodist who said that mankind would be happy indeed if it were not for the women.

Still, though we must believe in pain and struggle as the eternal and unavoidable law of life, we may yet reserve a place for joy, pleasure and re-current measures of happiness.

Pleasure is the sensation we experience when some pain is fulfilled or determined in some struggle. Thus, the pain of hunger is fulfilled in the struggle called eating; the pain of thirst in drinking; the pain of love in mating; the pain in all forms of longing whatever is fulfilled in complementary forms of struggle. But unless we know the pain of hunger we cannot know the pleasure of eating; hence, if our hunger is but little, our pleasure in eating will be correspondingly less.

Thus all forms of pleasure must be in proportion to our pain. To demand pleasure of life without acknowledging pain as a prerequisite is to demand a logical absurdity. Pleasure, then, is the measure of our pain as expressed in struggle.

Small pain, such as the wish of a child for a toy, can only be reflected in the small pleasure or limited struggle incident to his getting the toy. The low pain of an adult can be gratified in a low form of struggle. But great pain, the pain of great longings, calls for great struggle or achievement which is reflected in a form of pleasure of corresponding magnitude experienced by the world's great adventurers.

22. Happiness.

When we think of happiness, therefore, we must think of a succession of longings always expressed—if we are for-

tunate—in corresponding struggles whence all pleasure and happiness proceed. To turn longing into doing is to be happy; and, from the very nature of these processes, happiness cannot be otherwise than transitory.

23. Joy.

I am not sure that joy calls for any special definition. But if it does, I should say that joy is the fulfillment either of a pain of which we are not conscious at the moment, or brings an unexpected fulfillment of a pain of which we are conscious.

24. Humor.

There is a background of seriousness, of pain, in fact, to every joke and witticism. Why are we so much amused by human foibles, miscarriages and mistakes? Because every foible, miscarriage and mistake is a caricature of deadly earnestness. The humorous element in the staggering of the drunkard is that he is really trying his best to walk straight and with becoming dignity and his performance is so wide of his pretensions. The same general principle applies to the earnest singer with the cracked voice, the dancer whose steps are cumbersome, the actor whose deficiencies break thru his disguise, the speaker who cannot hide his vanity, the foreigner striving to speak a strange language like a native, the novice trying to swim, etc., etc., thru all the gamut of humorous incident. In fact, if we have a mind to always contrast effort with achievement, humor is as wide as the cosmos. But there are efforts which touch our own too closely for us to be able to enjoy the humor of their disproportionate achievement. For, after all, humor is the feint at pain.

25. Pride, Vanity and the Appetites.

As we all feel charged with our struggle-mission, it is natural for us to carry ourselves proudly and, however humbly we may intend to demean ourselves, we by no means succeed in shaking off our pride. In our hearts we know ourselves to be fighters; how then can we rid ourselves of pride?

When the Lord made strugglers of us He mixed with our clay a measure of pride and vanity. It is both foolish and impossible for us to attempt to dispossess ourselves of these essential constituents. On the other hand, our pride and vanity must bear some proportion to the thing of which we are proud or vain. On this account, the prouder we are the less perceptible our pride is apt to be to the undiscerning.

As for our appetites and our "lusts" even, what a good laugh they ought to have at the expense of the ascetic of the west and the doctrinaire mystic of the east! For how can we attain understanding save through the intimate knowledge of life imparted to us by our basic appetites which are part of our pain-consciousness?

Those who advocate the eradication of human pride and the appetites advocate suicide-in-life which is an impossibility.

26. The Sense of Beauty.

Who has not paused at one time or another to see a man catch and board a car? Nay, we did not turn our eyes away until we saw the runner on the step; then were we satisfied and turned to other things, for we like to see the fulfillment of all efforts—provided, of course, they are not in conflict with our own. I confess, I never saw a pick-pocket beset by a mob or the police, but I had a secret wish that he might get away; and, when I was a boy, I followed the exploits of the treasure-pilfering pirates of my readings with unholy enthusiasm. This sympathy is not altogether removed from the fond sympathy of parents watching their infant child in its first efforts to walk.

This principle—the fulfillment of patent effort or desire—is the same that applies in art and constitutes what we recognize as beauty. I do not know what desire or suggestion of pain is represented by a straight line, a curve, an angle, the color red, a note in music or one of the many gestures employed in the histrionic art. It rests with others to discover this if it remains undiscovered. But I do know that some suggestion of pain is inherent in the straight line, the curve, the angle, the color, musical note and gesture and, unconsci-

ously, we are affected by them when we meet them and we wish to see them complemented or fulfilled according to their kind. It requires no argument to prove that the unfinished song, the damaged picture, the broken statue, the ruined structure, the interrupted gesture, affect us disagreeably even as the morsel of food dashed out of our hand. They represent non-fulfillment, ineffectual desire. We have but to stretch our imagination a little bit further to see that the same principle applies when we are confronted by an unrelieving line, an inappropriate angle, an inharmonious color combination, a jarring note or chord, an awkward gesture. A bad work of art represents so many suggestions of pain which have not been fulfilled. This is what we mean by such expressions as lack of balance, discords, poor technique, clashing color schemes and designs, gracelessness, failures of all kinds.

It cannot be repeated too often that we live in a condition of pain. Every individual carries tons upon his shoulders, physically as well as spiritually. Every thing we do in this world is to relieve us or struggle from pain. Even our laughter and enjoyment have reference to ever-present pain. It must not surprise us, therefore, that every work of art and every component thereof carries out the suggestion of pain and the attempted fulfillment thereof. Every work of art, therefore, like life itself, is a striving for balance between pain and fulfillment or struggle. A great work of art, like a great man, is an embodiment of a larger consciousness of pain complemented by a larger measure of fulfillment or struggle. This rule applies to the arch, the statue, the quiet but unmistakable suggestiveness of the portrait or landscape painting as well as to the literary idyl, epic or the subtle symphony.

Beauty, then, is equipoise—equipoise of suggestion and fulfillment, longing and doing, effort and accomplishment, pain and struggle. This is what the artist intuitively perceives to be harmony, proportion, consonance, grace; and, it is because we recognize that these qualities are the embodiment of all that we look for in life under other names that we derive our enjoyment of art.

The question naturally arises: What, then, is the difference between great art and lesser art, since all art must have

pain-suggestion and fulfillment in equipoise? We have only to consult our individual experiences to find that we recognize as greater than another that artist who has put more of the pain and struggle of the world into his work without doing violence to the demands of equipoise or proportion. This is the whole difference between a perfect little *bisque* doll and the statue of the Venus of Milo, or, say, Rodin's "Thinker;" between Corneille's "Le Cid" and "Hamlet," or "Macbeth." This also is the difference between the art of the Greeks and the art of the Hebrews as evidenced by the Bible which is the true precursor of modern art.

Modern art is deeper in content, more ascetic, more charged with the cumulative pain and struggle of the world, more sensitive and complicated in its color schemes, its sound pulsations and its gestures. On this account, its equipoise of pain-suggestion and pain-fulfillment or harmony, as we call it, is more difficult of attainment. Our susceptibilities have undergone a considerable change since the time when Telemachus, struggling to find a word expressive of the dishonor done to his father's house by the suitors of Penelope, could only make the simple plaint that they were wasting his father's substance. We have ceased to think and feel as did the Greeks of Homer's time. This difference was becoming manifest even in the art of the Romans, who lived more intensely than the Greeks. But the Hebrew influence widened the breach most of all.

CHAPTER III.

STRUGGLE AS MORALITY

1. Morality in Man and Beast.

THE compass of the ego grows with every experience of pain; that is, its sympathetic perception is thus broadened and intensified. From these multiplied experiences of pain-sympathies, the intensified feelings created by them and the ever-insistent will to struggle from them, flow all the canons of pure morality in beast and man.

Pain is the universal substance which is given and the Will to Struggle is its concomitant. Thus, the struggle, say, of a herd of elephants against a common enemy is predicated upon the same fundamental law of morality as the resistance of the Allies at the Marne, and the feeling of the disgrace of surrender has its roots in the same universal recognition of the law of struggle. Indeed, the lower animals never surrender. As a matter of fact, nobody surrenders. One is first overcome and the formal act of surrender is a recognition of the fact and a manoeuvre to evade avoidable punishment.

Where, then, lies the difference between the morality of man and beast? The difference is in degree. The struggle of man is greater, more continuous, more embracing, because his sympathies and his appetites are greater, i. e., he has greater experiences of pain. Morality in man and beast, then, flow from the degree of their responsiveness to pain or sensitive experience.

We unconsciously fall into the habit of regarding the savage beasts, the lion, tiger, snake, etc., as supremely formidable. As a matter of fact, man is the most formidable animal. He is the veritable king of beasts and rules them.

Even animals represent a high order of struggle in that they protect their young and, to this extent, show an enlarged ego. This would apply still more to the animals that have the herd instinct, such as the elephant. As instances of creatures having a contracted or small ego with commensurately

limited intelligence or capacity to struggle, I would mention all those fowl and fish that are wont to eat their young. We may even go further and say that deep experience of pain carries with it the responsibility for posterity as instanced by prophets, patriots and humanitarians. Conversely, a limited experience of pain in a race will carry with it a lack of responsibility for kind as in the case of the cannibal.

2. The Origin of Law.

It is idle to speculate which was the first conscious law and whether that law was enforced through economic necessity or through the growth of humanitarian feeling, or as I would call it, the increased standard of struggle. I believe too much has been lately ascribed to economic necessity and too little to psychological necessity. Certainly, before we can speak of economic necessity for primitive races there must be in them an appreciation of economic necessity which could only come through an increased sensitiveness in observation and experience or suffering.

Thus, it is safe to surmise that when a sentiment as to a given act or omission attained unanimity among our primitive forefathers, it gave rise to a custom at first, and then to a more or less vigorously observed law.

Once a law was accepted and established, justice required that all act in accordance with it, because, to violate it was to lower the standard of struggle for some but not for all, thus giving an undue advantage to some over others.

From the point of view of Pain-Struggle, however, the trend of all laws is to foster the small struggler and increase his capacity for effort and to place larger burdens upon the greater struggler so as by no means to allow him to batten on his gains.

Religion has also stepped in and taken a hand in the formation of the law, so that to-day the law of the land is compounded of the natural chivalry of struggle (which prohibits one from taking an obviously preponderant advantage over his antagonist) and of Religion (whose tendency is

toward eliminating inter-human conflict as an element of universal conflict).

The chivalry of struggle enjoins us not to beg, not to steal, to fight bravely, not to take our enemy unawares, to champion the weak against the strong, etc. In short, the natural chivalry of struggle—which is a development of struggle—enjoins us to do all those things in inter-human conflict which will tend to observe the balance of forces so as to render a “fair” fight possible. In fact, all the fantastic “codes of honor” are an outgrowth of the natural chivalry of struggle as developed in the human fighter.

Religion adopts and makes the most of certain of the tenets of natural chivalry, such as the injunction against stealing, against the abuse of the weak, etc., but also adds injunctions of its own, such as the prohibition on bloodshed, on quarreling, selfishness, etc. Religion goes even further but of this I will not speak here. Suffice it to say that it makes the most of those of the virtues extant in the natural chivalry of struggle and adds such others as will tend to eliminate human strife as an element of struggle. Our common law is a composite, therefore, of the chivalry of struggle, religion and also, of course, of state-craft or latter-day collective struggle.

It is true that there is current an impression in the world that the laws against theft, for example, are intended for the protection of property. As a matter of fact, the law is absolutely unconcerned as to who has the property, provided it is acquired according to the accepted standard of struggle. The laws against theft makes acquisition more difficult. They that steal acquire by an easier method, notwithstanding that the method though simpler—and it is simpler—may be followed by punishment. If stealing were universal, it would be no crime and no wrong. In fact, it would be a virtue. The same with murder. It is easier to commit murder than to live at peace, which is a very drawn out and complicated undertaking requiring great tact and self-control. It is easier to propagate and abandon than it is to raise families. It is easier to neglect than to provide. In short, the tendency of all laws is to make things more difficult even though the citizen habitually imagines that every statute added to the

Code lightens his burdens. We are so used to living in accordance with the law that to be "law-abiding" has become almost a life-habit with us and we imagine that the law was made for our comfort. Tho they tend to keep us fit for struggle, laws are, in their nature, prohibitions. They compel high standards, thus taking away rights belonging to man in his state of nature.

It must be conceded, however, that the underlying tendency of laws is, also, to increase the possibilities of struggle to the many. These laws are grounded upon the wish to prevent the activities of the great struggler from interfering with the normal progress of the efforts of the small struggler. The effect of these laws is to compel the great struggler to extend his struggle on bigger, less conflicting lines and to encourage the small struggler to struggle—but by no means to eliminate the necessity to struggle. In autocracies and despotisms, the aim and tendency of laws is against the easy and unfair standards of the criminal, it is true, but also to confirm the great struggler in his advantages.

Altho law affects to deal with things, its true province lies in deciding questions of morality. That is why judge and advocate unconsciously assume such a lofty tone in the sordid disputes and criminal relations which come before them for review. They deal with the great question of comparative standards of struggle in which monetary considerations and penalties are supposed to play but a minor part even though the cupidity or ambition of interested parties operates to place the emphasis elsewhere. The real question that comes before the judge is: Did the defendant sink below the recognized standard of struggle? If he did, then the state will punish the act or omission, if it constitutes a crime; or if it was a civil infraction, then the plaintiff will be indemnified at the defendant's expense because of the disadvantage at which he was taken and the loss occasioned thereby in the particular struggle or transaction which is the subject of litigation.

We are so used, however, to living in accordance with the prescribed law and it is so dangerous to live in conflict with it, that we have come to believe that we live by means of it. Nothing of the sort is the case, however. Without it we should still continue to live, although upon a basis not familiar to us at present. Some of us, it is true, would adopt a lower, less

elevated standard of struggle but a more grimly simple one; others, as the anarchist contends, might rise above the bald requirements of the law, which last is a subject for speculation, perhaps.

To summarize by example, the law against theft deprives me of the right to acquire property by stealth. It is true that henceforth my neighbor will also be deprived of this advantage and our deprivations will be neutralized to this extent. Nevertheless the immediate effect upon my struggle is to drive it upon more subtle, more difficult lines. The same thing applies to my neighbor. It was an easier and simpler thing to take a thing when I wanted it, even at the risk of detection, than to serve the long and tortuous apprenticeship for it dictated by the rule of honesty. The early Spartans thought that it was legitimate to steal but disgraceful to be caught at it. To be caught meant to be defeated, and who does not feel disgraced in defeat?

3. The Basis of Property-Right.

Thus, to say that stealing is wrong per se is incorrect unless we have in mind a community wherein the rule is general and property is not so acquired. But where stealing is the generally recognized practice, it should convey a perfectly good title; and it has done so. To impugn titles acquired by theft and violence in an age when these were the recognized methods of obtaining title is just as absurd as to question the title of one monkey to a nut stolen from his fenian brother. Neither in the one case nor in the other has there been a breach of the standard of struggle evolved by the specie in question at the time in question. This leads us to the definition of the basis of title to property.

The true basis of title to property is acquisition by struggle according to the standard of struggle obtaining at the time the property is acquired.

With the foregoing as the basis for title to property, the question which naturally suggests itself is, Why should title descending to heirs continue to be good after the standard of struggle by which it was originally acquired has been superseded? Without going into the pros and cons of this question

at this time, it may be well to point out that the Law of Struggle itself supplies the remedy. All property-right is really in a state of flux in that title-holders have to fight to retain possession according to every new standard of struggle; and if the heir is not proficient under the new standard, there will be an inevitable change of possession and of title.

4. Honesty.

Honesty, then, is an acquired, as distinguished from a natural virtue, enforced by society in order to maintain a standard of struggle. Conversely, theft is a crime, not because it is unnatural but because it represents a betrayal of the common standard of struggle.

Honesty obtained vogue originally, not as an abstract virtue, but as a mark of the bold warrior who scorned to dispossess the owner of a thing without fighting for it openly. Honesty came into being as a fighting virtue, succeeding the easier method of acquisition by theft precisely because honesty was more difficult and dangerous. Honesty, then, is really a virtue born of the chivalry of struggle.

In our time, it is true, theft has been made dangerous by law but it has not been made more difficult than honesty. The chagrin of the person whose theft is discovered is due not only to the fact that his purpose has been frustrated but also because he has been caught fighting according to a lower and therefore treacherous standard.

5. Good and Bad.

We may speak of abstract virtue and sin, good and evil, but these expressions are simply of the short-hand of human speech.

There is really no such thing as abstract good and evil. Things are only good or bad in relation to their increasing or diminishing influence on struggle and insofar as they tend to uphold or lower the common standard of struggle attained.

6. Courage.

Let us take, for example, courage. It is obvious that in a world-organization of which struggle is the meat, courage

must become a universal virtue. The virtue of courage is a fundamental one. It is present in the beast in varying degrees, according to its life-experience or pain-adventures. It is at its height in man, but is often not discernible as courage, because man has introduced the fabian element of prudence in his battles; that is, man, unlike the tiger for example, reckons not only with the immediate obstacle but with consequential factors, as also the fox does on a pettier scale. Struggle takes cognizance of courage and honors it whenever and wherever it becomes conspicuous. Courage is not mentioned among the ten commandments of the Hebrews, simply because it is the oldest of human virtues, being, in fact, an animal-virtue and therefore taken for granted. Not to have courage, not to endure, not to persist, is not to live at all. The virtue of courage, however, is so fundamental that it must not surprise us to find that all praise takes the form of recognition of courage, whether the subject of it is a soldier who has conquered or an etymologist who has persevered in his hunt for an old root.

7. Sin or Surrender.

It follows that if courage, persistence, endurance and kindred virtues are virtues in struggle, the outstanding vice is weak-spiritedness or cowardice as exemplified in surrender. The great virtue of struggle is to struggle, the great vice is to surrender. This applies through the whole gamut of existence from the embattled nation fighting against subjugation, the besieged garrison, the maiden defending her honor, captains of finance and industry, small and great, in their nerve-racking tugs-of-war, the laborer faithful to his monotonous grind, the athlete in his sport, the fighting beasts of the forest, and, I doubt not, the mutual resistance of the so-called inanimate elements who only yield to the superior onsets of their kind.

8. The Virtues.

It follows that with such an organization of the world, whatever is in aid of struggle is a virtue or good, and what-

ever retards or defeats struggle is a vice and bad. Just as the athlete training for a great trial of his powers, rigorously adheres to his selected diet of plain fare, so the world in its onward strivings has hammered out habits of life which it terms virtues and which it will do its utmost to press into universal service. As the ancient Hebrews said of their laws of Deuteronomy: "These are the laws of which ye shall live and not die."

Easily comprehensible as fitting into the scheme of struggle are a great many of the common human virtues. Such are courage, industry, prudence, economy, hardihood, tenacity, etc., etc. But there are other human virtues which at first sight do not seem to fit into the struggle-scheme and seem to be in conflict with it. Such are, for example, modesty, sympathy, justice, generosity, self-sacrifice, humbleness, humility, etc. These therefore remain to be considered.

9. Modesty.

Most virtues show even upon the most superficial examination that they are virtues by reason of their obvious enhancement of struggle just as most vices are seen to be evil because they run counter to the fundamental requirements of struggle. Thus, for example, it needs no profound investigation to disclose that courage is a virtue and that cowardice is evil. Of such ethical conceptions it is hardly necessary to speak.

Why is it then that the quality of modesty is considered not only a virtue in a world of struggle but also a grace? Let us examine the main-springs of modesty. Modesty—not bashfulness—properly considered, is a superior kind of pride. The modest man aims so to demean himself, so to struggle, that his actions shall speak for him. It is a recognition that only that is worthy which is obtainable by struggle. Why is it that we stammer and effect to become foolish when we are praised to our faces? It is because praise is something abnormal. It goes against the whole current of our life. We are accustomed to fight for everything. When someone, however, suddenly stands up and says to us: "Here, I give you gladly what you have been fighting for," it upsets us. We only

appreciate, we hoard only trophies of such gains as were acquired by struggle. Even when we acquire things accidentally or without effort, we try to justify the acquisition along the lines of struggle-virtue. All must be justified by struggle. For this reason it is immoral to listen to praise, to eat the bread of idleness, to live on charity, to accept unearned gifts of any kind, to steal another's honors. The modest man is pre-eminently proud. His standards of struggle are high and difficult. He fears praise as a corrupting worm. He is a man of faith because he believes that no word or artifice is necessary to set true struggle in the right light but that it will receive ultimate justice.

I do not mean by this that the modest man does not like praise. Everybody likes praise. But the modest man will take pains to see that praise of him flows inevitably from his acts; that it is an earned increment; otherwise, he will shudderingly turn from the devil of flattery, realizing that it means death to struggle.

10. Duty.

Duty stands in no ethical isolation in man. Duty is simply the extension of the sense of obligation beyond the immediate interests of the individual. A man may have a sense of duty to his family, his friends, city or state, but they are all extensions of his sense of duty to his own selfhood.

11. Sympathy.

One would imagine that a struggle-system could not admit of sympathy as one of its inseparable concomitants; and yet, what is more common than sympathy?

We have but to analyze the causes of human sympathy in order to understand how naturally it fits into the scheme of things. With whom do we sympathize?

(a) We sympathize with him whose successful struggle will confer a benefit upon us.

(b) We sympathize with him whose struggle has been revealed to us intimately or closely.

(c) We sympathize with him who has a greater burden of struggle than is proportionate to his strength.

As for the first cause of sympathy, it hardly requires explanation. It must be obvious that where we expect to benefit through the successful struggle of another, the resultant sympathy is the sympathy of self-interest and is akin to sympathy with our own struggle.

The second cause of sympathy may require some elucidation. We have all noticed, no doubt, that we have an almost insuperable sympathy with people with whom we have been in contact for a great length of time, or whose striving has been intimately revealed to us as in the case of an invalid or sufferer. Some of these people may have shown disagreeable or even despicable traits in the course of our prolonged acquaintance. But, be they saints or sinners, they have somehow been revealed to us in the attitude of struggle against the forces of the world. We have been permitted a glimpse into the interior of their poor defenses and our sympathy has been aroused, consciously or unconsciously. Conversely, strangers, especially strangers without the faculty of instant self-revelation in face, manner or smile, that is to say, strangers without the knack of revealing themselves in the attitude of struggle against those odds which we all face, have the effect of abridging our sympathies and of looking to our defenses.

The third cause of sympathy is also inherent in the nature of struggle. There can be no struggle where the opposing forces are unequal or, to be more accurate, where the burden of struggle is on one but not on the other. On this account, barring special interests, our sympathies are always with the weaker. The world detests a bully, a giant measuring his strength with an infant. What the world understands by a hero is not one who is simply strong, but one who, be he weak or strong, assumes to measure his strength with forces that are formidable in proportion to his strength. The same principle holds good whether the medium of the struggle is a game, a prize-fight or a war. Germany, in the attitude of despoiling little Belgium for example, can hardly hope to evoke the sympathy of the impartial observer. It is only when, like the dying Fafnir of its own legends, it lies prostrate before a more powerful antagonist, that it can hope for a measure of sympathy.

12. Generosity, Charity.

Here are a couple of virtues which, at first blush, seem to conflict with the principle of struggle. As a matter of fact, however, they are born of the same horror of failure and frustrated strivings which we all share in greater or less degree in accordance with the sensitiveness to pain that is in us. The struggle of the meanest and weakest among us has the effect of mirroring our own struggle, its anxieties and hopes; and the more sensitive we are the more we will be moved to aid those who feel and strive but cannot achieve—provided, of course, they do not oppose us in our own struggle. The existence of such qualities as generosity, charity and sympathy in all their forms proves that the struggle of human beings is not necessarily antagonistic except in its most primitive stages. In fact, as already indicated, generosity and charity are extensions of our selfhood beyond the demands of the narrower ego.

13. Self-Sacrifice.

There is really no such thing as self-sacrifice. Self-sacrifice exists in Struggle as an extension of self, not as an elimination of it. An act of self-sacrifice is an assumption of a greater measure of struggle which is demanded by the extension of selfhood. In the economy of struggle it represents the acquisition of something, not the surrender of anything, although the act may be fraught with pain, anxiety and fear. It may be said that the struggler surrenders his peace of mind. But there is no provision for peace of mind in the scheme of the world and it is doubtful, to say the least, whether the struggler could acquire it by refusing to assume a struggle for which he has become fit and to which he feels himself called.

In short, there is nothing in the real nature of self-sacrifice, so called, which is in conflict with the Law of Struggle.

14. Pity, Mercy.

He who appeals to us to have mercy invites us to put ourselves in his place and to remember that, in most essentials,

he typifies our own position in the struggle that never ceases. It requires singular unimaginativeness or a very strong cause to be impervious to such demands. The greater the struggler the more apt he will be to be struck by the full force of such appeals. Far from being at variance with the principle of struggle, however, pity and mercy would have no meaning save in conjunction with struggle.

15. Justice.

Justice, too, can have no meaning save in relation to struggle. To do justice is to support him whose fight has been in accordance with the accepted standard of struggle as against him whose fight has been below the standard. To deny justice is to confirm the evil-doer in his treason to the common standard to which the world has progressed and to betray him who has relied upon it. Injustice may, therefore, be regarded as the natural precursor of anarchy which may be defined as a state of struggle without enforceable standards.

16. Honor.

There are a class of fighters to whom the observance of the highest standards of struggle is of equal importance with the things for which they strive. High standards, in fact, take precedence with this class. They summarize their allegiance to these standards by the word "honor."

Inasmuch as we are creatures of struggle, however, it is oftentimes very difficult to live up to the dictates of honor. We meet this difficulty in sport, discussion, in our business undertakings and in war. But tho the decisions in honor's behalf may come hard, the fact does not belie its existence.

17. Magnanimity, Benevolence, Nobility.

Custom, pride and the law compel us to observance of the common standard of struggle. The magnanimous, the benevolent and the noble rise above the common standard of

struggle. They set themselves a higher standard, but they struggle nevertheless. Therein lies all the difference between human littleness and human greatness.

18. Humbleness, Humility.

The inability to discern struggle when we see it because of its inoffensive guise, leads many to misunderstand, misinterpret, overrate and underestimate acts, characteristics, persons, people and conditions; to render us unfit for struggle ourselves.

Humbleness and Humility, like other human and animal qualities, have no meaning whatever except in relation to struggle. Who has not observed at some time a dog of humble mien? That dog, whoever he is and however he came by it, has been thoroughly persuaded, consciously, or unconsciously, of his relative powerlessness, his lack of weapons of offence against a militant world in arms against his kind. He may have developed a greater intelligence than his better-born, be-ribboned brother. At any rate he is apt to have a more correct appraisal of his own powers and of the tactics best suited to his capacities. He has learned that it is better and safer to slink than to spring; to wait until the butcher or cook has disappeared before attacking the slop-pail; to seek his opportunity obscurely; to be wary of other dogs; and so on, in all situations. Who shall say that this is not a well-calculated method of struggle?

We are accustomed to thinking of many animals as timid, like the deer, for example. Timid in relation to what? Do they overrate the power of their enemies, then? The deer knows that his best weapon is flight. His weapons of offense are inadequate. He struggles, accordingly, like many a general in a like position. When cornered, they may both attack desperately. So will a rat. The soldier, having a knowledge of the usages of human warfare, may seek safety in surrender. Surrender to an enemy is also a form of struggle, but it is on a terribly low scale—the struggle merely to sustain life which, in terms of Pain-Struggle, means struggle for the existence of struggle and not for its increase. Our error is to be always thinking of struggle in terms of attack. Struggle manifests

itself in many ways, in flight, in surrender, yes, and in humbleness. Even the suicide, who represents the most flagrant instance of surrender, struggles in desperation against the immediate pain of which he is conscious, irrespective of consequences.

Humbleness is not a negation of struggle. It is a way of struggle; generally, an astute and seasoned way, growing out of many conflicts, many defeats. But humbleness is not necessarily an attribute of the beaten alone. So to imagine is to have a false and stilted conception of what constitutes a hero. After all, what makes a hero? A hero is one who experiences many defeats, takes many a beating, assimilates them all and, once in a while, when it counts most, puts in a blow on his own account.

So much for humbleness. But how about humility? Does not this represent a virtue which is at the same time a negation of struggle? It is true that we associate humility with saints. The Bible speaks of the good as "walking humbly before the Lord," for example. But this religious humility represents the holy moments of contact between the venturesome spirit of man and revelations of eternity. It is the mute surprise of the frail mortal who, with unlooked-for power, has suddenly brushed aside the mantle from the face of the Lord. He needs must walk much more softly than the world-wise pilgrim among the labyrinths of daily affairs.

19. Prestige.

However kind, however humble, sanctimonious, peaceful, modest, demure, unselfish, unaffected or democratic we may be, we never escape the obligation of struggle. We show this in countless ways, although we often make ludicrous attempts to disguise and even to suppress this very human trait. One of the ways in which the aggressiveness of our real attitude is betrayed is through the care we bestow on appearances. Why do we bestow so much of our time, patience and substance upon our dress, manners, the appearance of our homes and whatever is related to us? Why, except in aid of our prestige which in turn is calculated, consciously or unconsciously, to aid us in our struggle!

20. Self-Consciousness.

Self-consciousness is a state of feeling born of the wish to conquer, coupled, however, with knowledge of inexperience in the particular struggle at hand.

21. Blood-Guiltiness or Homicide.

Murder is a heinous offence because it is the most palpable instance of the permanent cutting off of another's struggle. The world detests the murderer because the act is an indication of callousness or non-sensitiveness. Conversely, where the murderer is able to show sensitiveness he is generally able to show cause or extenuating circumstances, and the effect on public opinion veers from abhorrence to sympathy.

22. What Constitutes Progress?

Human progress is constituted in two ways: Increased sensitiveness to all forms of phenomena and increased struggle resulting therefrom.

Conflicting human interests contain great possibilities of struggle as the world has seen, but to stop at this form of struggle is to stop at a low level of struggle and to limit it. If the world had stopped at this form of struggle, there would have been no exchange of ideas, no social intercourse worth mentioning and men would only meet to dash out each other's brains. Therefore it is that the spirit of all progressive laws tends more and more so to make a man struggle as not to cut off and not to conflict with another man's struggle. All progressively conceived legislation has this end in view, regardless of its immediate effect.

For it is true that the immediate effect of much progressive legislation, art and invention at present is conflict, but their ultimate tendency is to increase the possibilities of struggle for each individual upon non-conflicting or less conflicting lines with the interests of other individuals.

I realize that the question may be asked: If the aim of life is struggle, why try to reduce inter-human conflict? Obviously, the answer is: To release the world to greater struggle. For interhuman conflict is by no means synonymous with

Struggle; it is only a stage or degree of Struggle which must be passed. For to progress means to go from one degree of struggle to another, and the implications of struggle, strange to say, point not to more inter-human conflict but to the emergence therefrom.

23. Cruelty.

Cruelty is abhorrent to sensitive man because it involves firstly, the state of callousness to the pain of others, and, secondly, because cruelty involves the needless interference with or abridgment of the struggle of another.

24. Crime.

Human impulses have a centripetal and centrifugal tendency, depending on inner and outer stimuli of pain or the suggestions of pain. The radius of our sympathies expands and contracts in accordance with what is in us and the modifications of outer circumstances. There are inner and outer conditions which call for deeds of generosity, sacrifice and heroism. There are conditions which compel to an abridgment of these virtues and the ascendancy of narrow, calculating longings and deeds. There is current a saying in this country that "it pays to be honest." Perhaps, it does. I rather think it does. But it must not be pretended that it is easier to be honest. It is far more difficult to be honest, generous and punctilious than to be the opposite. The penal statutes do not weigh much in the balance, because occasions are innumerable when they may be surmounted in the same way that a man daily surmounts the dangers of a street-crossing.

Let every reader consult his own heart and see if this is not true. It is far more natural to sin than to punish for the sin. No, it is not easy to be virtuous. It constitutes the greatest tax upon human strength and endurance because all virtue represents the highest gamut of struggle. And it is far from easy to maintain the highest. On the contrary, it is quite natural to sink under the strain from time to time. On the other hand, it is equally natural, though more difficult, to rise and go forward again. From such temporary defeats, reactions which every individual suffers from time to time,

spring all development and progressions. They are the spiritual exercises of humanity, leading from strength to strength, from lower to higher standards of struggle.

During some such a temporary relapse in struggle, it often happens that the State steps in and puts its heavy hand upon the offender, dragging him down to lower depths than the wretch had thought possible for him to sink. It puts an eternal collar of iron upon all the healthy forward impulses which would have been his had he remained undetected in his temporary lapse or crime. Laborer, banker, merchant, physician, lawyer or official, once discovered in the descending scale of struggle under the stress of some great danger or temptation, he is doomed to the branding-iron of the degenerate and habitualized criminal.

The world credits itself with more virtue than it really has or labors under the delusion that it can always be had for the asking, and looks upon those that falter with the mercilessness of ignorance; all of which is due to the failure to appreciate the fact that life is not static but dynamic; that virtue is an attainment of struggle possible to all but not all the time attainable. Insofar as society acts not from the wish to prevent but to punish, it lacerates itself needlessly and defeats its own purposes.

25. Despair.

Despair is the name we have given to the realization that comes over us when our pain cannot express itself in struggle. In this sense, then, despair is a kind of untranslatable pain and is therefore an abnormal state. For pain should always be in a state of flux. We call those people pessimists who do not see that the pain of the world is expressed in the struggle of the world, that yearning is realizable in doing, if not in the periods measured by life, then in the longer spaces of struggle.

26. Ambition.

This is another word for desire, yearning or the pain to achieve.

27. Marriage.

Marriage organizes our life for struggle. Hence the sanctity of marriage ties.

28. Bearing Children.

The begetting of children is an extension of individual struggle not unlike any other. There is a duty to bear children; but it is absurd to claim that this duty supersedes the duty to give them a fighting chance. To breed without responsibility is to help set the world on fire. Nor are numbers alone conducive to the improvement of human quality. On the other hand, it is folly to try to change the way of the world and, as a condition precedent, await a lane of roses.

29. Love.

The gradations of pain are wonderful in their variety. They range from the most delicate nuances to the most powerful degrees. The love-pain suggests a composite pain. That love is a form of pain, however, is not to be doubted.

30. Sex Relations.

Those sex relations and sex alliances are permissible which make for increased capacity to struggle on the part of the human race. Humanity has made wide detours in order to avoid such relations as result in sterility, anaemia, enfeeblement of mind and body and loose family organization.

In arriving at its decisions as to what is good and bad in these matters, humanity has employed, as usual, not its reason, but its intuition which is our true life-line in the sea of human consequences.

Our modern rationalists demand that the whole matter of sex relations be submitted to the test of reason. But humanity never did and does not now rely upon reason for guidance in these matters. It places its faith in intuition which has enabled it to come forward from untold experiences in the dim past with a wealth of knowledge that runs unerringly true for all that it is inarticulate.

31. Woman Suffrage.

The evolution of the suffrage movement among women is a very natural and logical one. As long as man assumed the entire burden of struggle in facing the outer world in behalf of the marital organization, it was natural that all

authority and responsibility should be vested in him, especially in matters affecting the relations of the family organization with the outer world. When man began to push women into the vanguard of the fighting so that both severally assumed the same burden of struggle, it became perfectly natural in the economy of struggle for women to demand all the powers and privileges that go with independent struggle. Applying the unfailing test of struggle, it will be increasingly difficult to deny women the right of suffrage.

32. Sex Equality.

Is woman the equal of man? It is difficult to answer such a question because unlike things can hardly be compared.

If her potentialities for sensitiveness is developed, there is no setting limits to her attainments.

But woman is not and should not strive to become the same as man. The demand of some that women be judged by the same code of morality as exists for men is in some respects premature, at least, and in others, definitely absurd.

As yet, for example, no one would hold up women to the same standard as men in matters involving honesty, courage, etc., which are cardinal virtues with men.

On the other hand, woman will be held to the strictest account as to her chastity. She may lie, even steal or fly in the face of real or imagined dangers and no one will think that she has seriously compromised herself; but she must be chaste. This virtue is of too great an importance in relation to the peculiar part she plays in the family organization for her to be judged by the same elastic standards as applies to men. In the struggle of the family organization, it is her post of honor to guard the inner solidarity of the establishment.

In this connection, it is significant to note how closely all morality is related to the nature of the struggle which the individual in question has assumed. The sexual morality of the soldier and even of the artist, for example, is not expected to be as high as that of the preacher, etc.

33. Man and "Superman."

The "superman" of rhapsodical philosophy is a creature apart from other men, of a different clay, as it were. From the point of view of Pain-Struggle, however, this grandiloquent word, if it means anything, means more of a man; a man of wider sensitiveness, deeper sympathies, finer understanding, better discipline, able to strike hard, yet not insensible to the sting in his blow, nor losing touch with the valid interests of his antagonist nor kinship with humanity; a struggler, in short, sensitive to all that is sensitive, a man of cares walking humbly before the Lord.

34. Tyranny and the Right to Liberty.

There is no vested title to liberty. Whoever has met a difficulty and struggled with it has known liberty. He is already free who struggles with his bondage. It is, therefore, impossible to make slave one who struggles to be free. The same principle applies equally to a nation as to an individual. As long as there is any kind of resistance to the conqueror, the national entity continues in being. In fact, it may be stated as an axiom that the test of nationality in any people is in its collective will to struggle. Just what form that struggle is to take I will not say, nor is it important. It is sufficient that its struggle takes some form of resistance. It is not even essential that all or even the majority of a people maintain the struggle. The will to struggle can be demonstrated by a small group or even by one. As long as all resistance has not been annihilated or suppressed, the national entity is still in being.

The right to liberty is a negative right. Although liberty may not be had without struggle, no one has the right to consciously come in conflict with the struggle of another to attain liberty; and it is the latter act which goes under the name of tyranny. For tyranny is the needless interference with or obstruction to the struggle of another. While no one can grant us liberty, the interference with our own struggle to achieve it is an invasion of our rights.

Tyranny is not only odious in its obvious implications but also because it runs counter to the idealism of the world.

Humanity, from time immemorial, has been groping with dimly understood, hardly uttered hopes toward a time when human struggle shall take non-conflicting lines. Tyranny, however, stands for repression of the struggle of some in the narrow interest of others, be they one or many. It represents therefore a stage of inter-human conflict which is bound to be eliminated in the natural progressions of struggle.

35. Morality and Economics.

There is current a belief that life is naturally easy but man, by his repressive laws and institutions, has made it difficult; that, if we desire it, we need adhere to no regimen, reap without sowing, marry without responsibility, conquer without striving, extract joy out of life and reject its cares, make sacrifices without hardship, in short, that life is a ready-made jam which the criminality of the capitalist and hypocrite has hedged around with barbed wire.

I once heard a socialist orator describe the fall of a shop-girl in this language: "The poor girl worked all day, she had an invalid mother to support besides a younger brother and sister, and she was naturally deprived of all those comforts and enjoyments which so many others, who happened to be a little more fortunate, had. She saw a chance to forget all the sordidness, discomfort and cares of her home and she abandoned this life for a life of vice. Can you blame her?"

Certainly not, if we are to view life from the standpoint of the socialist and utilitarian. But viewing life as it is, we must come to quite different conclusions. Morality has no meaning save as standards to be adhered to under difficult conditions. Our wants and capacities for enjoyment are innumerable. They follow us and multiply under all conditions. But life is hard, not soft. Doing the easier thing is not struggle. It is surrender—and surrender is sin. The substitution of a different economic system will not furnish us with a morality devoid of austerities, hardships, difficult decisions and possibilities of sin. Morality can have no existence save in relation to struggle. Our sins may be removed to another sphere but they will be relatively just as heinous

and no one will be able to find a balm for our individual culpability.

What is the good of pretending that our schemes for economic betterment are a panacea for human failings, pain and struggle? The most that we can claim for our cure-alls is that they will help somewhat to surmount the present struggle in some particular and thus place us to carry on with other struggles.

36. Callousness.

Callousness is the antithesis of sensitiveness. Nature abhors callousness—so much so, that, as I have intimated elsewhere, absolute callousness or non-sensitiveness does not exist anywhere.

Callousness, whether in matter or in man, is the concomitant of grossness, unresponsiveness, inability to touch the heights either in feeling or in struggle. Therefore it is that one of the most characteristic traits of the criminal is callousness. I do not wish to imply by this that persons capable of terrible deeds are necessarily callous. The outstanding deeds of great men were terrible at the time and under the circumstances under which they were committed; but though they may have had to steel their hearts to the task, these men were pre-eminently sensitive to the nature of their acts, which fact was the credential of their humanity and their greatness.

37. Vice.

The vices are those practices, habits or inclinations which weaken our capacity for struggle. The instinct to struggle is so strongly ingrained in human nature, that vice appears to us, not merely as injurious, but also as ugly and vile. At the same time vice does have a certain attraction for us at times because it presents itself in the form of self-indulgence, which is to say, as offering a lower and therefore easier standard of struggle. But although vice does offer a lower and therefore easier standard of struggle, it can offer no satisfaction to those who have once known a higher standard. The original impulse to struggle, although defeated, still remains, embittered, crying for expression, often festering like a wound that has been bound too long, but by no means cured; and

there is a difference between pain that festers and putrefies and becomes venomous and the clean and wholesome pain which expresses itself in natural struggle.

Just as the athlete training to put himself in condition, avoids the injurious regimen, so mankind in its efforts to overcome the obstacles of life, has painstakingly singled out all the health-giving habits of struggle and lovingly given them the name of virtue while to those practices which are detrimental to the highest standard of struggle it has given the name of vice.

38. The Punishment of Children.

Inasmuch as we put an artificial barrier of protection around our children in order to protect them from the natural consequences of their acts, it is necessary that they receive some form of punishment when they act in a way that is injurious or dangerous to their interests. Failure to receive some form of punishment when merited tends to give them an incorrect conception of the world, its obstacles and dangers, and renders them helpless against the time when, according to the law of struggle, they have to shift for themselves.

How, when and who should administer punishment is quite a problem. What is called "natural punishment" seems to be a good system to follow. Above all, however, punishment should be suited to the sensitiveness of the child. Where a word or a look is sufficient, it is worse than folly to brutalize it with harsher methods. What a pity that society has not evolved a similar method—punishment graded to the sensitiveness of the individual—in dealing with adults!

39. Filial Respect.

The presumption that age brings with it a harvest of scars, battle-experiences and sensitiveness ripened into a measure of broadmindedness and wisdom may not always be justified, but it is well to believe it if we can. In the case of our parents, however, whose struggles have been more or less of an open book to us and whose broadness of heart, if not of mind, was always apparent where our interests were concerned, this presumption may well be made by each of us. This, I think, is what is implied in filial respect.

40. The Growth of Sensitiveness or Civilization.

The early Judæan Christians, finding life well nigh intolerable under the bloody sway of the times, confessed that life was not worth while, but placed great emphasis on the life hereafter in which the virtuous and gentle would find their reward. Their eagerness in holding out this future after death was founded principally upon the belief that men were virtuous or sinful according to a calculated appraisalment of life's guerdons. It was apparent that life-on-earth was but a sorry reward for a virtuous life, as exemplified by the tyranny of Rome over Judæa, the sufferings of the poor and so on. What incentive was there then for keeping faith with the Lord save in a supernal existence?

They failed to realize that virtue, sensitiveness, humility, gentleness and the like grew quite irresponsibly and in varying degrees from the normal processes of life in the experience of pain and struggle, leavened by time. No man can become kind and merciful through the expectation of reward here or elsewhere, even though he may imagine so. It can only flow from the attainment of ripeness in feeling and sensing, which once acquired, will persist. It is not a matter of choosing so much as of having or acquiring. And in the fullness of time these attributes of virtue—or as the Bible names them, righteousness—descend upon the world.

Thus the Hebraic movement among the pagans which resulted in Christianity could not have been possible if the world had not insensibly moved several steps nearer to the degree of sensitiveness attained by the Hebrews to make a marriage of the two elements possible.

Rome was surfeited with military victories. Greece and the whole Hellenic culture had lost its pristine struggle-interest and ceased to answer the want in the heart of the people. Even among some of the barbarians like the Norwegians, a certain unconscious disdain of the terrors of war had developed latterly, as was evidenced by the fact that embattled warriors would hack their own flesh in sight of the enemy in order to show how little awe they had for physical suffering—an evidence that warfare was losing its place in the gamut of struggle even among the uncivilized, and that the world was ripe for another experience.

CHAPTER IV.

STRUGGLE AS STATE-CRAFT

1. Gregarious Man.

IF WE are once committed to the Law of Struggle, we cannot think of man save as a gregarious being. Struggle in its higher form has no meaning or significance save as it effects other human beings. Low standards of struggle, such as are known to those animals whose only striving is to keep alive, are not compatible with the standards of struggle necessarily evolved by the highly gregarious state of human society. It is by contact with others that lofty standards of struggle are evolved. It is largely on this account that highly sensitive, aggressive natures seek out the press of men, the populous centers, for a foil to their struggle.

All experiments to prove that man can live and flourish in a state of isolation have proven that it is impossible to do so. Such a state would only be productive of stunted growths or the sickliness of spirit that passes for mysticism.

A well-known American writer who lived in the solitude of a forest for two years, imagined he had proven that civilized man can live and thrive non-gregariously. He ruined his argument, however, by returning to civilized life and, still worse, by writing books about his experiences. We are apt to forget that the gregarious habit probably developed as a necessity of struggle and is of incalculable value to the human race.

Occasional solitude, even years of solitude, may prove very stimulating, just as contact with the life of the large metropolis is stimulating. But this is beside the question.

A great many of our most important struggle-values can have no existence save against the background of the gregarious state. Such, for example, are justice, generosity, honesty, charity, etc. These could hardly have been developed save through struggle in the gregarious state.

The gregarious habit of mind often lies heavy upon us and serves as a check upon the freedom of our movements. We fear to be alone spiritually as well as physically. Every leader, every iconoclast has to look back now and then to reassure himself that the rest of humanity are not far behind or will soon be joined with him. For if they do not come up sooner or later, whence shall he draw comfort or assurance of victory in his struggles? For this reason, only the strong resolute spirits can embark in new movements and even they count on the ultimate accession of numbers on a more intimate basis than ever.

Since man is necessarily a gregarious entity and must perforce partake of the benefits of gregarious existence, the individual cannot be absolved from a measure of responsibility for the well-being of his fellows. On the other hand, the natural and perfectly legitimate propensity of every individual to struggle to the utmost limit of his powers makes him unwilling to be delimited by the petty capacities of the weak and backward. This complicates the problem of political as well as economic concordance.

2. What Makes a Nation.

A nation is a people having a common experience in pain from which they collectively re-act or struggle. The degree of their national distinctiveness is bound to be in proportion to the intensity of their collective experience. A nationality is not destroyed as long as it manifests any form of collective struggle against extinction.

3. Government and State.

The State is the medium through which the people at large or nation has pooled its power for collective struggle. Technically, the Government is only the executive power of the State.

4. The Functions of the State.

Now the functions of the State, acting through the Government, are several, such as:

- (a) Providing its citizens with means of protection from the aggressions of other nations.
- (b) Increasing the possibilities of struggle for all.
- (c) Preventing the strong from enslaving or destroying the weak, through the modification of existing standards of struggle.
- (d) Increasing the possibilities of struggle through the creation and maintenance of public facilities.
- (e) Enforcing the observance of standards of struggle attained.

5. The Origin of Government.

Government, as the anarchist holds, constitutes a form of organized restriction of the liberties which might otherwise be enjoyed by individuals. Nevertheless, not even the worst of governments exist by usurpation, but because they grew out of the hard need of the people for collective action. The anarchist who believes that government is unnecessary because every man can act for himself or by means of a loose communal organization which need only be assembled when concerted action is indispensable and not otherwise, forgets that that was how government originated. In the early beginnings, when the need for collective action was infrequent and there was little community of interest with reference to anything except, perhaps, defense against or attack of a casual common enemy, government was only occasional. Under such conditions, it did not seem necessary to institutionalize Government in the forms of the State to guard the common interests of individuals.

In the course of time, however, it was felt more and more that such interests as were common to all could profitably be left in charge of one man or King, acting with or without advisers, who was chosen for his ability in determining those issues and in taking such precautionary measures as every individual would have to do for himself without the special knowledge, skill, power and sense of responsibility for the well-being of others that might be expected of the Governing Power or King. Government originated therefore as a trusteeship for the benefit of the people at large. Individuals might

usurp the Government or turn its responsibilities into abuses but this does not change the nature of Government nor eliminate its uses. It might even degenerate into a tyranny, still its uses as the Government of the people would outweigh its abuses; and this is the secret of the power of all forms of despotisms. Where the abuses of Government patently outweigh its uses, it lapses again into a state of anarchy, and the probabilities are strong that the head or heads will not long remain the seat of power but will be swept along in the maelstrom of destruction. Abuse of Government, therefore, destroys itself.

Government, then, is really a means of extending individual struggle. To be sure, it involves the individual in restrictions. But in this respect it is not different than the checks which every man puts upon himself in order to retain his health, say, and get the most out of his powers; the regimen of the athlete training for a great test of his powers. In short, government theoretically extends the individual's struggle by organizing, economizing and helping to protect him in such of his relations or activities as are susceptible of mass treatment.

6. Political Liberty.

To decry government because it limits our liberties is not consistent if we are desirous of its benefits. There is no absolute liberty in the sense of being entirely free from obligations contingent upon our actions. The minute we act at all, we are at once unconsciously involved in a whole chain of consequences and inhibitions for which we become responsible both to ourselves and to others. What does the word Liberty mean then? It really does not mean anything, unless it means liberty to struggle; and this is what Government helps us to further. Viewed from this angle, Government does not deprive us of liberty but extends its possibilities. We cannot escape this conclusion if we bear in mind that the word "liberty" is really another word, an approximation, a euphemism for "opportunity to struggle." Whatever extends our opportunities to struggle extends our liberties; whatever limits our opportunities to struggle, abbreviates our liberties.

This is why men will stake all, will give up life itself, in furtherance of the liberty to struggle. But it cannot be said that a government existing by the will of the people and operating to organize and protect the people in its most essential functions, is inconsistent with liberty. On the contrary, Government is a necessity born of the will of the people for the maximum of liberty to struggle for all. It is true, however, that Government also operates, through its laws or edicts, to curtail liberty by raising the standard of struggle and enforcing it, although all are not prepared for it.

7. Genesis of a Mining Camp.

To those who are accustomed to think of Struggle in terms of fisticuffs and the sword, the assertion that Government is born of the Will to Struggle will sound like a paradox. I shall perhaps be asked, How can you deny that there is more struggle in one day of life in a small mining-camp than in a week of life in one of your large, well-governed cities? But let us study the genesis of the "wild and wooly" mining-camp and see for ourselves.

The fact of the matter is that in the beginning of the history of the mining-camp, practically none of the prospectors has anything. This, coupled with the fact that no standard of struggle has been attained as yet, leads to the feeling of recklessness and insecurity; recklessness, because the prospector has as yet nothing to lose save his life, which, as I have already shown, is not as important as struggle; insecurity, because the feeling of recklessness is in the air and there is no settled standard of struggle upon which anybody can rely.

Some years pass. Conditions have changed. Standards of struggle have been evolved. Various and sundry of the new-comers have amassed fortunes or have acquired various means of livelihood and profit. The prospector now has something to lose. He wishes to safeguard his possessions, the fruits of his struggle. Nor does he wish to risk his life so readily. There is no necessity for it and life has become worth while. His struggle henceforth becomes more subtle, occupies a longer frontage, entails a more complicated attack and defense. Laws are promulgated expressive of new stand-

ards of struggle. New-comers are compelled to subscribe to them. Functionaries are vested with power to enforce them. The mining-camp has undeniably reformed and become "better"—by extending its struggle through Government. The petty form of struggle involved in thievery, murder and violence gives way to the almost intangible struggles of industrial aggression, the battle for franchises, political forays, etc. What has come over the mining-camp? Has it reformed? Has its struggle diminished?

8. Foundations of Aristocracy.

Aristocracies spring out of the need of a nation for extraordinary service. In such circumstances, the ablest and most aggressive will establish themselves with specially acquired prerogatives or will be established by the state.

That part of the population which answers best to the national need in any struggle is in line for such ennoblement. This ennoblement may take the form of enrollment in the vested aristocracy of the country upon a hereditary basis or it may take the form of a more personal distinction, depending upon the traditions of the country in question. To deserve this distinction, however, the efforts of the aspirant must have been in line with the recognized need of the nation. On this account, it sometimes happens that the class most singled out for distinction by one nation happens to be most despised in another.

Take, for example, the Chinese. Many are accustomed to think of them as effete, timid, unreliable. Nothing can be further from the truth. The fact is the great body of the Chinese people have been at peace for many centuries. They have been a merchant people. Consequently there has been no necessity for the growth of a military nobility. The struggle of the nation in the latter centuries flowed along what we would call peaceful channels. Under the sway of peace, there was no need for the soldier. The latter was therefore despised. The merchant and civil officer or mandarin attained to distinction and nobility. The best practices and traditions centered among them while the soldiery were held in contempt.

During the same period the Japanese, on the other hand,

were constantly at war, civilly and externally. The national necessity could best be served only by those adept at fighting. The country was rife with conflict. Naturally, only that part of the population attaining distinction in war became established as the nobility of the nation. A true Samurai accounted it unworthy to even know the value of a coin. Trade and industry was relegated to the base and ignoble and, in the natural order of things, fell into disrepute.

Aristocracies grow out of the hard necessity of the nation. The center of struggle changes in different periods during the life of a nation and begets aristocracies of a corresponding type. Thus, for example, even among an expatriated nation like the Jews, the institution of aristocracy was not absent. The class that attained to this distinction during the earlier days of the dispersion was the rabbi or teacher-class.

The rabbis of those days were not merely theologians. They were also the political leaders of the people. Realizing that survival by a race in dispersion could only be achieved through intellectual discipline, they sedulously maintained the ethnic distinctiveness of the Jews by keeping fresh their peculiar laws, customs and traditions and renewing their national hopes in one guise or another. The Rabbis thus came to be regarded as the fighting vanguard of the nation. They were the ruling aristocracy of Israel in exile. All that concerned the nation passed through their hands. It was they who taught that the ignorant in the Jewish national crisis was as reprehensible as the traitor. It was they who studied, intensified and refined the racial potentialities of the people to the end that the separatist tendency present in the Jews should not be overwhelmed by the disintegrating pressure of the whole alien world. It was they who changed the tactics of the headstrong Hebrews of the times of Josephus into the patient shrug, the smile of long-suffering, which became the badge of the truly resistant Jew of the middle ages. The Rabbinate was cherished by the mass of the Jews as the pinnacle of attainment and, indeed, in many communities they had, up to very recent times, absolute civil as well as religious authority.

In our time, up to the recrudescence of the war spirit of which we are witness, aristocracies were being recruited from

among those who distinguished themselves in the other forms of struggle with which the world is rife such as science, commerce, industry, art. As the world grows in experience, the vital importance of attaining proficiency in these forms of struggle becomes more and more apparent to all nations. It has become apparent that wars are not decided on military fields of battles only but that the onset penetrates into the whole life and past of the nation.

Aristocracies by descent are under the odium of being unmerited. To be sure, aristocracies are often so constituted that they survive the service which begot them, but this cannot and should not impugn the original title to their patents of nobility, even though the standard of struggle by which they were attained has long changed. Nor should we harbor the delusion that democracies do not permit of aristocracies. Aristocracies may be recruited from among great democrats just as from others who have signalized themselves by distinction in struggle. All that a democracy can do is to provide for one standard of struggle for all under the law. But persons being born unequal, everything else is unequal. Democracies will allow these inequalities to assert themselves freely and in this way, cultivate an interesting and varied aristocracy of its own for those that have eyes to discern it. Democracies will allow inequalities to assert themselves freely—this is of the very nature of democracy—but they will intervene where the inequality in question leads to an abuse or violation of the common standard of struggle to the permanent detriment of the unequal. Hereditary aristocracies, as a rule, are not conducive to the rearing of the most self-reliant proletariat; they lead to the growth of a class often notable for its sense of public responsibility, it is true, but having a tendency to supplant the sense of responsibility in the plain people; whereas a democracy, if it stands for anything, stands for universal responsibility.

9. Despotisms and Democracies.

If we only applied the test of utilitarianism to governmental systems, I strongly suspect that we would have to yield the palm to the despotic form of government. All

political despotisms are fundamentally "benevolent despotisms." The exceptions are simply abortions and do not disprove the rule. Despotisms are admirably suited to the handling of large masses. It may be that the subjects of a despotism do not have the individual sense of universal responsibility ascribed to citizens of a democracy, but on the other hand, there is a certain assurance of limited responsibility from which there is no escape. This, coupled with the docility to authority enforced by despotisms, makes a greater mobility possible in the employment of masses.

With the growth of sensitiveness, however, the world has half consciously groped its way to the position that human worth is not wholly expressed in employment; nor is efficiency under all conditions the sum of life. A measure of reverence is due human sensitiveness. And so democracy was born.

Democracy in a state means universal responsibility. A democratic government means one that is founded upon a universal or general sense of responsibility for the welfare of the state. Strictly speaking, a democracy cannot exist simply by the passive consent of the governed. A democracy exists by the active will of the governed, not by mere sufferance. That is why a democracy is the most difficult form of government to maintain and the last to be evolved successfully. A democracy cannot be had simply for the asking. There must be an active and continuous demand for it and an unwearied vigilance in its maintenance. Otherwise, it is bound to relapse into anarchy, dictatorship or plutocracy.

In Russia, for example, until recently, we had an instance of government by the consent of the governed, in the passive sense. The consent was there, otherwise the government could not have existed at all. But there was no general responsibility for well-being. The responsibility was not in the mass but in a few. It makes all the difference in the world whether a government is founded upon apathy resident in the Russian peasant or the challenging interest of the American proletariat. From the nature of things each must have a government representing what he is. Slaves cannot have free government. Freemen cannot be governed upon terms of slavery. In other words, it is the sensitiveness to their condi-

tion as a mass which is the deciding element as to the degree of democracy which they can attain.

10. What Is a Democracy?

A kingship does not necessarily preclude a democracy; but it militates against the democratic condition. For, as the old prophet Samuel pointed out when the Hebrews asked him to choose a king for them: "He will take your sons and appoint them unto him, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and they shall run before his chariots; and he will appoint them unto him for captains of thousands and captains of fifties; and he will set some to plow his ground," etc.

In other words, a king must have his entourage, and the army of the people may become his personal or dynastic body-guard. Both king and court, in default of popular endorsement and support, naturally resort to the weapons with which they are entrusted to maintain themselves in their difficult and dangerous position. Nor does the evil stop there. The people at large, if they do not revolt, soon learn that the real power does not proceed from them and with this consciousness in them, they lose their sense of responsibility for the well-being of the state which is the very crux of democracy. They school themselves to lean upon those in power for the solution of all questions and to this extent become indifferent citizens, lacking in virility and aggressiveness, and undermining the vitality of the state.

But it is better not to be too dogmatic about it. There have been, and still are, kings as heads of democracies. And there have been so-called democracies in which there has been more puffed up pride, callousness, slavery and corruption than in many an unassuming little monarchy. Nay, there have been monarchies in which there has been the true spirit of democracy—in which the people were conscious of their failings and their responsibilities, while there have been so-called democracies that bragged and bragged eternally and yet lived by force and fraud and relished it withal. Governmental forms are important in maintaining a democracy, but a sensitive responsibility as expressed in the life of a people are more important. Contempt of kings and self-indulgence do not make democracy.

Despite the outward trappings of republicanism and democracy, when individual families are able, in the language of Isaiah, to "join house to house and field to field until they are left alone within the land," and build up great estates upon which, through economic pressure, they can force the great body of free citizens to labor for subsistence, when the mass of the people toil without ownership or title, when extreme opulence goes with extreme poverty and callousness with misery, then, no matter what we may call the government under which this takes place, it is no longer a democracy; and, from the very nature of things, there is not and cannot be justice in it, nor attachment by the people at large to the soil of that land nor individual responsibility for the well-being of the state; and the nation must become enfeebled, and its democracy a mere shell without content.

Whenever this disparity takes place in a democracy, the only possible healthy reaction is to so modify the common standard of struggle as to place a greater burden of struggle upon the rich and in so doing increase the possibilities of struggle for the poor. This is the only way of salvation for the state as a whole, or, as the Bible has it, "These are the laws by which ye shall live and not die!"

There can be no universal responsibility in the political sense without sensitiveness that is universal. The degree of democracy obtaining in any country, irrespective of its political forms and catch-words, must be dependent upon the degree of sensitiveness evolved therein. It is correct, therefore, to consider democracy as the highest expression and indication of civilization. For what is civilization save sensitiveness? A nation is civilized or uncivilized in proportion to its sensitiveness to pain.

Generally, sensitiveness to pain goes hand in hand with sensitiveness to all phenomena including what we call inanimate life and the intricate forces of nature as expressed in science. But the latter is not the indispensable prerequisite of the state of civilization. Even though the cannibal is notoriously ignorant of the science of physics and chemistry (as many of us are) it is not because of this that he is adjudged uncivilized. So a nation may be ever so proficient in the technique of art, science and industry and not be as civilized

as a simple little shepherd folk with its one emphasis upon the dignity of human worth. This truth is not always understood but it is universally felt: Witness the predominant emphasis by all belligerents in the Great War, over and above all attributes of proficiency, upon the humanity or lack of humanity in the one or the other! This, indeed, is the one test of the message of civilization which each of the belligerents professes to bring; and it is by this that each will be judged; and by this, also, as to the degree of democracy evolved by each.

There is an impression in wide circles in this country that democracy means the gratification of the greatest number. Hence, when in a given community a party of reform is ousted from office by a landslide of reactionary votes, our reforming brethren feel that they have no leg left to stand on. Apparently, the democracy has elected to revert to lower standards. But, as I take it, democracy is not merely synonymous with numbers. Democracy stands for numbers in the attitude of striving upward. It is not constituted by majorities in the key of indifference or retrogression but in responsibility and progress. As we cannot be trusted, however, to weigh votes but only to count them, we must continue to do the best we can with the approximations afforded by numbers, unreliable as they often prove to be. One advantage we still have—that victory gravitates to the most sensitive. But this implies that democracy can only be had at the price of eternal sensitiveness.

11. The Socialist "State."

As yet, the socialist state is only a state of mind. In fact, the whole socialist program is in a state of flux and varies in different countries and periods. It may almost be said that every socialist has a different conception of the implications of the socialist state. Historically, socialism has been interpreted by its exponents as communism, collectivism, nationalism, social democracy, monarchic socialism, anarchism, radicalism, state ownership, Bolshevism, cosmopolitanism, and simply Socialism as a Principle of Action, whatever that means. There was a time when it threatened to

become an exact science. This was during the period of Karl Marx. The latter imagined that he had rescued it from utopianism. Having failed of conforming to scientific formula, socialism became a form of opportunism with a trend toward an economic system upon which there is yet no common agreement among socialists. Socialism does have a distinct tendency or direction, however. That tendency or direction is toward the improvement of conditions for the laborer and the increase of wages.

Hence, the socialist conception is not really of a state but a negation of the present state. It is a criticism. As such it is often of practical value, depending upon circumstances, but its chief service is in the direction of increasing sensitiveness to the yearnings of the working class.

Unfortunately, however, in the popular mind, socialism cannot be detached from the philosophy of utopianism in which it was cradled. A utopia, by the way, is a state in which achievement may be had without pain or struggle. The utopian element in socialism lies in the assumption that the happiness of mankind is based upon economic causes and that economic mal-adjustment is at the root of whatever pain there is in the world; that we do not live in order to struggle, but struggle in order to live; and, therefore, that the assurance of an easy livelihood is the antidote to human pain, and is realizable thru socialism.

One would imagine that the socialist, because of this materialistic reading of the scheme of things, would be an avaricious, money grubbing sort of a fellow who spends his days and nights amassing wealth. Actually, however, he is apt to spend his time and his substance trying to educate the masses to their best economic interests and, in the doing, to invite trouble with the propertied classes and the police, to his own economic loss, all unaware of his inconsistency on his main proposition. But, although inconsistent on the main proposition, he will try to be devilishly consistent in collateral matters. Thus, our bred-in-the-bone socialist is at war with religion because he will have no other ideal capable of supplanting socialism in the imaginings of the proletariat. He is no respecter of marriage ties because it is inaccessible to

the economic formula and disproves the sufficiency of it. He spurns patriotism for the same reason.

In short, socialism today is not merely an economic remedy as originally advanced, but a philosophy of life closely akin to a religious cult, like the Hindue Suttee, in which all other values are treated as non-existent or subordinate, to be cast upon the flames of economic sufficiency or socialism.

Chief among the sacrifices upon the funeral pyre of socialism is nationalism. From the socialist point of view nationalism has no valid existence and this, despite the whole course of human development and this Great War which is pre-eminently a war of racial aspirations. Socialism has become so enmeshed and tangled in the terminology of its argumentation, that curiously enough, on the question of nationalism, socialism has lost its character as a movement of protest against oppression, has assumed an attitude of indifference, and upon occasion, as in Russia, has even played the tyrant with the fates of peoples.

As a practical measure, socialism is not nearly as dangerous as it seems because, whatever its doctrines, in practice it must march with the normal requirements of human beings, and, insofar as it is not practical, can have no existence. Insofar as it has elements of helpfulness, it is bound to be absorbed in the progress of the world.

Socialism becomes a national menace only in its attitude of separatism. German socialism never had that character. The famous Erfuhr Program, for example, was not merely an economic declaration, but a German national manifesto, aiming, among other things, to enfranchise the German proletariat by universal, equal and secret ballot, which it did not then and still does not possess; to obtain the right of self-government; to obtain the right of free utterance; woman suffrage; secularization of education; compulsory education at public expense; judicial reforms; a graduated income tax; labor laws, embodying the fixing of a normal working day; prohibition of child labor under a certain age, legal equality of classes of labor as between each other, sanitary working conditions, confirmation of the rights of association, industrial insurance, etc. All these demands aimed at the reform of local abuses in Germany, the grandiose preamble of the manifesto not-

withstanding, and were thoroughly German in character. German socialism has since become even more national, if anything. The cosmopolitanism of some of its denationalized Jewish projectors has long since given way to a hardly discernible internationalism.

It is only socialism outside of Germany that conceives itself at war with national evaluation.

In normal times, one may laugh at the denationalizing tendency in socialism because such a tendency runs counter to the eternal constitution of humanity. But in times of international crisis, the separatist, anti-national character of socialism, as well as its opportunism, constitute a source of danger and, if not checked, may result in national disaster.

Despite the mass of evidence patently indicating, as it seems to me, that socialism is but a very shallow reading of the motivity of human existence, it is clear that socialists everywhere are under the impression that this war will usher the socialist state into being—an impression that is gaining ground everywhere, due to the fact that the belligerent governments have seized many public and private utilities, are exercising control over them, and are regulating prices. But, as I will try to prove in the next chapter, whatever economic advantages are derived from these measures are not attributable to the approximation to the so-called socialist state, but to the advantages of the rule of monopoly under state control.

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CHAPTER V.

THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE

1. Struggle as an Economic Factor.

THE economist habitually sees all struggle as an evil springing out of "the strife for the economic necessities of life." He traces the red herring of economic want through all the pages of history. He hints that even the semi-mythical war of the Greeks and Trojans had the same origin; that the wars of the Romans, the migrations of the races of Western Europe, the crusades of the Middle Ages, the American Revolution and, of course, the Great War of to-day, are born of extreme economic necessity or pressure. To the same cause he attributes practically all human ailments and Pain itself.

Now our knowledge of that human nature which partakes of universal pain and struggle, should teach us, that although economic want may have been the moving cause in one or more of the great changes in history, it need not necessarily have been the cause. The unrest in peoples leading to wars, invasions and changed domiciles, develops in the fullness of time and is born of the yearnings present in all that know pain, just as the country-boy, though sure of his three square meals on the farm, may run off to try the hazards of the city. Does he flee from economic necessity? Does the prophet preach from economic motives? If so, what is his economic gain? Does the eloping couple flee from economic motives? Does the Indian, chanting his death-hymn at the stake?

Doubtless there are innumerable instances in the world from time immemorial of conflicts carried on apparently for no other object than some economic gain. But on the other hand, what of the obstinate struggles that are born, apparently, of sheer rivalry, of reaction against any form of established pre-eminence, of complete sacrifice of the present, struggles of faith, struggles for the vindication of ideas, the pain

and struggle of love, of aggrandizement, the struggle for fame and so on?

There is such a thing as a struggle for economic betterment, to be sure. But ere the struggle for economic betterment came the consciousness of pain and the will to struggle—sometimes for economic betterment, sometimes for something entirely different. In short, Struggle does not exist because of the need for economic betterment but, on the contrary, the striving for economic betterment results from the existence of the impulse to struggle. Something of the bitterness of struggle in the economic field would evaporate, if it was more generally known and felt that we do not struggle in order to live but live in order to struggle. Where Struggle has reached such a low ebb that it is maintained literally in order to live, it is time for the State to intervene because its interests are in jeopardy; for it cannot afford to allow the strong to destroy the weak or to permanently stand in the way of the weak. Struggle does not mean destruction or permanent obstruction. It means a certain equilibrium of forces favorable to the development of strong characters anywhere and everywhere. Struggle means struggle—not domination.

Capital recognizes the test of Struggle and points to the fact that its strongest exemplars have risen from the ranks and, in any case, have their origin in distinguished struggle. Labor recognizes the principal of Struggle, for it predicates its demands upon a foundation of value given which is another word for struggle. It therefore behooves us to weigh the demands of both sides in the light of the common standard of struggle obtaining to-day and judge wherein it falls below the standard of struggle or wherein the standard of struggle is no longer equitable to either side and should be modified. The substitution of the economic principle as the cause of struggle introduces a sinister motivity into human affairs which only embitters and befogs the whole consideration of the subject.

The fashion to find economic motives for everything has become so prevalent that they are assiduously dug up and established as the *deux machina* even in such instances where the economic condition at the time was by no means acute. For example, we are even told that our own Civil War was due

to economic conflicts of interest, regardless of the fact that if the South had not attempted to secede the war would not have taken place. Through the introduction of slavery two hostile points of view, born of conflicting traditions—the Puritan and the Cavalier—came into sharp antagonism until it seemed that each side was trying to dominate the way-of-life of the other. Neither would give way, and the South therefore chose to secede. But secession meant that thereafter the nation was to be impaired in its collective capacity to struggle. Therefore war became inevitable. The economic gain to the North was not an issue during the war and cannot therefore be made an issue after the war.

The American Revolution was distinctly a struggle for Struggle's sake—a struggle against tyranny. The cause of the French Revolution was not essentially different, although economic abuses had much to do with it. The rallying cry of the populace, Liberty, Fraternity, Equality, does not necessarily pivot around economic considerations. It is true that economic conditions for the poor of France was very bad, but it was not the hungry that brought on the revolution. It was brought on by those who thought, by those who, whether hungry or not, realized that the channels for the opportunity to struggle—sometimes called Liberty—had been gutted, and proceeded to enlist the economically disaffected.

One who is actuated by the wish for his economic betterment does not attempt to alleviate his condition through the far-fetched method of national revolt. On the contrary, he proceeds to amass a fortune. The agitator who spends his days and nights demonstrating that the economic principle is paramount, is belied by his own actions. The logical thing for him to do would be to abandon his profitless propaganda and follow in the foot-steps of the Rothschilds, the Rockefellers and the Morgans of the world. The fact that he does not do this shows that the actuating principle in the world is not quite what he professes. As a matter of fact, revolutions are not engendered by the economically disaffected, the proletariat, but by part of the upper classes moving against the other part.

The history of the world shows repeated instances of struggles disassociated from economic causes. The Crusades

is one, notwithstanding that the contact of races brought in its wake an increase of trade with the Orient. Another noteworthy example is shown by the Jews, a people supposed to be keenly alive to economic advantage, who have withstood the pressure of the world for two thousand years under the most harrowing conditions, although they might have enjoyed every economic advantage if they had been willing to subscribe to principles in no wise injurious economically.

Doubtless, I shall be told that the present World-War is a clear instance of a great historical event brought on by economic causes. Nothing is further from the truth, however. If labor as labor has no cause to seek war, neither has capital. The life of any mercantile or industrial enterprise depends upon continual turnover. Interruption in turnover is immediately fatal, as a rule. Inasmuch as the first effect of war is to threaten the turnover of capital in most enterprises, war is regarded as a destructive visitation. Some enterprises are wiped out, some are crippled and some, it is true, are strengthened. But on the whole, war comes as a disturbing, if not destructive element, dislocating business from its normal channels of expression or struggle and threatening universal bankruptcy with few exceptions. Certainly, there is a period of readjustment, followed by excessive profits in many lines but few enterprises are in a position to court the period of readjustment involving, as it does, an interruption in the turnover caused by the loss of spheres of import and export, the increased cost of labor, the falling off in demand for non-essentials, etc.

Capital will go far to create markets but it will not interrupt its normal processes to do so, because it has to reckon with the present. The cause of the war must be looked for in other directions. The War is a war for ethnic preponderance in which economic factors are employed as weapons of offense and defense as they were before the War. If economic considerations were the sole considerations there would be no war at all. It is the aim of each nation for ethnic preponderance which complicates the economic problem and makes it a subordinate consideration, just as the longing of each individual for individual preponderance complicates the solu-

tion of labor problems. But I will treat of the War more fully in the succeeding chapter.

The economic factors in our daily life loom large because they are so common, so tangible and so important, all together. But economic factors are not the cause of human struggle. They form a large part of struggle, it is true, but as the consequence of the impulse to struggle, not as the basic cause thereof.

2. The Spirit of Acquisition.

Capital frequently makes complaint that its beneficial character is overlooked. Unfortunately, capital does not address itself to the task of creating benefits but solely to acquisition. Under the circumstances, it is natural for Labor to follow the same line of interest and, instead of seeking its reward in the work created by it irrespective of financial gain, fights for the maximum return obtainable. This is quite in accord with the Law of Struggle and capital need not be surprised thereat, even if it had allowed labor a wage liberal instead of niggardly.

On the other hand, it is idle for labor to pretend that all it desires is a living wage. It demands the living wage when that is denied but it does not stop there. The fact is that in a world in which achievement in struggle is measured by the acquisition of property, few can resist the longing to acquire. Acquisition, in fact, has become an incident and the final seal of success in struggle. It is this that makes the solution of the economic question so difficult. We are in conflict with the aims and ideals of human struggle which have not yet risen above the thirst for gain, which, in turn, is augmented by the prestige of acquisition and the relative insecurity of our economic condition—a consciousness that never escapes us.

The aims and ideals of human struggle are not permanently committed, however, to the striving for wealth. The world offers numerous instances of individuals and masses of men who have risen above the exclusive struggle for the world's goods and devoted themselves to other ambitions.

The possibilities of human struggle in this respect are measureless.

Witness this tremendous Race-War which has drawn millions of men into the trenches, men who have the full realization that, although their children may profit by the sacrifice, they themselves in all likelihood will enter the way of death. Could there be any better proof that the craving for economic gain is not the basis of Struggle?

But since the world as a whole requires the stimulus of tangible gain in order to extend its efforts to struggle to the utmost, it would be premature to force it to create or amass without possessing, to struggle without the illusion of concrete gain. All that the State can do at present is to check the strugglers for economic advantage from destroying each other, by forcing standards of struggle upon them.

Some day, however, it may become manifest to the world that acquisition of economic values is an illusion of Struggle, not a necessity. All the world's pictures, statues, books, houses, devices, etc., are little in themselves but only as showing that a degree of Struggle has been attained. What is the recompense of the boy who wins a race? Nothing but the exultation of successful struggle. It is not different with the multi-millionaire who gives up his art-treasures to the public after years of costly and painstaking selection. Nor is it different with the creator of any work. It is not the thing itself that is of prime value to the creator—though it may have value—but as a symbol of achievement by struggle. Possession, then, and least of all, physical possession, is not a necessity of Struggle, save as a confirmation of achievement in Struggle. To strong characters this confirmation may come by the power of visualization only and the extension of self-hood; to weaker natures it can only be realized through public approbation; and to the weakest, by actual physical possession and dominion in some form. It must be confessed, however, that, at present, we are all very weak in this sense and must be constantly re-assured by the crudest means in order to be kept to our task.

3. Economics and Struggle-Psychology.

I have no doubt there will be some who will smile at my views of economic causes and relations. They will ask, What has Pain and Struggle to do with the Law of Supply and Demand? And how can you mix psychology with economics?

But "psychology" has everything to do with economics. The resources of the world should be ample to supply the bare needs of mankind. What makes them insufficient? Two factors that are purely psychological:

One: The withholding of large resources from the many by the few, although those resources are not economically necessary to the few.

Two: The growing diversity of needs for each individual although not economically essential, i. e., not necessary to sustain life.

As for the first factor, it cannot be seriously contended that it is economically essential for the great capitalists to do with nothing less than millions of dollars' worth of land, mines, securities, or property in any of its forms. It may be helpful or even essential for their commercial undertakings to possess this superfluous wealth but it cannot be said to be economically necessary. Why then do they hang on to this wealth? The reason lies in the psychology of struggle. According to almost universal opinion, which is reflected in our institutions and life-habits, physical acquisition is the seal of success in Struggle; and as far as it goes, justly so, because, as a general proposition, acquisition only comes with struggle. In the present stage of our development, then, great wealth is a psychological necessity only, if it is necessary at all.

As for the second factor, it is well to bear in mind that we are all capitalists by nature. We all wish our struggle to be vindicated by the most tangible signs of fulfillment.

In other words, our economic problem is fundamentally complicated by our struggle-psychology. All our books on economics ought to be re-written with this fact in mind and our definitions re-framed to include those psychological factors that loom large in the determination of economic relations.

For example, one of the chief difficulties in the way of the solution of the labor question is that labor cannot be satisfied permanently any more than capital can be. Had it been possible to satisfy labor, it would never have migrated from the rural to the urban districts. Its demands have grown with its sensitiveness. It is no longer a matter of merely keeping body and soul together even in relative comfort. The capacity for suffering and for enjoyment, both, has grown and is growing tremendously. Our growing sensitiveness to experiences has increased our appetites in a great many directions hitherto uncharted. We are no longer content to live in mud-caves. However needy we may be, we must have curtains on our windows, some few ornaments, some few pictures, however trashy and fly-specked, some burnished spoons—not of wood as formerly—chairs, tables, furniture, however poor, beds and other accessories which would have been accounted luxuries by our primitive forefathers. About five hundred years ago the use of forks was hardly known. Today, who will do without them? We actually throw away perfectly good clothes because they may be worn or have holes in them. We will no longer sleep on the floor, eat with our hands, partake of unsiced foods or do without soap.

As for those of us who belong to the so-called middle-class, if we but stop to think of it, we adhere to most amazing standards of discomfort in our daily life which we regard as necessary to our comfort. These standards are created for us by those or for those who are accounted strong, i. e., wealthy or successful in the most prevalent form of struggle. Every young couple, for example, on entering upon the marital state, feel compelled to acquire the modicum of silver or cut-glass ware, as the case may be, whether they can afford it or not. Why? Why will they so much prefer a more expensive seat in the theatre even though just as good a view is obtainable for less money in another row? Why will women rush precipitately for straw hats before the winter is done and sweat in winter millinery when the summer is still with us? Why are the poor in such a stew to keep pace with the fashions? What is the role of fashion in the world of struggle? What is the meaning of this primping and embellishment where all is effort and strife?

The fashions are simply the grand manners of the strong. All wish to be considered strong and take pains to seem strong. To this end, every available means will be employed. All primping and embellishment therefore is for prestige in aid of struggle. This principle is felt, if not understood, by the poorest shop-girl, the leader of society, the soldier in the army, and Caesar on his throne of porphyry.

Generally speaking, what is fashionable may also be expected to be aesthetically pleasing. But this is not all-important nor essential. The strong will frequently adopt extremes in order to shake off the weaker imitating brethren who will be sure to appear at a disadvantage in them. On the other hand, the ugliness of the fashion will not be a deterrent to the poor because its aesthetic merit is not relevant to the underlying object, which is prestige. This accounts for the frequent visitations and disappearances of expensive fads of all kinds.

In this connection, I am reminded of a story I was told about ostrich feathers. Prior to the War, it seems, ostrich feathers were very much in fashion, worn by the rich and coveted by the poor. They were quite expensive. The War, however, with its necessary economies and limitation of foreign markets, made it impossible for the African ostrich farmers to export the feathers either to Great Britain, her allies, or, of course, the Central Powers. The ostrich farmers, therefore, sent all their feathers to America and, in order to force their sale, lowered the price materially so that it came within reach of the poor. The poor bought with avidity for a while, but the rich ceased wearing ostrich feathers because the article had become "cheapened." Then, strange to say, when the poor found that ostrich feathers were easily obtainable and the rich had ceased to wear them, the demand stopped altogether. Today, neither rich nor poor wear or covet ostrich feathers.

4. The Right to Property.

Property is acquired by struggle according to the recognized or prevailing standard of struggle at the time of its acquisition.

If title to property so acquired was good at the time of acquisition, it is good for all time.

Although the original title to property cannot be impeached if acquired according to the common standard of struggle, it is amenable to the rules, penalties and exactions of standards of struggle subsequently evolved and commonly recognized.

Thus, although the original possession was not wrongful at the time, its continued ownership and administration can be naturally affected by the resultant inroads of changed standards of struggle in the economic field or even by the edict of the state, if it be in accordance with the common standard of struggle.

But the chief thing to remember is that no matter what disposition future standards of struggle may make of property, it cannot impeach the original title as wrongful unless the property was not acquired according to an accepted standard of struggle. It follows also that we need not march with those that claim that property is theft in order to believe that property-rights are subject to modification by new standards of struggle.

5. Capital.

None of the definitions of this term indicates that capital pre-supposes a psychologic as well as a strictly economic value. How then can our conclusions prove correct?

Capital does not consist simply of subsistence, tools and material nor of labor only nor of all these things together. All these things become capital only when someone assumes the risk of employing these values under conditions of economic instability for the purpose of obtaining more value.

From the standpoint of Struggle then—and this is the correct standpoint—value becomes invested with the character of capital only as an incident of courage or the willingness to take risks. In short, capital is value employed at risk in order to derive more value.

6. Labor.

Labor—I mean, of course, wage-labor—is that part of value that is represented by human energy applied without economic risk. It is not capital save to him who assumes the

market risk in its employment. As soon as the laborer puts his services at risk instead of at a fixed wage, he becomes a capitalist. Indeed, many a laborer becomes a capitalist in just this way—by abandoning the security of a certain income through the medium of the wage to join an enterprise in which there is the element of economic risk and in which he invests his wage-labor as capital.

7. Capital and Labor.

As matters stand, then, capital assumes the economic risk and therefore claims and derives its corresponding reward when successful. Of course, the claim may be made that, as a matter of fact, labor does operate at economic risk because there is no stability in the wage-scale. But this risk—if it is a risk—is passive, not active as in the exercise of capital, and there is a world of difference between the two—in fact, it is the whole difference between risking and not risking.

Labor operates without risk, but also with correspondingly reduced hope. It may be said as an axiom that labor works without risk and without hope.

To alter this state of affairs and put labor and capital upon a more equal basis, either labor must agree to operate at economic risk or the element of risk must be eliminated from the operations of capital. But we will go more fully into this later.

8. Wealth.

Wealth is that part of economic value held free from risk. Under this head, then, belong all forms of property not placed in economic risk such as articles of wear used for wear and for nothing else; money that is hoarded instead of being loaned, invested or banked at interest, and all forms of private and public utility or economic value that is held for direct private or public consumption or enjoyment.

9. Struggle as Labor.

In order to gain some idea of the complexities of the labor-problem it would be well to consider the subject under the following:

- a. Labor Seeking Employment.
- b. Labor Seeking Living Wages.
- c. Labor Seeking More Than Living Wages.
- d. Labor Seeking Better Working Conditions.
- e. Labor as Struggle.

In considering the subject under the foregoing subdivisions, I wish chiefly to present the problem from the point of view of Struggle. It will be useful to do this even if for no other purpose than to help clarify the consideration of this great question and remove it from the morass of extreme partisanship and prejudgment which prevent the recognition of the rights of labor and the limits of its just demands upon the world.

a. Labor Seeking Employment.

It must be admitted that tho the actual number of the unemployed in different countries at different times may be large, their relative number is small unless we include in the same category those who, tho employed, earn less than living wages. Their actual number, however, is large enough—all too large.

Unemployment is not only evil in itself but it is a plague-spot on the body of labor itself because it threatens to reduce the wage-scale to lower and lower proportions. Indeed, it represents an apparent glut of the labor market with the attendant ills that go with the glut of any commodity. But whereas ordinary commodities cheapened by glut may be discarded to a certain extent, Labor cannot, that is to say, must not be cheapened below the living wage nor be discarded at any time because we are dealing here with human beings to whose welfare we have become sensitive.

Upon the face of it, there ought to be no excuse for unemployment as a chronic condition. The existence of human beings in whatever numbers should result in keeping the human family occupied in providing for itself. The more there are the more there is to do. There is no fundamental reason why this equation should be disturbed. Labor has, therefore, the right to look for such a rectification of industrial values as will provide all with the opportunity to labor.

The argument has been put forward, however, that the claim of Labor in this particular has no logical premise because the basis of life is the struggle of the fittest to survive. This, as I have already intimated, is utterly wrong and untrue. Struggle is not necessarily competitive. Struggle has no other object save to struggle—to struggle from Pain. In the long course of human development, the existence of other human beings and other interests may have been offensive to us, our incapacity in primitive times may have led us to snatch from others what we have since learned to create for ourselves or in common with others, and we struggled according to the pain that was in us—according to our “light,” as it is said. But there is no basic necessity to struggle at the expense of someone else. On the contrary, as struggle increases, it widens in scope and more and more interests are embraced under its wing. Thus, the greater the struggler, the larger are his responsibilities; the smaller the struggler, the narrower his interests and responsibilities.

It is true that the world was not born with a living wage and the ability to find compensative employment for all. But the world originated with a lower intelligence and with a lower standard of struggle, and, if we are not to revert to lower standards of struggle again, employment and the living wage are indispensable.

Although the proportion of unemployed is relatively small, it is, nevertheless, a tragic incident in the struggle of Labor where it does occur. Unemployment reveals nakedly the fact that our life is conditioned by struggle—whether failure to find employment is due to individual or collective incapacity. In cases of individual incapacity to find employment—as occurs in cities—there is generally the element of unwillingness to accept employment that is uncongenial, unfamiliar or not sufficiently remunerative. Indeed, these are the main factors that account for the movement of rural populations towards cities. In short, an analysis of individual instances of incapacity to find employment will show that the cause is psychological rather than economic in the narrower sense of the word. (I do not wish to imply, however, that this incapacity is not tragic because it is psychological in its nature. Our psychological experiences have the power to strengthen

or to kill us. But we ought to call things by their right names if we are to think intelligently of the real factors that make conditions for us.)

But, as a general proposition, there is employment for all, simply because we are forced to provide for each other in the natural course of things. The increase of population does not affect the mutuality of this principle.

During times of economic crisis (which is a period of general timidity due to the demonstration of general incapacity in supplying the actual as distinguished from the commercial demand for commodities) inability to find employment becomes more general and more acute.

The only relief for unemployment resulting from such causes, it would seem, is in the standardization of production to accord with actual, as distinguished from stimulated, needs created by over-trading. At present, some have no employment at all, others are compelled to work too many hours per day. The problem is to fix upon such a ratio between the cost of labor, the hours of labor and the essential needs of the world as will provide all with employment. The Eight-Hour Law seems a step in the right direction, but we do not know. Perhaps there should be a Six-Hour Law, or a Nine-Hour Law.

To be sure, there are those who believe that we are really suffering from over-population—that, due to the exhaustion of the resources of nature, the returns of labor are ever diminishing. Certainly, no economic system can avail us if the increases of population are such as to outrun our capacity to provide for it. If the world is actually insolvent and, on this account, starving, equality in distribution will not save it. On the contrary, in such a case, there is greater hope in inequality.

But the fact is, we do not know. Consequently, we neither concentrate upon the production of deficiencies nor place a check upon the growth of population. One of the reasons why we do not know our deficiency nor concentrate upon the problem of supplying it, is because the variable demands of trade are given precedence over every other consideration. Also, we are loath to believe that we are suffering from over-population, because experience has shown that our capacity to strug-

gle in the economic field, as in every other field, has increased enormously beyond the limits of what was once thought possible and, despite our past and present limitations, the potentialities of human struggle, human resourcefulness and productivity, are endless. True as this may be in the abstract, if we choose to work, not with an abstraction, but with actuality, it behooves us to take steps toward the standardization of production and distribution.

If we cannot or will not effect such provision as will provide labor with employment, the standard of struggle is bound to be violated if not lowered. The unemployed must resort to riot or mass-violence, individual crime, or still the pain of unachievement with drink, drugs and the like which undermine permanently the capacity to struggle. The taint spreads in all directions.

b. Labor Seeking Living Wages.

All the world sympathizes with labor in its demand for a living wage. It is recognized that means to sustain life should not be denied anyone. The struggle to sustain life is the most pitiful and the most inglorious known because it is struggle at its lowest ebb or struggle for the existence of struggle.

Now, however much we may believe in struggle as a universal principle, we have gone beyond the stage when it could be invoked as a formula of oppression or of indifference. The world is too sensitive today to allow labor to remain forever on the rack, if it can be prevented. But how can capital come to the relief when it is itself in jeopardy?

To offer labor better than prevailing terms comes exceedingly hard to capital, because capital is carried along by the momentum of quite another pursuit or struggle—to increase capital and minimize its risk by reducing operating costs. How then can capital be expected to suddenly halt in its tracks, turn around and offer labor a seeming gratuity in the shape of compensation that is not forced by market conditions? Such an act would run counter to the whole thread of commercial struggle.

It must be remembered, also, that practically all enterprises start with an amount of capital that is relatively insufficient for the object in view and are further intimidated by the instability of market conditions. It is here that the element of economic risk enters. The promoter, however, throws into the scale all the other helpful factors he can command—his own courage, skill and enterprise, his borrowing resources, and the opportunities presented by the markets of the world both as to material and as to labor. Labor in such circumstances cannot hope for a better wage than is conducive to the interest of capital in its own struggles. It is a condition grown naturally out of the soil of struggle inherent in all relations.

To be sure, there are a relatively few instances in which some concessions have been made gratuitously, but the donors were generally surfeited with gain or the fighting edge for acquisition had been somewhat dulled by age or, in the best instances, where the possibilities of struggle by means of capital had broadened in the minds of the donors to include more than profits; but even the latter instance must have been preceded by a period of single-minded acquisitiveness.

Confronted by such a condition, it is natural for Labor to organize with a view to enhancing its market value or at least, to prevent the price of labor from falling below the legitimate life-cost which makes labor possible, and thus exact a living wage from capital.

Labor, no less than capital, has the right to withdraw from the field when market conditions render operations unprofitable. In doing this labor, like capital, is only exercising its elementary right to struggle. But admitting the right of labor to force the increase of wages in this way, it has still to contend with the increases in the costs of commodities which labor cannot control and which have the effect of neutralizing such wage increases as labor is able to wring from capital.

But this is only another aspect of the complex labor problem. Let us now consider the subject of

c. Labor Seeking More Than Living Wages.

It cannot be said that labor is satisfied with a bare living wage. It organizes with a view to forcing a higher and

higher wage irrespective of the demands necessitated by the needs of bare existence. When Labor attains this position in the gamut of struggle, it should by no means forfeit our sympathy. The sympathy of the world goes to whomever has the largest burden of struggle placed upon him and struggles valiantly under it; and this will be the measure of our sympathy for labor.

It may be well to concede, however, that Labor will never be content any more than the rest of us will ever be content. There is no limit to our desires nor to the pursuit of means to gratify our desires. The love of our own kind and the preservation of certain fundamental standards of struggle essential to the development of the human race entails a duty upon us to see that no one is denied the minimum opportunities to maintain life or struggle. But the fulfillment of more complicated desires are matters of individual acquisition, not matters of right. The quarrel of the individual here is not with any economic "system" but with life itself.

As soon as we get beyond the bounds of the reasonably necessary wage, we are no longer in the realm of basic necessity but in the sphere of psychological necessity. Psychological necessities are not to be underestimated either; they may be of tragic intensity. But here we are face to face with the intangible conflicts that go on everywhere in the soul of each individual as a result of the mysterious imaginings to which he is bound to fall prey. At this point, every individual has his own peculiar battle and must win whatever support he can on the merits of his particular case. His fight is an aggressive one, not a defensive one, and he must take the portion of the struggler.

Many a poor man would be glad to work with the advantages still left to the bankrupt. But the bankrupt is apt to consider himself permanently ruined and thinks of suicide. Why? Not because the bankrupt is ruined economically but because he is ruined psychologically. It is not the loss of ducats, it is the loss of self-respect as a struggler which proves the heart-blow.

So, too, the desire for things beyond the requirements of fundamental necessity, is one of a vast number of variable

psychological necessities. It is for the individual in his function as a struggler to force society to reckon with his desires, if he can.

But tho the individual's just demands, as matters of right, may be limited, society itself cannot escape the obligations created by its own sensitiveness. Thus, for example, the desire to sustain life is also merely a psychological necessity. But the time has come for society to take cognizance of this necessity, if for no other reason than because it is such an important flowering or developing point in struggle and because it affects us so vitally and so universally in our character as sensitive beings; and we need to retain our sensitiveness if we are to realize our fullest possibilities in struggle.

So, too, when we speak of living wages, we must think, not only of a wage sufficient to keep Labor in physical well-being, but also, such an arrangement of its economic position as will keep the way open for further achievement or struggle.

d. Labor Seeking Better Working Conditions.

The State itself should, as it often does not, provide reasonably sanitary and safe working conditions for all that labor for wages.

One may well ask, why this disproportionate solicitude for the physical welfare of the small wage-earner? What is there about the wage-earner that makes his physical well-being a matter of greater concern to the state than the privations of the poor student, the struggling artist, scientist, shop-keeper and professional man? Why do we allow the organizer of railroad systems, the builders of bridges, the founders of great commercial enterprises, the leaders of political movements fraught with universal benefit, to labor beyond their capacities until they pass the breaking point? Is the State for the petty struggler and not for the great—for the weak, but not for the strong?

The State is for the weak as well as for the strong; for the weak by seeing to it that the struggle does not destroy them; for the strong, by leaving the way open to them to carry a burden of struggle worthy of their strength.

e. Labor As Struggle.

But, it may be argued, in a world of struggle, why should labor be at such pains to insure its comforts when there are such innumerable examples of voluntary privation and sacrifice on the part of unorganized workers in all forms of activity? Is it not a degradation of the noble form of struggle that goes under the name of Work?

Here we touch upon the most crucial aspect of the whole labor problem and the one which has received the least attention—the yearning of every worker to engage in that form of labor that shall be expressive of himself, that shall contain the possibility of struggle from pain. Given a task in which they are “interested,” men will not hesitate to undergo all the hardship, all the privation that goes with it. That is why one man will pore over his work long after the day is done, or will endure the hazards and hardships of the equator or the arctic regions, while another will be unable to keep his eyes from the factory clock. Why, indeed, should one man grimace at the prospect of spending an extra hour in a factory and another stand knee-deep in the water of a war-trench and not think himself ill-used to face an enemy all day?

The truth is that the economic factor has been overrated in relation to Labor as in other relations. It is true that practically all strikes are ostensibly for higher wages or better working conditions or both. But if wages were too low and conditions of labor too onerous, why did the employes engage to work in the first place? The answer is that they engaged in the work in response to their will to struggle as it then existed. The work answered to their will to struggle for a time only. But it contained no possibilities of struggle in an ascending degree. On the contrary, it was devoid both of possibility and interest. Struggle could only be satisfied outside of it, not in it. To one engaged in the deadly monotony of labor without interest, activity without the exultation of struggle, the strike itself is a relief, even without a victory. The strike represents the interest which the work fails to offer.

The wage is not everything. The Belgian Laborers, impressed by the Germans, were promised good wages. Did this

fill the bill? They called it enslavement. So, too, those that work without labor-interest have to contend for emancipation. Here is where the real tragedy of Labor lies hidden. Not the insufficiency of the wage, not long hours, not unsanitary or perilous conditions—for men have borne all these gladly—but the complete divorce of sympathy for the work in hand. Instead of arousing interest in the work, employers have only succeeded in accentuating interest in the wage. Naturally, then, the centre of struggle focused around the wage. The work once mastered by "the hand," ceases to offer any possibilities of struggle. But the wage-question invites to struggle because it calls for all the inventive power, resourcefulness and self-expression of the worker. It is the one struggle in connection with his work in which he is a real factor instead of a pawn.

Doubtless, men will not long remain passive under a wage that is both insufficient and is capable of being increased. They will make many endeavors to force the increase. Many will even turn from their chosen vocations and engage in more lucrative occupations. All this, however, does not prove that the wage-interest is necessarily the foremost one. It may easily become foremost under certain conditions, just as breathing became the premier essential to the British prisoners penned in the Black Hole of Calcutta.

At the present time, the wage-interest is the only one for labor because the individuality of the laborer in modern industry is completely lost. He is not an artist nor a scientist. He is an anonymous worker. Sacrifices would be meaningless. I, for example, can at least put my name to this book so that all men can see how, where and when I struggled, and my achievement will not be a stone thrown in the dark. So, too, the soldier, however unnoticed, feels that the spectacular and heroic nature of his struggle, makes him the cynosure of all eyes. But the struggle of our laborer, as matters are constituted, if not represented in the wage is not represented at all.

Thus, what is really chronic in the labor situation is that labor has been robbed of its struggle-motive. Labor has no portion of achievement in the work that labor does. Therefore, unless labor succeeds in wringing satisfaction out of its wage, it is virtually in a state of slavery. If neither the wage

nor the work itself answers the demands of pain-and-struggle, it is natural for labor to lay great emphasis upon the conditions of labor, the length of hours, etc.

What is the lesson to be drawn from this? To me the conclusion seems inevitable that labor, too, must be supplied with the perspective and zest for achievement enjoyed by the entrepreneur and capitalist, for these are the things that make for struggle.

How can this be done? I should say, by providing labor, in addition to its necessary wage, with a share in profits, i. e., permitting it to realize the effectiveness of its struggle.

10. Why Values Must Be Standardized.

When all is said as to what can be done to compose the differences between labor and capital, i. e., to maintain the equilibrium of their struggle so that neither may be crushed by the other, something remains yet to be said. It is easy enough to talk about allowing labor to share in profits, but what establishments are in a position to do this as things are constituted? As already explained, most enterprises begin with a capital that is insufficient for the ends in view and, even when this insufficiency is subsequently supplied, the momentum of struggle—for even capitalists are subject to the law of struggle—carries them beyond their original objectives, so that a certain disparity always exists between the end and the means to attain the end. This is another way of saying that capital is always conscious of being at risk. This consciousness of danger permeates every branch of trade and industry and all actions are weighed down by the dread, even where such dread seems to be unjustified. Labor alone assumes no economic risk. It neither assumes risk nor attempts to mitigate the risk of capital. Why then should capital make sacrifices for labor? But, as we have seen, although labor assumes no risk, the fact does not save it from loss due to the risks assumed by capital.

The basic reason for the insecurity of capital is due to the fact that commodities have no standard value. Cheaper labor markets, cheaper methods of production, over-production, subsidized production in other countries, changes in

transits, changes in tariffs and the creation of new centres of production, invention and competition in all its forms, operate to upset the schedule of values. These unexpected changes in productivity in different parts of the world keep our markets in a state of uncertainty and turmoil; so many alien factors enter into the problem of the world's demand and supply that capital is reduced to the position of the gambler. The psychology of the gambler thus enters perforce into the operations of capital; every operation must bring its maximum of return for there is no certainty in tomorrow. According to every rule of natural justice, labor is not entitled to share in the profits accruing from the risks of capital because in all the operations of capital labor does not participate as partner but as creditor.

It is the insecurity of capital, then, with which we have to grapple and which is the chief stumbling block in the way of its regulation by any doctrinaire method. Because of this insecurity of capital—a quite justifiable insecurity under the conditions—practically every industrial and commercial enterprise is normally in a state of panic. The larger institutions have a knack of disguising their panic more effectively, perhaps, but this is about the only difference. How can capital be cajoled or legislated into a profit-sharing equinimity with labor when we all realize that the economic affairs of the world are in a state of catch-as-catch-can and that capital, for all its bloated appearance, has no assurance of continuity?

Thus all plans for economic conformity that are not grounded upon the standardization of values are bound to fail.

11. How Values Can Be Standardized.

We have seen, then, that however sensitive we may be to the upward struggle of labor, we cannot go with those who claim that property is theft or that labor is being robbed or that labor is entitled to equality of income as a principle of justice.

But labor can so alter the conditions of struggle as to earn the right and create the means to share in profits over and above market wages even though labor is not now in a position to assume part of the risks of capital.

We have seen that capital's claim to all the profits springs from the fact that capital assumes the risk incident to its employment; that the laborer who is willing to place his wages in risk as capital, can enter the capitalist class and habitually does so enter it; and that the conditions of risk assumed by capital are created by the uncertainty of values which in turn are caused by the lack of standardization in production and distribution. This lack creates conditions of real risk and the reward which capital derives as the fruit of its enterprise and daring is justified by the fundamental law of struggle to which we all subscribe whether we are aware of it or no. It is on this account that capital is so firmly intrenched in its right of possession and it will so remain. It is on this account also that capital is not and need not be ashamed, despite the fulminations of its traducers, as long as its struggle is in accordance with the standard of struggle.

Now let us concede that as matters are now constituted, labor as a mass has not the capacity to share economic risks with capital in order to win the right to share in profits. It cannot, therefore, attain its desires from this angle. But by virtue of its position in the electorate of the country, labor has the power to eliminate economic risk from the operations of capital, create standardization of values and by this fundamental concession, win the right to share in profits, simply paying capital for the use of capital and not for risks since there would be no risks.

How can labor do this?

By introducing a system of legally-recognized, price-fixed, profit-sharing monopolies in all fields of production and distribution.

The era of monopolies is not merely an artificial patchwork of doctrinaire ideas. It is something that is now being evolved and will gradually grow into being, except that we have the power to facilitate its arrival by intelligent adaptation to our needs, if we will.

But in order to see all the implications of the monopolistic idea, let us imagine that we can decree the era of monopolies into being.

Let us imagine that the Government (X) proceeds to consolidate all the small and large enterprises in every indus-

try, thus creating monopolies in every line of endeavor and legalizing these monopolies in such fashion that competition with those monopolies becomes not only difficult but impossible because unlawful.

Let us imagine further that in order to make these monopolies absolute, X enters into trade agreements with other countries or, failing this, establishes tariffs to protect these monopolies from foreign competition.

Let us stretch our imagination a little bit further and imagine that all these monopolies are profit-sharing as between employers and employees—say, for example, that fifty per cent. of the net profits is to go to employees beside market wages and exclusive of industrial insurance, etc., and the balance to the owners or investors.

Let us imagine further that X not only decrees prices and profit-sharing, but also sets a limit upon the salaries of the owners which must be decided by law according to some fixed schedule; as, for example, a salary measured by the degree of responsibility assumed and ability required for the position of executive, the replaceable cost as employee in the same or a similar enterprise, apart from the owner's share in the profits accruing from his investment.

Now let us see what must be the result of these measures.

In the first place, the creation of monopolies in all lines will automatically stop all gambling and speculation in commodities.

As X will limit the rate of profit which can be charged against any commodity, prices must go down accordingly to within the limits set.

In order to obtain the maximum profits obtainable within the limits set by the Government, each monopoly will endeavor to produce a quantity equal to the demand.

As distribution would be in the hands of monopolies, there would be no object in manufacturing or producing more than sufficient of any product nor would there be any object in scrambling to be the first to glut the market.

In order to increase profits, only one method could avail and that by cheapening the cost of production.

Inasmuch as labor would be entitled to its minimum market wage besides its share in profits, there could be but one

method of cheapening production, and that by improved methods.

Cheaper production through improved methods would be of benefit to everybody, including the creators of it.

Inasmuch as all monopolies would receive state-recognition and be legalized, capital would be secure.

Security of capital would result in the maximum of industrial and agricultural activity and provide employment for all.

Values would be standardized and panics eliminated.

Labor would have no cause to strike on account of insufficient wages inasmuch as it would receive in profits all that it could not obtain as wages.

Capital would not be in a position to grudge profits to labor, inasmuch as the State—of which labor is a part—would accord capital the security as well as the certainty of profit that goes with monopoly; and as capital would be taking no greater risk than labor, labor would be entitled to an equal partnership.

Labor could have no cause to oppose monopoly on such terms inasmuch as it would itself be part of it and profit by it.

The consumer would be protected inasmuch as the State—of which he is a part—would fix the rate of profit on production by fixing prices; and the consolidation of all enterprises into homogeneous monopolies so controlled must inevitably reduce initial cost upon which profit is figured.

Capital would not or should not quarrel with the restriction of profit;

Because the privilege of monopoly and the elimination of trade-competition would remove the entire element of risk in the employment of capital and, as we know, capital is quite content to operate upon a smaller profit basis, where the investment offers relative security;

Because the limitation of profits for the benefit of the State is simply a more direct method of taxation of income and would mitigate the necessity for taxation by other methods;

Because the limitation of profits as a national principle would insure stability in the cost of materials necessary to every monopoly—whether a distributing monopoly or manufacturing monopoly.

Although all industry and commerce would take the form of monopolies, the individual would have full liberty in the matter electing his line of activity, investment or both, subject only to the natural demand for his labor, capital, or both. It must be remembered in this connection, that the rule of monopolies would create a practically unlimited demand for labor and capital.

The rule of monopolies would not fasten an economic caste-system upon the world,

Because the wage-earning capacity of individuals would remain unequal and unrestricted save by the economic value of his services;

Because it is as difficult to retain wealth as to earn it, and there would be no check on spending it;

Because every wage-earner could invest his surplus profits and thus obtain the status of investor.

It must be admitted, however, that many holdings of capital would descend intact for some generations. But capital would be entitled to this benefit, in view of the fact that so much of its earning power would be employed for the benefit of wage-earners and the state as a whole.

Capital at present may object to the inclusion of labor as partner. But such an objection would have to give way before the realities of the situation which indicate that labor has many of the powers of a partner even if without the privileges of one.

Based upon the return demanded by capital as sufficient compensation for safe investment—which often turns out not so safe—capital should be well satisfied to divide profits with labor where capital has the assurance of a legally recognized security conferred upon it by labor.

The individual capitalist may be averse to forming part of a monopoly, and prefer to maintain a more precarious existence if he can preserve his independence and individuality. But the choice of becoming part of a monopoly will not come to the small capitalist at the height of his strength, but only after a long period of industrial or commercial struggle, at the end of which, consolidation will appear a refuge safe and profitable. In other words, the era of monopolies will be evolved as the culmination of an inevitable tendency against

which it will be demonstrably useless as well as unprofitable to struggle. On the contrary, monopoly will become revealed as introducing into the vortex of economic struggle the elements of order, cohesion, economy, vision and comprehensiveness by which the whole world will be the gainer.

There are those, to be sure, who cannot tolerate the idea that the world of the future is to be dominated by privately-owned, even though government-controlled, monopolies. To such, equality of ownership or public ownership, is not merely an economic concept; it is a psychic obsession. What difference does it make, after all, whether the government owns or controls a given monopoly? Is it more pleasant to contemplate the unescapable inequality of officialdom, of the mandarin, rather than the inequality that exists elsewhere? Or have the economic fetiches of the day actually bludgeoned us into the belief that there are no distinctions and no inequalities save those created by economic conditions? If envy is to play a part in the re-organization of the affairs of the world, no economic system will prove adequate, because envy, as well as all other forms of discontent, lies much deeper than economics. Economic equality is no more necessary nor possible than physical, mental, moral or aesthetic equality is necessary or possible.

Insofar as the inequality of income can be taken advantage of by governments to-day for taxing purposes, the medium of graduated taxes would still be available to whatever extent may be necessary.

We have still to meet the objection of those who make claim that the resources of the world are being outstripped by the unchecked increases of population. Is this correct? We do not know. But the standardization of production and distribution would enable us to take stock of the world's resources and teach us wherein we are wanting and what remedies to employ and where.

Throughout, the Government would not only protect labor and capital in its grants of monopolies to the exclusion of private ventures tending to upset the standardization of values, but also in order to protect the interest of the consumer against both capital and labor. Inasmuch as the personnel of every monopoly would consist of consumers who

would be protected as against the incursions of other monopolies, the arbitraments of the government would be a very welcome factor in the scheme of things.

Now the economic organization of one country through the medium of monopolies in all fields, including foreign buying and selling, would result in the creation of a very high state of efficiency difficult for other countries to compete with upon a profitable basis—unless those other countries adopt the same method of specialized domestic organization. This would lay the basis for international conformity in the standardization of values through world-monopolies operating under the aegis of the governments concerned. These world-monopolies, whether in the field of agriculture, industry or distribution, in their own self-interest and under the seal of their governments, would apportion markets, standardize production and values, eliminate useless competition, and substitute for the gambling of international commerce a modus of exchange based upon actual requirement and economy in production and distribution.

A fair example of a monopoly dove-tailing with the monopolies of other countries is the mailing service. The post-office, by the way, is an excellent example of the advantages of monopoly. To be sure, it suffers from the defect of being government-owned instead of being government-controlled and that neither labor nor capital has any share in it. But the fact that it is a monopoly gives it advantages which make us forget that it is operated by a niggardly and tyrannical employer and that its personnel have no interest in its success, that the people at large pay its deficits without knowing or the means of knowing whether they are paying much or little for the service.

As between State-owned and privately-owned, government-controlled monopolies, the latter are by all means to be preferred,

Because government-ownership would not be of the slightest advantage to anyone, save that the natural inequalities inherent in man will pass from unofficial to official life;

Because private ownership of monopolies spells greater individual responsibility and initiative;

Because it is much more expedient for the State to control what others own, than to own, operate and control;

Because the Government already has the power to control, while the power to acquire on such a scale as would be necessary is not in sight;

Because the Government, in its capacity of employer with absolute ownership and control, must become a tyranny and, as such, would be in conflict with the law and spirit of struggle;

Because profit-sharing is an integral aspiration of human nature (human struggle) which would not be available under State-ownership, except, perhaps, as a mooted abstraction;

Because the State can serve the interests of the people best by specializing in its governmental functions only, of which it also would have a monopoly, subject to criticism and correction, just as every monopoly would be subject to public opinion operating through the Government.

I shall probably have hurled at me as an argument the benefit of public ownership of the railroads in this country, because of the sorry mess in which the railroads were until the government took them over as a war exigency.

The fact is we have played the cat-and-mouse policy with the railroads. At the outset, we gave the railroads unrestricted liberty of action, virtually surrendering all control, and they used their enormous privileges to the utmost. Thereafter, to counteract the resultant abuses, we began to sap their concessions by setting up needless competition. In lieu of preventing the watering of their stock, we began the policy of baiting by taxation. We enacted an eight-hour law under pressure, knowing that this was only an indirect method of increasing wages and that the increase would be paid by the people at large. Under the exigencies of war, we seized that control which we never should have relinquished in the first place. Necessity compelled us to realize the advantages of monopoly. We thereupon took over all the railroads and now stand in danger of confounding the advantages of monopoly with public ownership. The advantages of monopoly will now be misunderstood as advantages of public ownership. Patriotism and partisanship will prevent intelligent criticism

and the understanding of the shortcomings and blunders of public ownership. Labor will become addled as a result, and as strikes are incompatible with State-ownership, its tongue will stick out with its desires and ambitions, but that will be about all. After the war, the Government will have the choice of two blunders; either to complete the blunder of public-ownership and go into the railroad business, or to hand back the railroads upon the old terms, break up a natural monopoly and consign the matter to the old morass of railroad baiting, cat-and-mouse play, strikes and competitive disorganization. There would be still a third choice, but—?

The principle of monopoly cannot at once be introduced in all lines of activity.

It must be admitted that not all of our industries are in shape to be consolidated into monopolies. Nor is it advisable to force the process of consolidation because disorganization is evidence that the industry in question has not yet "grown up." The rule of monopoly will be inaugurated, if not wilfully opposed, in the natural processes of time, as each industry matures, as the result of fulfillment in struggle. Monopoly can be aided but it cannot be forced. It must have its period of gestation. Allowed to come naturally into being upon condition of submitting to profit-sharing and State-control, it would be in consonance with all the implications of the Law of Struggle, conflict with no legitimate interests nor be confronted by a world in arms against it.

State recognition and control of monopolies is not only beneficial but essential for the safety of the State. Otherwise, monopolies, through the power wielded by them, are in a position to commandeer the liberties of the people and, in effect, usurp and abuse the powers of government. Economically, those great industrial organizations that have become virtual monopolies subject to occasional onslaughts by the government, are enjoying all the advantages of capital employed at risk although actually taking only a potential risk. These monopolies, then, command all the profits due capital as an incident of courage or the assumption of economic risk, although really assuming no risk save the risk of government interference. Nor, as things are constituted, are these monopolies under the necessity of dividing profits with employees.

The application of the principle of standardization and the elimination of economic risk would not only insure profit-sharing, but it would save us these ridiculous railings against great industrial organizations simply because they are great. Nothing has shown more clearly how much our thinking is out of joint with the basic necessities of struggle than the thunderings of our Government to large undertakings to become small or suffer dissolution.

All things considered, one of the most hopeful developments in our economic welter is the emergence of great industrial organizations. By means of them we can promote and take advantage of

(a) The consolidation of unorganized enterprises into coherent units.

(b) The reduction of wastage through the elimination of needlessly duplicated effort and expense in production and distribution.

(c) The standardization of costs and output.

(d) The possibilities of reduction in costs due to the foregoing conditions.

(e) The increased possibilities for international conformity in production and distribution.

(f) The increased facilities for taxation and government control.

All the foregoing features of great industrial organizations, added to the guarantee of monopoly given upon condition of submitting to profit-sharing and government price-fixing, would stabilize market-conditions, organize the output and distribution of the world, and be of incalculable value in making the elementary struggle for an economic foothold a minor instead of a major effort.

12. Private Ownership Under the Rule of Monopoly.

Under the Rule of Monopoly private ownership would have nothing to fear from the Government any more than now. Every man would be fully entitled to the work of his own hands or to anything produced for his own consumption or the consumption of his establishment or for any other purpose

exclusive of trade. There would be no interference with individual production in which there was no element of trade distribution.

Any individual who would regard himself self-sufficient in whole or in part, such as small farmers, hermits, and non-gregarious philosophers, could carry on their chosen methods of living without hinderance, by simply registering the limited nature of their productivity. It is only when production goes with distribution—trade distribution—that it would have to be carried on only as part of a monopoly in order not to disturb the standardization of values. In other words, while private ownership would still be legal, the standardization of production and distribution would have to be enforced as a requirement of public well-being with which no individual would be permitted to come in conflict.

13. Land Ownership Under the Rule of Monopoly.

As the Rule of Monopolies would only concern itself with production and distribution, land as such would not be the subject of monopoly for nothing could be gained by it.

Private ownership in land is justified in the same way as private ownership of anything else—by acquisition according to the standard of struggle prevailing at the time of acquisition. As for the argument that land-owners are not entitled to the “unearned increment” of land whose value has increased on account of the growth of population in its vicinity, this contention, if true with reference to land, is equally true with reference to any other commodity for which the demand has increased out of proportion to the supply. The basis for this contention about land is the assumption that ownership of land stands in a different moral relationship to man than other things and that the reason why men flock to the cities is because land is held out of use due to excessive taxation on building or improvement. But neither of these assumptions are valid. Land, like any other commodity, is the prize of standardized struggle. On moral grounds, therefore, the title to land cannot be impugned. I have also shown, I believe, that the influx of populations from agricultural lands to cities, is due, not to economic but to psy-

chological causes. In former times, cities were developed out of citadels or centres of collective struggle which, in turn, metamorphosized into trade-centers or battle-places for psycho-economic struggles and, as such, were re-duplicated wherever opportunity offered. The influx into cities at the present time is not an attribute of defensive but of aggressive struggle.

The whole stock of Single Tax arguments are similarly unconvincing. The advantage of a single tax over many forms of taxation is principally an administrative advantage, which would also be available under the Rule of Monopolies. The argument that men cannot subsist without land is also true of the products of land which, under Single Tax, would remain in private hands and still be subject to the employment of capital at economic risk. Furthermore, the fact that Smith, say, has "improved" the value of his land by building a mansion on it, is no reason for increasing the taxes on the shack of poor Brown who lives alongside of him or to compel Brown to move elsewhere. Finally, the confiscation of land would be wholly unjust, even if it were as practicable as it is not.

Nothing could be gained by monopolizing the ownership of land, as owning is but a passive act as distinguished from the improvement of land. Land-improvement would be embraced in the activities of all the other monopolies charged with the exploitation of the soil.

There is, therefore, no reason why the State should interfere with individual preferences in the matter of land-ownership, save only in such instances where individual ownership would interfere with indispensable requirements of monopoly, as in mining lands, oil lands, railroad beds, etc., which should be subject to the right of eminent domain in the interest of the people as a whole, and which can be so acquired on behalf of monopolies decreed by the State where these monopolies are unable to acquire such lands by private agreement with the owners.

But if State-monopoly in land is inexpedient, it is still more unwise to permit private monopoly in land for purposes of speculation. This can best be prevented:

(a) By the levying of a heavy tax upon all land held out of use or held for speculative purposes only.

(b) By forbidding the alienation of land to any but direct users.

Those who hold land for direct use, such as farmers, homesteaders and industrial operators would suffer no loss or penalty in the land actually held in use by them. Those who hold land for speculative purposes would simply have to accept the changed conditions as the result of poor speculation and get rid of their holdings to direct users upon the best terms available as fast as possible. The effect of such a policy would be to prevent monopoly in land for speculative purposes, bring down the price of land to its correct value as a commodity in actual use according to its use. Land-values would thus be forced to come down to something like legitimate levels. The pressure of an adequate tax, levied solely upon such land-holdings as are held out of direct use, and inability to convey title to any but direct users under the law, would divest land-values of speculative inflation, effectually prevent local monopolies in land, and meet the well-founded objection of exponents of the Single Tax.

This policy would be warranted on the score of collective expeditiousness; but even on its ethical side, it must be borne in mind that land which is held out of use simply for the sake of possession is, in its essence, nothing but a luxury to the holder, and should, therefore, be taxed as a luxury in favor of those who require it as a necessity of their struggle. No one is in a position to complain of taxes on luxuries or set limits upon them. On the other hand, land which is held out of use for speculative reasons—to await a better price—represents a falsification of the economic books of account, the withholding of commodities needed for economic exchange. This is a solecism in the scheme of things which we have the right to render expensive just as nature makes any error expensive; an instance of mal-adjustment in the distribution of land which must be eliminated just as mal-adjustment in the distribution of other products will be eliminated through the development of legally-recognized, state-controlled, profit-sharing monopolies.

For tho it may be conceded that the State has no moral

right—even if it had the power—to declare forfeit all private ownership in land, it does have the right and the might to discourage gambling in land values. Gambling, by the way, is such an assumption of economic risk as leaves neither production nor service in its wake as far as the economic interests of the world are concerned. Those who trade in commodities presumably give service in bringing things from whence they are produced to places where they are wanted or in such form as they can be used. In this sense trade is service just as truly as labor is service. But the continual transfer of title to land as an incident of land-speculation is an absolutely barren procedure as far as the economic interests of the world are concerned. Such transactions do not differ from gambling upon the exchange or gambling with cards. The land has not been moved or improved thereby. Unless, therefore, the land has been conveyed to a direct user, the transaction constitutes another gamble, a speculation tending to inflate land values and thus increase the necessity for that form of interhuman struggle or economic non-conformity from which we wish to emerge.

Thus, altho the State may not and, indeed, cannot, confiscate land-holdings, it can and should discourage the holding of land out of use and prohibit land-transfers in the nature of speculations.

14. Taxation.

The question of taxation has always been a difficult one, and to-day, it has become more difficult to solve than ever. Our taxing systems are hopelessly inept.

Through the medium of monopolies in the production and distribution of all products the problem of taxation will become wonderfully simplified. We have simply to choose whether to tax the profits, gross production or distribution of every monopoly. Whichever method we choose will embrace the best elements of proportional or progressive taxation, will be simple and uniform in application and justly proportionate to the income of labor and capital. The tax would apply at the source of income, would be paid at the source, and would thus become part of the maintenance and distributing expense of every monopoly.

In order to simplify the matter of supervision, standard books of account would be introduced and enforced in all monopolies.

Taxation would thus become simple and relatively inexpensive to collect.

15. Price Fixing.

The real difficulty would lie, not in taxation, but in the matter of governmental price-fixing. The cost of production or distribution would have to be taken into consideration together with an allowable profit as well as the interest of the consumer. Under existing conditions such an adjustment is really impossible, although under the stress of war, governments have gone through the form of solving the riddle. Actually, they have only succeeded here and there in bludgeoning down certain patent abuses temporarily, often simply transferring them to other economic spheres.

Under the regime here indicated, however, our task would be wonderfully facilitated by the standardization of values, through the medium of monopolies in all spheres of production and distribution. We should thus have the advantage of dealing with static conditions. The enforced maintenance of standard books of account would be of aid in further simplifying the problem of the standardization of prices.

It must be conceded that, from time to time, in the process of years, prices would have to be re-standardized in order to give the world the benefit of improved productivity or to increase prices where necessary.

To do this, no doubt, considerable means would have to be permanently employed. Even so, however, the cost would be justified as relatively insignificant.

16. Profit-Sharing as a Struggle Requisite.

Although there are some undoubted advantages to capital in the application of the profit-sharing plan, the real test of its efficacy and indispensability rests upon the fact that it is demanded by the law of struggle. Those that demand peace

in our economic relations cannot have it at the price of the complete subjection of labor. Sufficient provision must be made to allow labor the same realization or fulfillment in struggle that capital seeks. To expect to placate labor and run counter to its struggle is to demand the impossible.

Profit-sharing would have the effect of eliminating a degree of struggle that should have been reached and passed, the competitive struggle for the means of subsistence, a mean stage in the glorious gamut of human striving. Profit-sharing would break the back of inter-human conflict which threatens to reach almost cannibalistic depths. Profit-sharing threatens no vested interests with destruction. On the other hand, it would prevent the accumulation of wealth to indecent proportions by a few in the face of absolute destitution on the part of many. Imagine, for example, if the Corporation X should divide 50 per cent. or 80 per cent. of its total net earnings half and half with its employes, leaving the remaining 20 per cent. to increase the earning capacity of its plant. Would this threaten the X Corporation in any vital respect? Let us even concede that some of the stockholders would be out of pocket to this extent. But when we talk of changing economic systems and perhaps revolutions, this looks like a very mild kind of mulcting. When we further take into consideration the increased zeal that will be brought to the work, the elimination of strikes and all forms of obstructionism, the sacrifice of our imaginary corporation seems almost tolerable. Finally, profit-sharing is not only an economic requirement, it is a psychological necessity.

Profit-sharing with employes is not only good morality because it provides labor with a struggle-motive and thus raises it from a condition bordering on slavery, but it is good business, i. e., increases the efficiency of capital, because the zeal or quality of labor is enhanced thereby so that capital becomes more productive. Is it not a decided advantage to any enterprise to have the rank and file sensitive as to its success and thus share the burden of responsibility with its executives? It should not be an impossible achievement to find a *modus operandi* by which both labor and the entrepreneur can share in the profits and have something added to the capital invested which, after all, would thus accrue to the benefit

of both through the increased earning power of the enterprise as a whole. It is doubtful, to say the least, if capital would not gain as much and go further by this method than by operating with an indifferent if not hostile working personnel with its strikes and incentives to waste, depredation, etc.

One great advantage (to capital) of the profit-sharing principle as a practical measure lies in its elasticity and adaptability to actual conditions. Profits must be in being in order to be declared and must be available in order to be distributed. The principle guiding it, however, should be fixed and certain, not capricious. Nor should the uncertain prospects of profits be allowed to take the place of adequate wages. Profits should begin after the limit of the market wage-scale has been reached, especially where the latter is only barely adequate.

Governmental regulation can do something to make profit-sharing equitable. If the profits of our investors are paid in cash then a proportionate share of the profits due to labor would also be paid in cash. If the profits are not paid out at all during any year but remain in the enterprise then labor is to be credited with its proportionate share on the books of the enterprise in question until profits are declared. A great many other practical questions naturally suggest themselves in connection with the workings of such a plan, concerning which opinions may vary, but they are not vital to the main idea nor does this seem to be the place to dilate upon them.

These questions may require special study and may, no doubt, be fraught with many complexities, but the basic principle of profit-sharing is a sound one, both from the standpoint of the requirements of human nature and economic adjustment. The institution of profit-sharing would not run counter to any economic laws, nor result in confiscation nor the violent upheaval of industry or market conditions. No industry would be committed to any unwarranted burden of expense because, unlike wages, one year's scale of profits would be no criterion of the next year's profits.

17. Choosing Economic Systems.

It seems, then, that the solution of our economic problems, insofar as they can and must be solved, lies in

One: The elimination of economic risk from the operations of capital, through monopoly and standardization.

Two: Profit-sharing between labor and capital.

Three: International conformity in the regulation of monopoly and, through this regulation, the universal standardization of value and supply.

This looks like a program of slow realization. Admitted. But is there a more quickly realizable one in sight? I hardly think so. On the other hand, this is the program toward which we are tending anyway, save that it is our power to impede or accelerate its realization, depending upon the mental attitude we bring to the problem.

The chief difficulty in the way of the revolutionary is that he declines to work with the material which God has given him. He will only work with the motives, methods and men of another world. And yet we know that whatever improvement may be vouchsafed us must develop from things as they are.

The manufacturer who makes a better shirt for less money and more of them per day than his competitor may be actuated by a purely personal struggle, but the world is the gainer thereby. The projector of the large emporium or department-store may be actuated by quite narrow motives, but as the scope of his struggle widens, he is compelled to provide employment to thousands of others and, to this extent, to march with their interests. In the economic field, these motives and considerations are the pieces with which it is given us to play.

Due consideration must be given to the fact that the greater the struggler the more possibilities he opens up for others. Nor can the negative leveling by the small struggler be regarded as an all-sufficing substitute for the ability, genius and daring of the great. If it is wrong for the employer to prey upon labor, it is mean and paltry for the employe to stand in opposition to the great struggler simply because he is great. In the main, the interests of employer and employe

run together and the point of conflict only begins where the usual unity of interests cease to dove-tail.

Much has been said against exploitation simply as exploitation. As a matter of fact, we all exploit one another. The government exploits the taxpayers of the country and vice versa. The taxpayers exploit the labor of its school-teachers, and the school-teachers exploit the taxpayers. Even the school-children "exploit" and are "exploited." It is all a question of just relationships. It serves no purpose to be either prejudiced or intimidated by shibboleths.

Now, I contend that the valid causes of antagonism between labor and capital will be eliminated by the application and development of the remedies above mentioned, i. e., the curtailment or increase of the hours of labor in accordance with actual requirements, profit-sharing over and above market wages, standardization of values through the growth of monopolies controlled by the state, and international conformity in the regulation of international monopolies with a view to the standardization of the bases of exchange in all products between nations.

There are those who believe in equality of income. I do not share this view. Equality of income without equality in the ability to dispose of it would leave things pretty much as they are in a very short time. Besides, we should not attempt to perform such an operation upon human nature as will tend to remove those incentives to initiative and achievement which are such a large factor, as yet, in determining the limits of our activity or struggle; for it cannot be denied that for the great mass of human beings, income and economic achievement generally constitute a large part of the pain that expresses itself in struggle and are the measures of their progress in struggle, as I have tried to explain elsewhere. To most of us the incubus of having to provide for our livelihood has not been without benefit, regardless of the fact that we may feel called to higher things. To many the elimination of this necessity would only result in self-indulgence and general decline in moral standards; for morality presupposes difficult conditions of struggle to be surmounted.

In short, the law of struggle does not co-exist with sinecures in the economic field any more than in any other field.

Neither labor nor capital can do without provision for expression in struggle; existing conditions and all systems projected for the future will have to square with the law of struggle. Nevertheless, the interests of labor and capital are not necessarily antagonistic, save only where short-sightedness and incontinence makes them so, just as when partners quarrel. A recognition of the law of struggle as a universal principle in human nature might lead to the allowance of natural avenues of expression for both sides and the dove-tailing of interests. For although the law of struggle cannot be denied, it does not necessarily involve economic antagonism nor mutual destruction. The profit-sharing principle, which is really a very ancient principle of equity, and a very simple one, releases both sides to the struggle for which we are all intended, but upon non-conflicting lines.

All the schemes for economic conformity so far advanced seem to be lacking in conformity with human nature. Whoever wishes to re-create the economic world for us upon a new plan must see to it that his plan conforms to the fundamental characteristics of human beings and human relations; as, for example, to the fact

That economic stress is not ascribable to any class, caste or set of men but is quite in keeping with the history of the world and the natural scheme of things; and, whether intensified by over-population or maladjustment, can only be overcome, now as heretofore, by Struggle—whether Struggle takes the form of restraint, improved production, re-adjustment or all of these things.

That we are all capitalists by nature and have the wish to acquire apart from the bare needs of existence.

That most of our so-called economic needs are not “economic” at all but psychological.

That, due to these psychological needs, our economic wants keep continually increasing and will continue to increase.

That the spirit of acquisition is, indeed, part of our struggle-nature.

That, due to the natural inequality in men, equality of wealth is not possible even if it were desirable—that inequality

of wealth is, in fact, only one of the phases of the inequality in men.

That, nevertheless, the human family has attained to a state of sensitiveness which dictates that the bare needs for subsistence—or the minimum requirements of struggle—shall not be the subject of interhuman conflict.

That labor demands a share in profits over and above market-wages, as the psychological necessity of its struggle.

That the security of capital in turn is dependent upon the standardization of values.

That industries in the fullness of their development tend to large combinations or monopolies.

That the standardization of values can be effected through the growth of monopolies and international conformity in the regulation of them.

That monopolies without the capacity to abuse their powers are economically useful as tending to eliminate reduplication of effort, disorganization and waste.

That economic re-adjustment upon less mortally conflicting lines is dependent, in large measure, upon the security of capital.

That labor, by co-operating to eliminate economic risk from the operations of capital, can earn the right to share in profits over and above market-wages, through the medium of state-recognized monopolies.

CHAPTER VI.

STRUGGLE AS WAR

1. From Peace To War.

TO ONE schooled in Pain-Struggle, there is still something startling, tho nothing unnatural, in war. War reveals man in a more elementary attitude of struggle than is usually apparent in the complex ramifications of the struggles prevailing in peace-times. The grocer, the baker and the candlestick-maker are also at war. But it is a struggle to which we have become accustomed as something normal; nor does it stand out in such sharp relief as war, because the wars of trade and industry are less picturesque, its alignments harder to discern, its attacks and defences, victories and defeats more difficult to follow.

Certainly, war is another manifestation of the law of struggle. To say, however, that war is a revelation of man in his more natural state is a fallacy, unless we mean by the word "natural" a lower state. War is a reversion to type, to a lower standard of struggle as between man and man. Above all, war is not synonymous with struggle. It is only a phase of struggle, a small phase; nor is it an eternally indispensable phase. So much for war as war.

When war becomes part of a great aspiration, however, it takes on the character of its aspiration, becomes one with it, and thus attains to greatness in the scale of struggle. The finite becomes infinite in its implication. War, then, becomes a great manifestation of struggle, not because it is war, but because it becomes the embodiment of a great idea, full of innate religious force, transfiguring all classes and all relations.

Our cynics profess to see no possible relationship between war and religion. And yet, it is the force of religious conviction that prepares us spiritually for war. The religious feel consciously what all human beings feel subconsciously—that life itself has nothing final in it. It is only of value and sig-

nificance in conjunction with struggle. Only to live is to be on a par with the lowest of created things. It is the unconscious perception of this truth that creates the background for that dangerous psychological impasse between nations which is apt to culminate in war. Man was made to struggle and, given a cause, no nation will evade its struggle even if deaths and destructions are incident to it.

It must not surprise us, therefore, when a nation is impelled to rush to arms in order to avenge the killing of a few citizens on the sea or in its border, where the killing is an infringement of its sovereignty. It is true that the resulting war must inevitably involve the loss of thousands more, but this is no argument. It is not the number of those killed that matters; it is the significance of their dying that counts. It is one thing to die fighting and quite another to be cut down like swine.

Furthermore, the concept of nationality is inconsistent with submission to the way-of-life or individuality of another nation. A passing wrong may be endured. But permanent obstruction to the natural struggle of a nation cannot be tolerated and is not compatible with the maintenance of national individuality which is the essence of national differentiation.

There are those indeed who ascribe this War and all other wars to economic causes, just as they ascribe individual struggle to economic causes. I shall try to show that the wars of nations, like the wars of individuals, are due, not to economic causes but to the wish for individual or ethnic preponderance in which economic mastery is an incident, a weapon.

Let us place ever so much insistence upon the economic pretensions of nations, they will not seem sufficient causes of war. The hiatus between peace and war cannot be bridged by such a motive. It is only by changing our conceptions of the nature of human beings and the real motivity in life that we can gain an insight into the causes that loosen the dogs of war.

That the individual is a creature of struggle we have seen. It cannot be expected, therefore, that the mass of individuals comprised in national groups will be of a different clay. It is a fact, however, that the individual subscribes to certain standards of struggle and reckons with them, and that,

on the whole, the standards of struggle for the individual are higher than those set for national groups by national groups. Moreover, when a standard of struggle has been attained among individuals, fear of the contumely of men and the penal statutes enacted to keep men to the highest common standard of struggle, prevents the individual or, at any rate, checks him to a degree, from the danger of falling back to the old abyss from whence he emerged. But while the individual is thus compassed about by his sense of personal responsibility, the national group has no standards of struggle to which it holds itself amenable. Neither law nor tradition has fixed the standard of struggle for the national group and there are no dangers compelling it to a permanent standard of struggle save only the temporary, shifting considerations of expediency or fear of this or that power or powers. Under these conditions, it is not only difficult but practically impossible for one isolated national group to consistently maintain a higher standard of struggle than the rest of the powers or even to hold permanently to any standard.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the usages of national groups in relation to each other have not kept pace with the development of the individual but partake of the atmosphere of mutual suspicion in which they live. In the state of international anarchy in which nations live, it is natural for some national groups to exist upon a predatory basis and for others to arm in self-defence. Thus, although nations as such exist in a state of anarchy, it is the predatory groups that create the *modus vivendi* for the rest.

These being the conditions, it is useless to rail against armaments unless we are to indorse the corollary that it is wrong to defend ourselves against possible aggression. It is not against armaments that we must be opposed but against theft—the theft of lands and peoples. Eliminate the possibility of the theft or subjugation of alien lands and the whole reason for armaments disappears. What we must attack, then, is not armament but the belief that there are ends to be obtained—ends other than self-defense—which can only be obtained thru the conflict of arms and which are thought worthy of being acquired through this means. The resort to arms for purposes of self-defense is certainly justifiable but, as a matter of fact,

it is the lust for ends other than self-defense which makes national armaments necessary even for the purpose of self-defense!

War, then, is not a crime in itself but only when associated with a criminal object. A much greater crime both to the nation involved and to the world at large is submission to conquest. Submission to conquest involves, first, an immediate and far-reaching deterioration of the progressive elements in the conquered and a degradation of its whole moral gamut; for the forcible admixture of peoples attendant upon conquest must result in moral chaos, in which the maintenance of a civic or national conscience is indefinitely suspended and no man can adhere to any standard or trust his fellow; and the sinister influence of any people debauched and degraded by conquest, must emanate to all the world. Secondly, the resultant influence upon the conqueror is to numb his sensitive faculties with the state of glut which is the prelude of that callousness, self-indulgence, moral obloquy and inner stagnation characteristic of all surfeited nations and which must ultimately lead to their undoing. Third, submission by one nation to conquest upsets the balance of power among other nations and leads to that fatal feeling of insecurity thruout the world.

We are familiar with this last proposition in a general way, but have we ever stopped to consider its practical workings? It is very simple. For example, if a nation, A, conquers B, A must thereafter maintain a standing army to keep B in subjection. Now C cannot afford to allow its neighbor A to possess a stronger armament than it (C) possesses because of the menace constituted by this disparity in armed force. C consequently feels compelled to increase its budget of army and navy expenses, which it proceeds to do. D, a neighbor of C, happens to be in the same relation to C from a military standpoint as C was to A. As a result of C's increase of armament D, too, must make an increased showing. And so the movement for increased armaments spreads from nation to nation.

It is obvious that it would have been far better for B, as well as for the rest of the world, if it had fought until it was absolutely destroyed rather than submit to conquest. This,

according to the Law of Struggle, is a cardinal sin. For a single nation holding one or more races in subjugation by force, becomes a morass of pestilential proportions, carrying the gospel of permanent and increasing militarism to its neighbors and to all the other countries of the world. The most intolerable aspect of this condition of affairs is, that on account of the burglarious attacks upon the free life of the world by these robber nations, other nations who are content to live at peace with the world, i. e., to struggle along non-destructive lines, like the United States, are likewise compelled to arm and to stimulate an enforced easily-misunderstood martial propaganda in self-defense, until they, too, are drawn into the morass of militarism from which they vainly try to escape. The whole world is dragged willy-nilly after the triumphal chariot-wheels of the nations that try to achieve success in subjugating other peoples. Thus it is that blood cries for blood, and no nation is absolved from punishment when one sister nation is permitted to be crushed by another.

It becomes apparent, then, that the whole guilt of the military system of the world rests upon the shoulders of the nations that rob. If nations were to unite to-day on the principle of allowing every people the unrestricted possession of its own soil, the entire military system of the world would disappear like a nightmare because there would be left no object for the maintenance of such enormous expenditures of thought, energy and resources. The whole paraphernalia of war would be discarded as the junk of an out-worn form of struggle peculiar to a hyena-period in the life of man. To talk of peace, of banding in organizations for the spreading of the gospel of disarmament, is fatuous where such organizations or movements do not place the elimination of thievery and the freeing of subject peoples in the foreground of their peace-programs. There can be no peace save the peace of justice, the peace of right-doing, of restoring to each what belongs to each.

2. The Struggle for Ethnic Preponderance.

The problems occasioned by economic non-conformity are further complicated, if not created, by the struggle of every

one for individual preponderance. Economic non-conformity does not necessarily follow from this state of facts but, in actuality, it does, due to the fact that we have not yet adopted a method of keeping the economic avenues open for the struggle of the individual upon lines that will not conflict with the struggle of other individuals. This has already been explained.

Now the problems of international non-conformity are intensified in exactly the same way, i. e., by the struggle of every nation for ethnic preponderance. And the solution must be of a similar order as in the case of the individual; channels of natural expression for the struggle of every nationality must be provided but upon non-destructive lines.

This can only be accomplished through education in the law of struggle and its natural media of expression.

But before we go into this phase of the matter further, let us see to what extent war in general as well as the present war in particular is occasioned by economic causes. We are all familiar with the oft-repeated claim that Germany was compelled to wage war upon the Allies because her congested area was insufficient for her population—that she was compelled to seek additional territory and that she required more markets, etc. Assuming that this is correct, for whom did she require these things, these economic advantages? For Germany. What is Germany? An empire composed, in the main, of a confederation of tribes possessing an ethnic identity. In other words, Germany reached out to benefit itself ethnically through the seizure of certain economic advantages.

Thus, although Germany may be said to have waged war from economic motives, if we please, these motives are economic in an auxiliary sense only. Germany was seeking its maximum good, as it understood it, for itself only and not for the other nations, so that when we say, for example, that the War is being fought on economic grounds, it is a misnomer. The truth is that the War is fought on ethnic grounds, that is, each nation seeks its greatest economic, political and cultural advantages for itself—as auxiliaries for its continued ethnic preponderance. Thus, Germany is not interested in the well-being of its children in other lands unless they persist as Germans. If they prosper as newly-

constituted Englishmen or Frenchmen, Germany considers them alienated and lost which, indeed, is the fact. The same holds good with reference to the attitude of the other nations toward its emigrants. This is an unavoidable position if we believe in nationalities as distinct ethnic entities. No nation by nature committed to the principle—as all of them are—that its ethnic continuity must be maintained and promoted, will look with equanimity upon the submergence of its subjects in alien areas.

It is folly to infer from this that the continued existence of different races and nationalities is an evil which must be extirpated, as the so-called cosmopolitanist holds. Without entering into a lengthy discussion of this question, it should suffice to say that the climates of the world, if nothing else, are pledged to the perpetuation of different races of men. National forms are simply the natural expression of the life-experience of large ethnic groups. This they can no more eliminate than we can shed our skins. Can Chinamen by an act of will become Britons? Can the Eskimo become a Zulu? In the same way, one must be obtuse to imagine that the Frenchman can at will become a German or vice versa or the Jew become an Irishman. In short, the existence of different races and nationalities in the world is a fact in nature which must be accepted as axiomatic.

Racial or national differentiation is as sacred and inviolable as the individuality of persons, except more so. Development of racial groups, as of individuals, is only possible upon terms of freedom for the expression of natural differentiation. There is no other way of life. Interference with national differentiation is, therefore, a crime.

We are, therefore, committed to two axioms. One, of the basic nature of struggle; two, of the permanent and basic nature of national differentiation.

From these two axioms follow two concomitants. From the first, which includes the acceptance of struggle as a law of life, flows the concomitant that it is wrong to surrender. "Thou shalt not surrender" may be said to be a law of all life actuating the most unnoticeable creation of the universe alike with the Indian chanting his death-hymn and the nation battling until its last man falls and its women die by their

own hand. There is no transcending this law in any code of morality that has ever been formulated. The concomitant of the second axiom, i. e., of the basic nature of national differentiation, is that each nation must struggle to maintain its identity at all costs.

The question suggests itself, doubtless, how can we expect the elimination of war since it has already been conceded that struggle is inevitable in itself and also for the maintenance of national individuality? I have already said, however, that struggle is not synonymous with war. There are innumerable forms of struggle. For example, I am struggling now when I strive through this medium to impose these ideas upon the reader. We know of many struggles carried on similarly which have prevailed although the armed forces of the enemy were aligned in opposition.

Again, we have already seen that the real object of war is ethnic preponderance and also that ethnic preponderance obtained through war is deceptive, temporary and vicious even in its resultant influence upon the conquerors. Unless one nation absolutely destroys another—which is an absolutely barren act—no permanent conquest is possible through war. The Norman French set out to conquer England which, technically speaking, they did. After a few generations of French rule, however, the garrison of conquerors absolutely disappeared, swallowed up by the alien life upon which they had come to impose their will, so that their traces are hardly discernible, save to the student of genealogical trees and petrified customs. France has since received many a beating at the hands of England, and its poor Norman province with it. Swords decided nothing here. The decisive element was the elementary qualities in the genius of the people. In other words, not war, but strength of soul, the spiritual forces of people decide as to who shall prevail, if either, or whether the struggle shall be a drawn one. The idea that one nation may foist its spirit upon another merely through the resulting issue of a battle is an absurdity. Where such a thing did occur—as through the conquest of one small tribe by another—the result is traceable to the fact that there was no real ethnic difference between the conflicting races and the war was simply a crude mode of contact and amalgamation, although the adversaries

were too blinded by prejudice to appreciate the fact. Nature itself decides the justice of the case.

Take, for example, the Jewish nation. According to all rules of military philosophy they should have been swallowed up and utterly submerged in the maelstrom of opposing races among whom they persist, relatively, a handful.

Had the ethnic difference between the Jews and the rest of the world been slight or had the Jewish people been deficient in its ethnic will-power, these exiles from the east could not have survived the temptation to surrender and be at peace, under the pressure put upon them from without. It is folly to ascribe their continued persistence to the fact that they lived in Ghettos. One might say with equal truth, The Russians held out for a number of months against attack at Port Arthur because they lived in a fort! Were the Russians under compulsion to live in a fort? They might have come out and surrendered as, indeed, they ultimately did. So, too, the Jews might have come out from behind Judeangasse and Ghetto-wall, embraced the religion of their oppressors and submitted to the will of the conqueror. This privilege has always been open to them. What prevented them? Briefly, strength of soul, persistence of the national will to struggle as an ethnic entity. This they did without armaments, military organizations and the like which were an arm of defence which they had lost in the wars with Rome. The rabbis, who were then the accredited leaders of the Jewish masses and the captains of the thousands and tens of thousands, devised by every means within their power to create a kind of intellectual discipline governing every action of the daily life of the Jew, through which the solidarity and national identity of the people might be maintained in the face of the multifarious centres of attack radiating from alien environments. Sometimes these rabbinical leaders gave fanciful reasons for their injunctions, but the instinct which begot them was always the same, the conservation of the national identity. As the conception of national distinctiveness could only be instilled through this intellectual discipline, it followed that they held the ignorant Jew in abhorrence ("Split him open like a fish!" one rabbi said) because they felt that in the limited mode of struggle open to the nation, the illiterate individual had no

hold upon the national life-line and must be submerged by any chance wave from the ocean of alien environment. So, too, with the instinct of the herd for seeking out its own best interests, at times they would not re-admit a renegade, no matter how repentant nor what the impelling force that resulted in his apostasy! So, also, dissentients could not be tolerated in the state of siege in which the Jews were. In fact, quite an interesting study could be made by the biologist of the evolution of the struggle of the herd as developed in an intellectual people driven by necessity to novel methods of defence.

Now I simply cite the foregoing facts about this powerfully-struggling people by way of pointing out how profound the matter of ethnic struggle really is and how pitifully inadequate a struggle through force of arms alone is to give one race preponderance over another. The victory is simply not to be gained in that manner. Such victories are merely superficial and short-lived. Can we really entertain the idea that military legions, drilled to wield the short-sword or the rifle, can superimpose their spirit upon a matured, cultivated nation? Doubtless, they can create waste-places, they can destroy and bring degradation in their wake. But that is the limit of their capacity.

It is clear, then, that the attack of German militarism upon the normal struggle of the world is not due to economic considerations, but to the craving for racial preponderance and to the assumption that it is permissible and practicable to attain it by "blood and iron."

The whole world is rife with the onsets of different races and different mixtures of races clamoring for supremacy! Why the clamor? What do all these raucous voices hope to accomplish? Deep in the soul of every inhabitant lies the sure seed of inevitable persistence or disintegration. Time will tell whether the composition of the one or the other is such as to entitle him to a distinct existence in the ethnic state in which he arrived. If their differentiation is sufficiently great, if they have sufficient ethnic soul to justify distinctive ethnic existence, heaven and earth will see to it that their points of dissimilarity are maintained to the extent to which nature and their strength of spirit entitles them. In the meantime, they have their great reservoirs of national inspiration and culture,

their own homelands; and if, despite these sources of strengthening influence, they cannot maintain themselves in foreign areas as distinct entities, they do not deserve nor have they the right to be so maintained by force of arms. The German resort to arms in such a case is the last argument of a weakling attempting something beyond his natural capacity. It is the act of one sick with self-love enviously polluting the food he cannot eat. Nations dedicated to such an unfair method of struggle are the enemies of mankind, as well as themselves.

Most of the belligerents in this war have their own national reservoirs, they hold sovereign sway over the land which constitutes the national domicile and, save for the war into which they have been plunged, the continuity of their national life is secure. But how about those nations who are without a home of their own? Are they, too, not entitled to a reservoir of national energy, a place in the sun of life? For them the struggle to maintain their national identity in other lands is a hundred fold more difficult because they have nowhere whence to draw sustenance with which to refresh their souls in the hard and unrelenting war which the world is making upon them. Is peace on earth thinkable without justice to the small nationality? No, it is not thinkable and there will be no peace without justice to all that have been despoiled. The epoch-making character of this, as distinguished from all other wars, is that this issue has at least come into clear relief and that the Allies recognize that their own safety is bound up with the rectification of this injustice.

3. Germany in the Scale of Struggle.

Germany offers an interesting example of a people in whom the progress of sensitization has been arrested—temporarily, let us hope. Forty-odd years of class military pounding, superimposed upon a historic experience of the same general order, has hessianized finer sensibilities. It is significant that Germany has latterly declined as a factor in art, literature, music and religion. Only in science, industry and trade, that is, in the materialistic perception of sensitive existence, has it been noteworthy. Politically it has remained stunted since that abortion of 1848 which some dignify with

the name of revolution. Its socialist majorities have signified nothing. There was no more humanitarianism or religious fire back of these political showings than in the stockholders of any corporation clamoring for larger dividends. They have converted a movement, valuable as a movement of protest, into a guild! More and still more wages, better and still better working hours and conditions, pensions and insurance funds, was the polestar of their new guild. Hence when a great moral issue came to them they could only respond—like a guild! Of the insistence on that minimum of political liberty, which the peoples of England, France and the United States regard as the holy sign manual and indispensable requisite of human worth, there has been no great sign, save on the part of a heroic few.

German militarism has this in common with all small egos, with all those in the lower scale of struggle, that suppression and destruction follow in its wake instead of fructification and expansion which are incident to great strugglers. The great struggler's way upward is by enlisting the forward impulses of all that he meets in his way and persuading them to travel with him. The way of the small struggler is by trying to crush under foot all that stand in opposition. This is the brutal, limited conception of struggle upheld by the militarist. That is why the great heart of the world beats against Germany to-day and why German militarism will never attain to the world-empire it covets.

The Germans have and maintain a wonderful military organization, but it cannot stand up against the natural organization of the world and its normal interests. The only great empire-building people of the world, the British, almost always brought order out of chaos. The British are not a very logical people; but they are a sensitive people, blessed with the saving grace of intuition, which has enabled them to sense the fitness of things in almost every crisis. Their strength comes from placing things in right relation to each other and deriving their political advantages and their safety from seeking the natural position of things. Hence they are able, with a relative handful of soldiers, to control an empire so vast! German militarism, on the other hand, proposes to encompass world-empire by bringing chaos out of order—by trying to

stand nations and peoples on their heads in the interests of Germany. It is not a conception born to success.

The Germans, unlike the British, are an extremely logical people. In fact, they have carried their logical propensity so far that they have rationalized the human element out of existence and become quite positive and conceited about it. The fact is, however, as I have tried to explain elsewhere, we are not at all rational but poor, intuitive creatures to whom an iota of intuition is more decisive than a ton of rationalism. The German attachment to the syllogism has led them to misread the heart of the world and their place in the scheme of things. For example, all the junker-philosophers in Germany have been preaching for generations that the State is non-moral and is not amenable to the laws of morality in its relations to other states. This they deduced from the fact that there were no enforceable standards (of struggle) among nations as there are among individuals. It is a fact that there are no enforceable standards among nations, but there are human standards. But it has remained for Germany, with sledge hammer logic, to deduce that, because the standards of humanity could not be enforced in international relations, therefore, they did not exist and to act accordingly.

It is right and proper for a state that is both logical and non-moral to commandeer the intellect of the nation, to enforce the cult of junkerism thru the state-paid professoren. The junkers, as mainstays of a non-moral State, are not amenable to the ordinary rules of morality either in relation to the civilian in Germany or to the civilian in an enemy country or to the enemy in arms. Naturally, this state of non-morality in the professorial and junker class has its repercussions in other lower and wider quarters in Germany. The Germans, let it be remembered, are very patriotic; and the object of their patriotism is non-moral. Is it difficult, then, to image the relation between the German mind and the German act as revealed in the great drama of the war?

But all the manifestations of the logicalness of the German mind have yet to reveal themselves. It will lead them on to every resort and expedient with a terrible thoroughness, until all the blood, all the resources, all the last ounce of

strength shall have been used up. The millions of captives in Germany, so resourcefully employed in order to release more men to the firing lines, are useful enough as far as German logic can see. Actually, however, they are only serving to make the destruction of the German man-power more complete. But Germany cannot escape the uncanny power of the demands created by its own reasoning. It must go on to the end.

Of course, the non-morality of the German State is really immoral; but it does not avail us to call it names. It is a different order of morality than we profess and only relatively immoral. Actually, it is a kind of morality, inferior in the scale of struggle, it is true, and founded upon the assumption that

- (a) The duty of every German is to Germany only;
- (b) That every other state is a legitimate object of prey;
- (c) That all recognized standards can properly be suspended where there is any kind of conflict of interests between Germany and other states;
- (d) That the physical, moral, cultural and economic ascendancy of one state over another can best be gained and maintained by military conquest.

It is a fact that it is not Germany alone who always harbored such conceptions. But it has remained for Germany, in our days, to consciously and unflinchingly adopt a state-morality which set the standards of individual morality at naught, practically saying, "Evil, be thou my good!"

In dealing with Germany, therefore, it is of the utmost importance to realize that we are dealing here with a peculiar state-morality; and that whether this Germany speaks fair words or foul it is still speaking from the defenses dictated by its political Code. I take it for granted that it is because the Allied statesmen intuitively feel this to be the case, that they decline to enter into *pourparlers* with Germany before receiving unmistakable evidence that something has happened in Germany indicating that its dangerous state-morality has been supplanted. So far, the only human accents that have proceeded from Germany have been uttered by a very heroic few, barely discernible in the dominant note of militarism.

There are some who profess a certain admiration for the fight Germany is making. Certainly, there are elements of fascination in almost any form of struggle. But, tho we cannot but concede the enormous capacity of Germany in this respect, it must not be forgotten that this War was begun by Germany, not as a struggle in the heroic meaning of the word, but as an act of aggression, an abuse of power. It was a crime conceived in the night, to make a sudden and overwhelming onslaught upon the unsuspecting world. Why did Germany go to war? Nobody pressed it—it suffered from no external abuse—none invaded its prerogatives. It is not in the spirit of divine struggle but sheer ponderous brutality when a first-class power goes marauding among weaker neighbors of supposedly lesser resisting force. Struggle—that is, struggle for both opponents—presupposes a certain equality in opposing forces. This fundamental element of struggle is so strongly ingrained in us that we can seldom sympathize with an antagonist who is manifestly too powerful for his opponent. The War is a struggle in relation to the Allies and was so at the start. In relation to Germany, it was conceived as a windfall and began to assume the proportions of a struggle later.

It can hardly be denied that the Germans have proven themselves very proficient in the business of war. This is due, primarily to the fact that their state-morality has induced a state of mind which leaves the field clear for whatever action is deemed necessary to accomplish the end in view and this without any great resolves or halting judgments. Secondly, the comparative lack of sensitiveness and individuality in the masses, admits of easy handling of large, docile groups in long preparation for war as part of their daily existence. Thus, Germany was not only prepared in the technique of war. It was mentally prepared. The difficulties of the civilian are not his fear of the actual field of battle so much as his aversion to donning the soldier's straight-jacket. It is his dread of this change of life which is the most difficult to overcome. For Germany to proceed to war was only to carry the day's business one step further. With the United States and Great Britain, it was an embarkation into a new and strange world. That they have done it is one of the miracles of truly great

struggle and should forever discredit the claim of the professional militarist to supremacy in the scale of struggle.

From the standpoint of Struggle, it would be a world-calamity, greater by far than the War itself, for the Central Powers to win. A drawn result would even be worse because the whole world would have to remain in arms indefinitely and the military caste system of Germany would be fastened—like an iron collar—upon the neck of humanity. Brute force would again become the apparent measure of success in struggle and international distrust a permanent article of faith. Democracy would be banished as belonging to a different order of struggle.

To break the dead-lock and restore the normal order of struggle between nations, one of two things must occur. Either the Allies must break the military resistance offered by the enemy and coincidentally usher in a revolution which will discredit and destroy the state-morality which is at the root of this onslaught upon the world, or this revolution must take place among the Central Powers without such a victory by the Allies. Certainly, an Allied victory unaccompanied by revolution would be a sterile attainment. For the object of the Allied effort, as I conceive it, is not merely a formal military triumph, but to drive home to the masses of the Central Powers such a degree of sensitiveness as will make them conscious of the enormity and futility of the mode of struggle they have permitted themselves to adopt in relation to the rest of mankind.

But far more important and fundamental than any military decision, is the correct understanding by all the nations of the law of struggle and the resultant conclusion that ethnic preponderance is not attainable by military conquests; that no nation is entitled to ethnic preponderance, just as no person is entitled to individual preponderance, save only and to the extent only to which we unconsciously influence others by what we are, by the natural revelation of the sensitiveness that is in us in fulfilling our measures of pain. Doubtless, this cannot be fully conveyed by the telling alone, it must be conveyed in the draughts of pain we are imbibing, and the War is one of the avenues by which this knowledge will come to us.

To those to whom life is an expression of the so-called will-to-live this War will doubtless come as an indictment of God, since he is setting his own law at naught. But this War ought to revise our conception of the aim of existence. To those to whom the Law of Struggle and the Will to Struggle are the basis of life, this War, like all phenomena, is one more evidence of the insignificance of all other forms of motivity. The terror and the glory of war is that it is one of the most lurid phenomena disclosing, as through a flash of lightning, how all the important things of life fall away from us beside the awful Law of Struggle. For once, if at no other time, we are able to see ourselves elementally, and the Law by which we live. War, it is true, is a cruder level of struggle than we have developed for ourselves. It is not only cruder but is a feebler manifestation of the possibilities of struggle that is within us. On this account, it involves all the greater exertion, not on the part of the professional soldier, but on the part of those that have war thrust upon them. For the latter, war often offers, not an extension of the possibilities of struggle, but demands rather a contraction of individual struggle in line with the requirements of mass effort. It is in this sense that war, although representing struggle on a lower scale, demands the supreme effort of the individual.

Cruel, implacable, heart-rending and wasteful as this War is, it cannot be said that it constitutes an indictment against God any more than any other war that ever took place can be so regarded. War certainly belies the God of the will-to-live but not the God of the Will-to-Struggle. The evidence of the ages is that we have emerged from war, that our sensitiveness has been quickened by it, that succeeding wars have tended to increase the standards of struggle, that the monstrosities of savagery have given way or, rather, flowered into chivalries which, in turn, have developed into the amenities of struggle which constitute our normal life to-day. The fact that Germany has suffered a relapse, simply evidences that in her the processes of sensitization have not yet reached the stage of development that had been claimed for her.

If, as a result of this awful bloodshed and universal suffering, this generation is able to pass on to succeeding generations a more sensitive world, one in which the invasion of

another's right will be regarded as a horror pregnant with calamity, in which every people will cease to be the prey of another and in which the whole direction of human struggle will tend toward mutually helpful channels, will this War have been fought in vain?

4. Bolshevism in the Scale of Struggle.

The movement in Russia that goes under the name of Bolshevism can be viewed under several different aspects, each suggesting a contributing cause. As a purely Russian movement, Bolshevism is a reflex of Russian self-indulgence from the tyranny of Czarism; it is compounded also of war-weariness, abetted, financed and accelerated by Germany because of its disintegrating influence upon the unity and military effectiveness of the Russian people.

But Bolshevism is also an intellectual movement. It is a logical culmination of socialist doctrine; and it is from this aspect that Bolshevism bears a sinister, universal meaning to the world.

There are socialists, to be sure, who repudiate Bolshevism. And yet Bolshevism, apart from certain natively Russian earmarks which characterize it, follows naturally from the socialist premise. This is why there are such unmistakable symptoms of it in all countries in which socialism has obtained a foot-hold. It is only in Germany that Bolshevism has made the least headway, and this is due to the fact that German socialism, despite the universalist aims of its early de-nationalized Jewish projectors, has remained nothing but a German guild. Hence, German socialists, intensely ethnic as they are, in rejecting Bolshevism, have remained thoroughly consistent as Germans.

When I say that Bolshevism follows naturally from the socialist premise, we must bethink ourselves of the natural implications of that premise. For the socialist, consciously or unconsciously, has abolished all national distinctions, and with the abolishment of national distinctions, the socialist has discarded all national values. Hence, from the socialist viewpoint, in so far as the Great War is due, not to economic

causes but to racial aspirations, it is a war carried on for values that have no existence.

Thus, from the standpoint of Bolshevism, there are no issues, apart from the economic issue, around which the Russian workman or peasant need rally; the Belgian proletariat were foolish to defend Belgium against invasion by Germany because they owned nothing in Belgium and hence had nothing to defend; that it did not concern the French who governed Alsace-Lorraine, as long as the people of those provinces were economically unaffected either way; that English Trade Unionism was far more important than the political fate of France or Great Britain, etc., etc.

Bolshevism is socialism reduced *ad absurdum*. It is devoid of patriotism because patriotism is not consistent with the economic motivity assumed to be actuating all relations. It recognizes no ties of honor with the allies of Russia, because honor itself is an anomaly in the economic purview of things. It sees no moral distinctions between the aspirations of the belligerents because all the belligerents have been remiss in failing to force an economic straight-jacket of unvarying dimensions upon their subjects. It has no sympathy with the nationalist aspirations of subject or despoiled peoples, no matter how tragic the case, because the only common human bond it recognizes is the economic bond.

Thus, the Bolsheviks, abandoning that national appeal thru which even the poor, ignorant *mujik* was able to feel himself identified with the seat of government, such as it was, left the peasant with nothing but an economic hunger. Naturally, the result is chaos. For the substitution of the economic motive in place of nationalism is an invitation to the lowest form of individual struggle. In the scale of struggle, the economic appeal is an assumption that the human being is contained between his hat and his shoes; that he has no wider interests and is invulnerable to any other form of sensitiveness or responsibility save the gratification of his economic appetites.

The Russian proletariat, unleashed with the injunction to fill their stomachs and their pockets as the sacred concomitant of the sacred will to live, must pursue the cycle of depredation and destruction to the end. Human nature, which

must express the law of struggle under all conditions, will not be changed one jot; but the rich peasant must be rendered poor and the poor, rich; the great must be rendered small and vice versa; no stone must be left unturned. Then, when the round of destruction is complete unto nausea, and the rabble—or some of them—attain something worth guarding, the uses of some of the things destroyed will occur to them; and the people will proceed to re-build, stone by stone, what was destroyed, with a measure of improvement here and there such as will be suggested by the increased sensitiveness gained in the turmoil; and national self-respect will re-assert itself again.

For national groups cannot subsist as such without national self-respect, any more than the individual can subsist without self-respect which is another word for faith in the capacity to struggle further. Remove the basis for national self-respect, either thru conquest, surfeiture or cosmopolitanism, and you may have left a few individuals who are world-conscious, but the mass of the people become narrowly self-seeking, lose their unity of interest and pride, and the current thought becomes, "Every man for himself!"

In theory, the cosmopolitanist, Ajax-like, carries the whole world upon his shoulders. In practice, having no definable mass-obligation, he becomes a bohemian and carries nothing but himself. It was this state of feeling at the close of the French Revolution, resulting in general insecurity and national purposelessness, that culminated in Napoleon; it is this state of feeling that must undermine Bolshevism as well, insofar as the rule of the latter will not be prolonged thru German machinations.

It becomes apparent, then, that socialism, despite its apparent coherence and its call to economic organization, is an anarchic element in times of national crisis; that at such times it spells disintegration and confusion of all issues and relationships, and is as great a peril upon the horizon of the world as that militarism it aims to counteract. The socialist may or may not have a quiverful of remedies applicable to our state of economic non-conformity; but as long as he fails to grasp the individuality resident in national groups and the sacredness of that individuality, or to realize that national

self-respect must struggle to express itself nationally, he is in the position of the physician who administers ingenious toxins but forgets the important tho homely element of food, so that his patient must needs die. This aspect of socialism has best been exemplified by the Bolsheviki, as well as by their confreres in France, England, Italy, and elsewhere, to a lesser degree.

5. War As a Requisite of Trade.

The claim that this or any other considerable war was waged as a requirement of trade is untrue. If war had to wait upon the decision of industrial or commercial magnates or organizations there would never be any war. The requirements of trade do not permit of the interruptions and vicissitudes of war, and capital is far too timid and too exacting to embark upon such undertakings for sustenance and increase. Of course, once the state of war is in being, those enterprises that survive the changed condition of affairs try to accommodate themselves to the new order of things and even to make the most of them. Military conquest does not of itself insure the permanent trend of markets. The conquest of markets, like the ascendancy of religions and cultures, is too subtle a task to be within reach of the military arm. Witness how the trade of Germany succeeded in circumnavigating the globe and reach out into the possessions and home markets of all the nations!—a peace-achievement which the War will do nothing to enhance!

It cannot be gainsayed, however, that there is an element of great danger in the non-cooperative rivalry of the nations as they strain for exclusive markets. While it is true that the requirements of international trade do not commit the world to resort to arms, it may be a contributing influence psychologically. But it is not trade which resorts to militarism, but militarism which regards trade, like everything else, as the subject of prey. Nowadays our military wiseacres look at the map with a commercial slant and would convert the competition of commerce in terms of militarism. Actually, there is no more excuse for this than for a debating society to resort to fisticuffs. Debating and fisticuffs are both degrees of strug-

gle, to be sure. All life is made up of gradations in struggle. The whole problem is to prevent the declension of higher to lower forms of struggle which is the difference between ethical and unethical observance, between morality and immorality, between industry and theft, between war and peace. The temptation to convert trade enterprise into military aggressions is particularly strong where the field of operations happens to lie in the territory of a weak, conquered or otherwise helpless people. As this situation creates a field free from recognized standards, with the advantage to the strongest, it is here that our junkers and super-thugs begin to smell powder and snort fire. This, of course, is another way of saying that peoples and territories regarded as subject of prey by stronger powers are a menace to the peace of the world.

Apart from this, there exists a natural but unnecessary tug-o'-war in the trade relations of all countries. One nation will spur on the growth of an industry that is being carried on better by its neighbor, and covers up its incapacity by a high tariff. Others, like Germany, will sell some of its products at a loss, in South America, say, simply to keep competitors out of the field and retain control for the sale of more profitable items. Every nation strains to get solid ground under its feet by obtaining exclusive markets or special concessions. Why should the unsuccessful nation be loaded up with unsalable merchandise and its factories cease to operate? Why should it make too much profit on one item and suffer a loss on another? Why should the United States and the nations of Europe look with so much dread upon the enterprise of Japan and the low-priced labor of the Far East? Why should Japan look upon the commerce of Europe and America as so much prey? In short, why foster unnatural competition, over-production and the unnecessary cheapening of products which have an economic value for the world?

Why, indeed, but because of the instability of economic values, due to the lack of domestic and international standardization? But, the value of commodities can be gradually standardized, economic risk and excessive production eliminated and the direction and quantity of exports adjusted. The era of state-controlled monopolies, operating in the fields

of transportation, domestic production and distribution, and in foreign buying and selling, would do away with the last vestige of an excuse for war, always provided it be understood that no land becomes subject to forcible annexation by alien powers.

The problems of world-trade cannot be solved by armies and navies. They can only be solved by the world's best hearts and minds acting co-operatively, with a view to giving to every nation its quid pro quo, even to the last match or grain of wheat, in an absolute adjustment between its natural productions, wants and the requirements of the rest of the world. Values, after all, are artificial creations. Why not adjust values so that they will tend to supply instead of deny the needs of human beings? The economic problems of one nation are the economic problems of all. The world is indeed sick. But when a human being becomes ill do we call in the aid of the executioner? Can the world as a whole do with less of the tender care and the solicitude which we bestow upon an individual?

CHAPTER VII.

STRUGGLE AS A RELIGION

1. The Mystery of Pain.

WE HAVE seen how the presence of pain in the universal composition compels to struggle; how common need compels to struggle; and how, in the absence of common need, pain asserts itself in a new guise and compels to struggle; how morality is developed from struggle; how law compels to a maintenance of the common standard of struggle attained; how the arts represent pain and struggle in equilibrium; how the march of civilization, through all blood-lettings and vicissitudes, tends to the survival of the most sensitive and the creation of higher standards of struggle.

We now come to the consideration of the place of religion in struggle.

The prophets who, by consensus of opinion, were intensely religious, viewed God as imbued with loving kindness and, at the same time, as the Lord of Battles. They saw no inconsistency in the existence of both these attributes in God. On the contrary, they even said, "Whom the Lord loveth he chastiseth," and "A God of Battles is the Lord," and "From the right hand of the Lord runs a law of fire." It has remained for our time to soften the conception of God and to imagine him, not in accordance with a cosmic conception of things, but as a panderer to our momentary wishes.

Religion is recognized as the highest attainment of human growth, and rightly so. It represents the carrying of struggle into domains that are beyond the limits of time, space, and the pressure of immediate relationships. It is therefore an extension of the battle-line beyond the out-posts of local conflicts.

In the last analysis, religion flows from the wish to account for pain upon terms that are consonant with immediate or ultimate human welfare. Thus, it will be seen that religion, too, is struggle from pain. It is a more subtle, more ambitious, more powerful struggle than any in the whole gamut of struggle. It is the lone Jacob wrestling with the

angel of eternity. All religions are attempts to account for universal pain.

The first step in the formulation of a creed is to attempt to trace the cause of pain which, with most peoples, is synonymous with evil. Having found the cause of pain or evil, the second step is to study how to placate it as (a) the Carthagenians and others did, by offering excruciating sacrifices and immolations; (b) by attempting to root out pain altogether through the castration of the appetites or sensibilities to pain, as do certain Hindu sects; (c) by studying how to live in harmony with it through continual trials or experiences with it, as the Hebrews did. These three are the most inclusive methods of accounting for pain.

The first step in tracing the causes of pain or evil having been taken, and the second process of placating the deity having also been evolved, the third process follows, which consists in a significant, comparatively rigid ceremonial, liturgy, and certain sacred laws compelling a course of action in keeping with the particular conception of the requirements of the deity; also, a priesthood permanently charged with the task of seeing to the observance of the ceremonies, liturgy and sacred laws on the part of the people.

The priest-institution, although a very useful one, has often caused great trouble in the world because of the fact that it rapidly became vested, and its task unaltering in its nature and form, whereas the people at large underwent all the modifications natural to growth or experience in pain. Thus it happened, that while the religious conception of the Hebrews at one time had undergone such a development that the institution of sacrifices and burnt offerings was really no longer in harmony with the times, the priesthood still clung to them, although some of the priests, as happens everywhere under like conditions, endeavored to invest the old ceremonies with a new significance in keeping with the spirit of the times. This problem still persists in all religions.

But the question which presents itself at this stage of our analysis is, since it is claimed that all religions are attempts to account for pain, why is it that some religions are based upon the conception of many divinities, others upon two, and others, again, upon only one? This question goes to the root

of the whole matter. It also affects our understanding of what peoples are deeply religious and which are not.

A religion may center upon many divinities or upon one, depending upon the scope and intensity of the national experience of the people professing the religion in question. Thus, a barbarian of limited national experience and corresponding deficiency in intellect, will have a proportionately superficial view of divinities. Every force in nature will be apparent as a separate, unrelated devil or god. The fire will be one god, the water another, the sun another, the moon another, etc., etc. Another barbarian, more sensitive to certain interrelations between these various phenomena, will evolve a family or pantheon of gods or devils with individually defined and coherent functions, as exemplified by the panthea of the Egyptians and the Greeks. In the process of time, perhaps, these beliefs will be superseded by convictions that the authorship of all phenomena is ascribable to one of the gods only, such as the sun-god, which was the belief that was gaining ground in Egypt when the Hebrews and the Hittites had the ascendancy in that country. The early Canaanites, who were conquered by the Hebrews, seem to have had a highly unified conception of a god, despite their ritual which was quite logical even though harrowing in its apparent immorality from the point of view of the Hebrews. Their conception of divinity was still considerably more unified and profound than that of the early Greeks with their more or less haphazard pantheon. It seems well established that they worshipped Baal and Ashtoreth (or Astarte) as the male and female principle governing all forms of life. Judged by their religion, they had a more intense experience of life than the Greeks and Romans.

In the early history of the barbarous races of western Europe, the conception of god-head was most diffuse. Their conception of deity began to attain unity only when they became pain-conscious in the larger sense. It is thus apparent, that notwithstanding the glitter and pomp of wars, conquests and the trappings of culture, the true measure of the wealth of experience absorbed by a nation, is its ability to unify its conception of all phenomena and all relations; and, indeed, as even the Greeks and Romans became older and more

sensitive to their experiences, their conception of the deity began to intensify until finally they amalgamated with that Hebrew movement in the world which is called Christianity.

The people who brought unity of conception into the world in the most startling relief were the Hebrews. This unity of conception sprang from a sublime intuition formed of the very heat and shock of their conflict with the hard facts of life. Intuitively, through all the maze of their experiences, to which they were highly sensitive, they saw God the same in innumerable phases. They did not blink at pain. They recognized it as divine; that pain must come with knowledge; that out of the right hand of the Lord runs a law of fire; that out of many purgings by trials something better and holier may come; that the Lord loves a man acquainted with many sorrows; that the punisher and the punished are instruments in the hands of God; that God may be in the cloud and the sun, the grass and the trees, the land, the water, the thunder and the still small voice; that God ordained that the fruit of evil must be evil; that every generation is responsible to God for what it passes on to the next generation; that a nation may not live half free and half slave; that the acts of daily life are in relation to all other acts, and therefore necessarily holy; that the laws of a nation are the laws by which it shall live and not die; that God is universal and means well by all that follow in his ways; that to follow the statutes of God is the way of health for a nation as for an individual; and that the ways of sin are death or destruction.

Thus the Hebrews presented to the world a conception that was all-inclusive, unified and signalized that the race stood upon the apex of the world's civilization. For what is civilization in a people but its degree of sensitiveness to pain? In this sense—and it is the only proper sense—the Romans, for example, were not civilized at all, in fact less so than some of the tribes they subdued.

Thus, as I have said, all religions are attempts to account for pain; and the lower we go in the scale of sensitiveness, the more unorganized, incomplete and casual is the conception of god-head. The greater the experience of pain and struggle, the more monotheistic and universal this conception will be.

2. The Religion of Suicide.

The Hindus say, "In the beginning there was desire." This is not a true saying, because before there can be desire there must be a condition begetting desire. That condition is Pain. Pain begets not only desire but struggle. In a certain sense Struggle is Pain become conscious of itself. Desire and Struggle may or may not be, but pain always is in varying degrees; and it was in the beginning.

Now the Hindus call desire evil and believe that desire can and should be eliminated because all evils flow from it. The fact is, however, that desire flows from pain, and unless we root out pain, which is an impossibility, desires are inevitable. Desires are, of course, subject to discipline but their total suppression, as attempted by the Hindu cult, is a subtle but futile attempt at suicide in life. It is an avoidance of life which springs from a too mellifluous conception of the aim of the universe—nirvana or unfeeling, i. e., no pain or happiness.

When the Hindu seers said, "In the beginning there was desire," they came very close to an understanding of the subject. For, after all, desire is the subjective name of pain. In a sense, pain is desire. But instead of perceiving that pain is of the stuff of life and choosing to express this desire in struggle, they elected to root desire out of the scheme of things. They thus saw pain in wrong relation to the other realities of life and their fumbling quest to find themselves in the maze of their own creation was bound to end in mystic vapours.

In brief, Pain is not something accidental or adventitious, but of the very stuff of life. There is no release from it save through expression in ever-widening areas of struggle. Religion, far from being a medium of evasion of struggle, is an extension of it through and beyond the borders of life.

3. Peace in Struggle.

It may perhaps be imagined that it follows from the acceptance of pain and struggle as the basis of life that peace must be considered forever banished from our conception of things. This by no means follows, however.

We have seen that pleasure is nothing but the fulfillment of some pain in some struggle; that beauty, whether in art or in nature, is an impression made upon us by the equipoise or proportion of pain-suggestions and their elements of fulfillment. It is apparent then that neither pleasure nor beauty are foreign to nor irreconcilable with pain and struggle but, that on the contrary, they flow from the nature of pain and struggle and cannot be conceived or postulated except as we know pain and struggle. Now the nature of peace in relation to Pain-Struggle is not materially different. Peace is a bigger, more inclusive word than pleasure and means fulfillment. He alone knows peace who can and does turn longing into doing. The word peace is a more inclusive word than pleasure because it does not refer to isolated instances of fulfillment but to the whole gamut of human desires. On the other hand, peace is the complement of beauty in that it implies an equipoise of pain and struggle or fulfillment in human relations, just as beauty implies the same thing in art or nature.

Obviously, then, the yearning for peace, instead of being inconsistent with the acceptance of Pain-Struggle as the law of life, flows legitimately from it and it is not surprising that the most suffering of peoples should have made peace its mission. The longing for peace is a quest for the adjustment of life to the law of struggle. It is an adjustment which must be a continual adjustment. One must "walk with God."

The Hindus, it is true, believe that peace can and should be obtained permanently once and for all time. But here is where Pain-Struggle and the peace-idea part company. We cannot know peace unless we know pain. There is no short cut to peace. Peace can only be had through struggle and through faith in the efficacy of struggle.

4. Death and Immortality.

In the terminology of humanity, death is a result following upon the failure or inability to translate pain into struggle in terms of the flesh.

Humanity asks, Is death the last of the individual!

If the word "individual" implies as we were wont to see the one who is dead, the answer is, as far as we are capable

of knowing, Yes, that is the last of the individual; he is now but a memory.

Humanity asks again, however, To what end, then, did he strive? Why did he live at all? Why struggle to live if we do not live but die?

But whence did the world get the belief that we struggle in order to live? There is no true foundation for this belief. The contrary is true. We live in order to struggle. It may indeed happen and does happen that the bare keeping of body and soul together taxes almost all our energies, just as, when one stubs his toe, his entire consciousness is centered upon the injured member or when there is no oxygen in a room, our whole aim centers on supplying the lack. Yet our aim in life is not to keep the toe sound nor our body sound. It is doubtful indeed if there ever was a human being who made it his life-aim to preserve his life.

Humanity argues, however, Well, have it as you say. The departed one did not struggle in order to live, but, as you say, lived in order to struggle. But now that he is dead, is this not the end of his struggle as well as of his life?

The answer is that his struggle is not necessarily cut off any more than any other form of energy once set in motion, is cut off. Struggle is not limited by death. It may reverberate through the ages, long after "life" has ceased; for all we know to the contrary, eternally through the avenues of time, sometimes visibly, sometimes invisibly. Consider the life of any great man, trace his struggles beyond the borders of his "life" into the life of succeeding generations. (Or consider the life of a great people, totally annihilated every few generations or so, nevertheless transmitting its struggle to succeeding generations.) We must consider this phenomenon, not as a poet's vagary, but as a fact with which we must reckon if we wish to realize something of our place in the scheme of things. Life between the borders of birth and death is but a minute in struggle.

What determines the extent of the reverberations in struggle after the period of life? Is there an equality of immortality in struggle? It would seem that the immortality given to each is in proportion to the energy of sensitiveness or pain and struggle which the individual experienced in his life. The

prematurely demised infant has the modicum of discernible immortality that is proportionate to its short span of sensitiveness and struggle, and the adult who has passed beyond has a corresponding proportion of discernible immortality. I say discernible to distinguish between the immortality that is perceptible to immediate survivors and the immortality which must be taken for granted as a fact in nature even tho we cannot follow it with our limited vision, just as we cannot follow the influences of other progressions of various forms of energy whose motion is, nevertheless, not cut off.

I do not pretend that this is the kind of immortality which the heart of man craves. Granted. Put me down as one of those who finds it very, very hard to find consolation in such immortality on the part of departed ones dear to me. But this does not prove that this is not immortality. Our natures are simply too finite to appreciate it as we should. Big distances in time and space are not easily surmountable by us at present. Even the most tender-hearted are often unaffected by tragedies occurring in neighboring villages or even streets. Infinity we do not grasp at all. It is therefore exceedingly difficult to follow the immortal flights of the earth-born when we are deprived of the intimate lineaments which characterized them. Nevertheless their true life, which was in struggle, was not arrested but continues. If they did not live long enough or intensively enough, to generate any great struggle capable of surviving them, neither could they have suffered out of proportion. Either way we look at the matter, the basic justice inherent in the law of struggle is unescapable.

If, however, we are committed to the principle that the "dead" struggled in order to live, the conclusion cannot well be avoided that their life was a delusion, a tragic effort capped by failure and emptiness. Viewed from the opposite standpoint, however, that the "dead" lived in order to struggle, their life becomes full of meaning nobly justified in itself—they certainly struggled—and replete with significance for the future; and there is a future for the dead, because struggle is not interrupted by death.

The most common recognition of immortality through struggle is exemplified in the sacrifices which men shower

upon the altar of struggle in war-time. Immortalization thru heroism entailing death is then more easily sensed because the whole nation stands revealed as flowing progressively in the same direction; and a nation cannot commonly be extinguished even though it is feared that the individual might be. The individual joins his struggle to that of the nation and trusts that this union of struggle will survive even if he does not. At such a time, faith in struggle attains almost to the height of a conscious creed.

Most difficult, however, is to maintain faith in the immortality of individual struggle, in times of so-called peace, when the world is unorganized and the struggler is alone in his endeavor, and the fire of his torch sinks and sputters in the dark alleys of the immense world, and every stray wind threatens to blow out the feeble light and leave him in the darkness unregarded.

After all is said, I shall perhaps be told, What you say about the immortality of struggle is not very clear. Do you or do you not believe in the immortality of the soul? I should have to admit that, far from knowing anything about the immortality of the soul, I do not even know what the soul is. As far as I am aware, there is no soul. There is less struggle—corresponding to matter—and there is greater struggle—corresponding to what is called spirit. I believe that, when one dies, that part of the individual which is matter or less struggle becomes associated with kindred matter or struggle, in the cosmic fitness of things; and that that part of the individual which is spirit or greater struggle pursues the avenues of spirit or greater struggle; and that if we could distend our perceptions to embrace this kind of after-life in the individual, we would not and could not seek anything else in the realm of immortality.

I hear the question asked, But what becomes of the individual? Or is there no immortality of the individual?

After all, what is the individual? In a broad sense, individuality is simply another word for limitation. Here and there the unit of sensitiveness which we call self shows certain peculiarities, whimsies, inequalities which mark the border-line between the finite and the infinite. Thus, the individuality of a child keeps changing and enlarging in many

respects so that for the most part the adult shows an entirely different individuality than the infant. We do not recognize it as a different individuality because we can trace the development and recognize some fixed traits which have not undergone much of a distension. Nevertheless, the individuality has changed. Now if we can imagine this change or distension to go on indefinitely, would not the original ear-marks of the early individual entity disappear altogether? The things that move an individual once may move him no more. On the other hand, his sympathies, for example, may embrace a much wider area and may extend indefinitely to include many cities, countries, climates, the world, then, include the world of the infinite future, so that the present would seem of small moment. This complete extension of the individual with infinite realities would create the very condition we so dread in death—the passing of the individual into the form of infinite struggle, or as it could best be put, extension in God.

This extension I would by no means call nirvana because the latter is meant to apply to a consummation of the state of negation or atrophy of the fundamental appetities. Extension in God comes, however, from a fullness of experience in the fundamental appetities and their extension into other domains than what we call the flesh.

5. Ideas of God.

I think of God as in pain and eternally fulfilling himself in struggle. (Man is made in his image and it is this image in which he is made.) This is what I understand by perfection—pain reacting in struggle. And it is in this wise that I understand God to be perfect.

I do not think of perfection as being satisfaction. It is the wish for satisfaction that partakes of perfection. Permanent satisfaction is abhorrent to the whole idea of Pain-and-Struggle.

A dissatisfied, punishing, vengeful or suffering God is therefore perfectly logical and clear to me. What other way of the universe is there or can there be? For permanent satisfaction means death.

If we understand by love a state of yearning, then God is also love.

They have a true glimpse of God that perceive him in the state of suffering, but not when they imagine his yearning to be temporary and vicarial only.

The pain of God and his re-actions in struggle, are expressed in varying degrees in the clod, the tree, the plant, fire, water, the electric current, the beast and man, our speculations and yearnings, eternally and universally.

6. Who Is Sensitive?

Many a man has gone through battles, storms, sufferings and deaths, travelled through many lands, mingled with many peoples, met the world's elect, met with adventures that should have been unforgetably beautiful or harrowing, and yet emerged from all this practically as callous, unimpressed and unimpressive as when he began.

On the other hand, a slatternly little woman dwelling all her life in a little village or in an obscure corner of a city and seldom straying far from the corner grocery, may have more of the world's great vistas locked in her bosom, the knowledge of pain and sensitiveness to beautiful relations and noble characters, may have actually seen and experienced more than the far-travelled adventurer ever dreamt.

I have read the essays of some writers purporting to deal only with the life of turnips and potatoes, but as I read, I could see that although the author only affected to deal with vegetables—with turnips and potatoes, the subject was replete with the profound problems of life, death, struggle and fate. On the other hand, I have seen melodramas and read out-pourings purporting to be about life, death, pain, struggle and fate, and nevertheless, amid all these mouthings, could only discern turnips and potatoes.

There is an Empire which has won a preponderating position among the nations of the world by virtue of the magnitude of its industrial achievement, its zeal and fidelity to the study of the phenomena of science and its commercial enterprise, but is so unsensitive at heart that its people have not yet been moved to attain self-government, that despite its employment of the most comprehensive spy-system in the world, it cannot surmise the most patent characteristics of its neigh-

